performance doctrine (North Carolina) · Go Syfert
← North Carolina issues

performance doctrine in North Carolina

9 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Cator v. Catorgreen
ncctapp · 1984 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022EMGEE, LLC 2022-NCCOA-790 Opinion of the Court November 3, 2020, then [it] certainly constituted substantial performance.”2 ¶ 18 North Carolina recognizes the equitable doctrine of substantial performance, which “allow[s] a party to recover on a contract although [it] has not literally complied with its provisions.” Cator v. Cator, 70 N.C.

2022EMGEE, LLC 2022-NCCOA-790 Opinion of the Court November 3, 2020, then [it] certainly constituted substantial performance.”2 ¶ 18 North Carolina recognizes the equitable doctrine of substantial performance, which “allow[s] a party to recover on a contract although [it] has not literally complied with its provisions.” Cator v. Cator, 70 N.C.

22
Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Tolsongreen
ncctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013App. 119, 127 , 615 S.E.2d 906, 912 (2005) Therefore, we determine the specific performance clause in the Separation Agreement does not negate Plaintiff’s burden of proving the equitable requirements for specific performance.

11
Frank LeRoux, Inc. v. Burnsgreen
washctapp · 1971 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001The court in Frank LeRoux, Inc. upheld a specific performance clause after finding that “absent such a provision . . . plaintiff would be limited in his remedies to [the U.C.C.].” Id. at 170, 480 P.2d at 216 (1971).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Black v. Clark green
ncctapp · 1978
2 sentences

2022App. 719, 722 , 321 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1984) (citations omitted). “[T]he doctrine was conceived for use in a situation where the []plaintiff has given the []defendant a substantial portion of that for which he bargained and the performance is of such a nature that it cannot easily be returned.” Black v. Clark, 36 N.C.

2022Id. ¶ 19 A “time is of the essence” clause makes completion dates and times a material term of a contract, causing a material breach if performance is late.

31984–2022
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2005The Supreme Court stated, "[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 694 .

2005The Supreme Court stated, "[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 694 .

31988–2018
Martin v. Sheffer green
ncctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2013App. 802 , 403 S.E.2d 555 (1991), this Court upheld a specific performance clause in a commercial contract for the sale of goods.

2013Id. at 804 , 403 S.E.2d at 556-57.

22001–2013
Rompilla v. Beard red
scotus · 2005
1 sentence

2009The performance of defense counsel did not sink to the level of that described in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), which defendant cites as support.

12009–2009

Where else courts name it

OH 352 (1986–2026) TX 203 (1961–2026) KS 84 (1990–2025) IL 62 (1891–2025) CT 58 (1909–2025) CA 58 (1919–2026) NY 53 (1903–2026) MS 48 (1988–2022) AL 36 (1975–2023) FL 35 (1963–2026) PA 32 (1912–2025) MI 32 (1920–2025) UT 30 (1982–2026) MD 24 (1884–2025) RI 23 (1970–2026) IN 21 (1894–2023) GA 20 (1977–2025) OR 16 (1929–2026) MT 15 (1944–2020) TN 14 (1915–2026) MO 14 (1975–2025) WA 14 (1924–2026) NJ 11 (1961–2023) IA 10 (1909–2025) WY 10 (1926–2026) DC 10 (1985–2024) MN 10 (1905–2007) WI 10 (1965–2024) NM 10 (1986–2023) VA 9 (1969–2018) NC 9 (1984–2022) SC 9 (1981–2025) KY 9 (1924–2022) MA 8 (1978–2024) AZ 8 (1966–2023) DE 8 (1999–2026) CO 8 (1940–2025) NE 7 (1894–2022) ND 6 (1974–2016) ME 5 (1947–2011) VT 5 (1972–2024) OK 4 (1937–2007) LA 4 (1895–2026) SD 4 (2005–2023) WV 4 (1995–2015) ID 3 (2009–2026) HI 2 (1967–2024) AR 2 (1989–1996) AK 2 (1970–2021) NV 2 (1950–2015) NH 2 (1988–1997)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check