absence of any claim in Georgia

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the appellant] fraudulently induced them to enter into the sales contract by actively or passively concealing” damage).

2013See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the appellant] fraudulently induced them to enter into the sales contract by actively or passively concealing” damage).

2017See Double View Ventures, 326 Ga. App. at 561 .

2017See Double View Ventures, 326 Ga. App. at 561 . 35 from the questions of whether Six Flags and the other defendants breached their respective duties to Martin and whether those breaches proximately caused Martin’s injuries.

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

2013And indeed, Goody’s director of real estate testified that his own expectation before signing the sales contract was that the DAM representative had toured the facility “on many occasions” and that she “understood the condition of the property.”11 Thus, the relevant evidence supported 9 See Browning v. Stocks, 265 Ga. App. 803, 803-04 (1) ( 595 SE2d 642 ) (2004) (when contract contained merger clause, “[i]n the absence of any claim that the fraud arose from representations which were part of the sales contract, the [appellees’] suit for damages was necessarily based on [the] claim that [the ap

1998Here, in light of the 911 tape, the immediacy and intensity of the police chase of Maxwell from the scene, the prompt out-of-court identification and subsequent in-court identification of Maxwell as a perpetrator, the location and connection of the holster and the weapon to Maxwell and the incident, as well as other testimony at trial and the complete absence of any defense to the crimes, “we find it highly probable that any error in this regard did not contribute to the verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Seavers v. State, 208 Ga. App. 711, 713 ( 431 SE2d 717 ) (1993). 3.

1998Here, in light of the 911 tape, the immediacy and intensity of the police chase of Maxwell from the scene, the prompt out-of-court identification and subsequent in-court identification of Maxwell as a perpetrator, the location and connection of the holster and the weapon to Maxwell and the incident, as well as other testimony at trial and the complete absence of any defense to the crimes, “we find it highly probable that any error in this regard did not contribute to the verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Seavers v. State, 208 Ga. App. 711, 713 ( 431 SE2d 717 ) (1993). 3.

1994See Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 818 ( 412 SE2d 598 ) (1991); Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988), and cit.

1994See Merriman v. State, 201 Ga. App. 817, 818 ( 412 SE2d 598 ) (1991); Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135 ( 372 SE2d 448 ) (1988), and cit.

1993That situation does not exist in this case because there is no conflict between the exhibit and the complaint, and neither the complaint nor the exhibit “affirmatively show the absence of any claim [against King].” (Emphasis deleted.) Fudge v. Weissinger, 201 Ga. App. 409, 411 ( 411 SE2d 62 ).

1993That situation does not exist in this case because there is no conflict between the exhibit and the complaint, and neither the complaint nor the exhibit “affirmatively show the absence of any claim [against King].” (Emphasis deleted.) Fudge v. Weissinger, 201 Ga. App. 409, 411 ( 411 SE2d 62 ).

1993Also, appellant has failed to carry his burden of satisfying all six of the requirements of Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (1) ( 271 SE2d 792 ) as to any of the proffered evidence.

1993Also, appellant has failed to carry his burden of satisfying all six of the requirements of Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (1) ( 271 SE2d 792 ) as to any of the proffered evidence.

1992See generally Pierce v. Fieldale Corp., 194 Ga. App. 303 ( 390 SE2d 298 ) (1990); Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166 ( 279 SE2d 342 ) (1981).

1992See generally Pierce v. Fieldale Corp., 194 Ga. App. 303 ( 390 SE2d 298 ) (1990); Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166 ( 279 SE2d 342 ) (1981).

1992Given the absence of any factors that either interfered with appellant’s appreciation of the danger posed by the cracked railroad tie steps (e.g., poor lighting, compare id., or weather conditions, compare Shackelford, supra) or distracted her from exercising due care for her own safety (e.g., traffic, compare Globe Oil Co., USA v. DeLong, 182 Ga. App. 395, 396-397 (1) ( 356 SE2d 47 ) (1987)), even when construed most favorably to appellant, the evidence demonstrates that appellee was *178 not liable to appellant because she had equal knowledge of the specific hazardous condition presented by

1992Given the absence of any factors that either interfered with appellant’s appreciation of the danger posed by the cracked railroad tie steps (e.g., poor lighting, compare id., or weather conditions, compare Shackelford, supra) or distracted her from exercising due care for her own safety (e.g., traffic, compare Globe Oil Co., USA v. DeLong, 182 Ga. App. 395, 396-397 (1) ( 356 SE2d 47 ) (1987)), even when construed most favorably to appellant, the evidence demonstrates that appellee was *178 not liable to appellant because she had equal knowledge of the specific hazardous condition presented by

1991The exhibits fail to do so in the instant case. “[A] motion to set aside is not a proper vehicle by which one may belatedly attack the sufficiency of a complaint unless it affirmatively shows the utter lack of a claim.” (Emphasis supplied.) Johnson v. Cleveland, 131 Ga. App. 560, 562 (2b) ( 206 SE2d 704 ) (1974). 2.

1991The exhibits fail to do so in the instant case. “[A] motion to set aside is not a proper vehicle by which one may belatedly attack the sufficiency of a complaint unless it affirmatively shows the utter lack of a claim.” (Emphasis supplied.) Johnson v. Cleveland, 131 Ga. App. 560, 562 (2b) ( 206 SE2d 704 ) (1974). 2.