absence of any claim in Ohio

2020Nuspl v. Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511, 516 , 575 N.E.2d 447 (1991).

2020Nuspl v. Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511, 516 , 575 N.E.2d 447 (1991).

2014See Dailey, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1968 at *10-13 (despite improper jury charge effectively relieving the state of its burden of proving an element of aggravated burglary, error was harmless where the record demonstrated that the element was actually decided by the jury; “a mandatory jury directive resulting in constitutional error * * * [does] not necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions if the reviewing court can confidently determine from the entire record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d

2014See Dailey, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1968 at *10-13 (despite improper jury charge effectively relieving the state of its burden of proving an element of aggravated burglary, error was harmless where the record demonstrated that the element was actually decided by the jury; “a mandatory jury directive resulting in constitutional error * * * [does] not necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions if the reviewing court can confidently determine from the entire record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d

2014See Dailey, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1968 at *10-13 (despite improper jury charge effectively relieving the state of its burden of proving an element of aggravated burglary, error was harmless where the record demonstrated that the element was actually decided by the jury; “a mandatory jury directive resulting in constitutional error * * * [does] not necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions if the reviewing court can confidently determine from the entire record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d

2014See Dailey, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1968 at *10-13 (despite improper jury charge effectively relieving the state of its burden of proving an element of aggravated burglary, error was harmless where the record demonstrated that the element was actually decided by the jury; “a mandatory jury directive resulting in constitutional error * * * [does] not necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions if the reviewing court can confidently determine from the entire record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d

2014Therefore, the decision of the Ohio Department of Education was not based upon a “preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence.” Id.

2005State v. Borders, Clermont App. No. CA2004-12-101, 2005-Ohio-4339, ¶ 15-16 ; State v. Collier, Butler App. No. CA2003-11-282, 2005-Ohio-944, ¶ 41 ; State v. Mason, Butler App. No. CA2004-06-164, 2005-Ohio-2918, ¶ 81 .

2005State v. Borders, Clermont App. No. CA2004-12-101, 2005-Ohio-4339, ¶ 15-16 ; State v. Collier, Butler App. No. CA2003-11-282, 2005-Ohio-944, ¶ 41 ; State v. Mason, Butler App. No. CA2004-06-164, 2005-Ohio-2918, ¶ 81 .

2005This definition is consistent with our reading of the disputed clause in its totality.” Allied Moulded Prod., Inc. v. Keegan (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 424, 428 , 611 N.E.2d 377 . {¶ 23} Recognizing that under common law the word “damages” is inexplicably tied to the concept of a tortfeasor who, by operation of law, becomes liable to an injured party, it follows that the absence of any claim for “damages” against the Ranch before 2002 should have significance in arriving at a proper understanding of the exclusionary language.

2005This definition is consistent with our reading of the disputed clause in its totality.” Allied Moulded Prod., Inc. v. Keegan (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 424, 428 , 611 N.E.2d 377 . {¶ 23} Recognizing that under common law the word “damages” is inexplicably tied to the concept of a tortfeasor who, by operation of law, becomes liable to an injured party, it follows that the absence of any claim for “damages” against the Ranch before 2002 should have significance in arriving at a proper understanding of the exclusionary language.

2005State v. Borders, Clermont App. No. CA2004-12-101, 2005-Ohio-4339, ¶ 15-16 ; State v. Collier, Butler App. No. CA2003-11-282, 2005-Ohio-944, ¶ 41 ; State v. Mason, Butler App. No. CA2004-06-164, 2005-Ohio-2918, ¶ 81 .

2004Huffman v. Shaffer (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 291 , 292 , 13 OBR 356, 469 N.E.2d 566 . 4 Although there is no record showing a ruling on the motion, we find that Liberty has adequately shown a continuing controversy because it moved for a stay and there is no evidence showing that it paid the fine.

2004Huffman v. Shaffer (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 291 , 292 , 13 OBR 356, 469 N.E.2d 566 . 4 Although there is no record showing a ruling on the motion, we find that Liberty has adequately shown a continuing controversy because it moved for a stay and there is no evidence showing that it paid the fine.

2003The evidence was also helpful in explaining his reasons for investigating Joseph as a suspect." The investigator's speculation was patently inadmissible. 37 State v. Griffin (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 65 , 753 N.E.2d 967 (Painter, J., concurring separately). 38 State v. Hawn (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 449 , 462 , 741 N.E.2d 594 . 39 State v. Spears , 3rd Dist.

2003The evidence was also helpful in explaining his reasons for investigating Joseph as a suspect." The investigator's speculation was patently inadmissible. 37 State v. Griffin (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 65 , 753 N.E.2d 967 (Painter, J., concurring separately). 38 State v. Hawn (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 449 , 462 , 741 N.E.2d 594 . 39 State v. Spears , 3rd Dist.

2003The evidence was also helpful in explaining his reasons for investigating Joseph as a suspect." The investigator's speculation was patently inadmissible. 37 State v. Griffin (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 65 , 753 N.E.2d 967 (Painter, J., concurring separately). 38 State v. Hawn (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 449 , 462 , 741 N.E.2d 594 . 39 State v. Spears , 3rd Dist.

2003The evidence was also helpful in explaining his reasons for investigating Joseph as a suspect." The investigator's speculation was patently inadmissible. 37 State v. Griffin (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 65 , 753 N.E.2d 967 (Painter, J., concurring separately). 38 State v. Hawn (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 449 , 462 , 741 N.E.2d 594 . 39 State v. Spears , 3rd Dist.

1965In the case of Mates v. Spitzig, 70 Ohio Law Abs. 113 , two of the members of this panel of judges, while sitting by designation in the Eighth Appellate District, determined that a real estate broker, who, under a valid contract with the vendor of real estate, procured a purchaser for the vendor’s real estate, was, in the absence of any claim of fraud on the part of the broker, entitled to his commission on such sale, even though the contract between the vendor and the purchaser was voluntarily terminated.

1965It cannot be exercised where a strict rule of law is applicable, as the term discretion implies the absence of any such rule. * * Trunk v. Hertz Corporation, 95 Ohio Law Abs. 364, 367 .

1965In the case of Retterer v. Bender, 106 Ohio App. 369 , the court said: “1.

1955Thus, in Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 201 N. Y., 184, 188 , 94 N. E., 602, 603 , it is said in the court’s opinion: “* * * the plaintiff, in the absence of any waiver or matter of estoppel, had a personal right of action growing out of the issue of the Hamilton stock, but it was a right of action against the corporation, not in its behalf.

1955Thus, in Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 201 N. Y., 184, 188 , 94 N. E., 602, 603 , it is said in the court’s opinion: “* * * the plaintiff, in the absence of any waiver or matter of estoppel, had a personal right of action growing out of the issue of the Hamilton stock, but it was a right of action against the corporation, not in its behalf.

1941Usher v. Severance, 86 Vt. 523, 528 , 86 Atl. 741 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 169 , 50 Atl. 863 ; State v. Taylor and O’Donald, 70 Vt. 1, 4, 39 Atl. 447 , 42 L.

1941Usher v. Severance, 86 Vt. 523, 528 , 86 Atl. 741 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 169 , 50 Atl. 863 ; State v. Taylor and O’Donald, 70 Vt. 1, 4, 39 Atl. 447 , 42 L.

1941Usher v. Severance, 86 Vt. 523, 528 , 86 Atl. 741 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 169 , 50 Atl. 863 ; State v. Taylor and O’Donald, 70 Vt. 1, 4, 39 Atl. 447 , 42 L.

1941Usher v. Severance, 86 Vt. 523, 528 , 86 Atl. 741 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 169 , 50 Atl. 863 ; State v. Taylor and O’Donald, 70 Vt. 1, 4, 39 Atl. 447 , 42 L.

1919In the case of Schell v. DuBois, Admr., 94 Ohio St., 93 , the supreme court of Ohio settled the question of legislative authority and also the effect of a violation of such enactment.