performance inquiry in Connecticut

2019In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 291 Conn. 62 , 79-80, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) ; Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction , 290 Conn. 502 , 512-13, 964 A.2d 1186 , cert. denied sub nom.

2019In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 291 Conn. 62 , 79-80, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) ; Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction , 290 Conn. 502 , 512-13, 964 A.2d 1186 , cert. denied sub nom.

1995In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.' Id., 688 . `Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and courts `must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id., 689 , quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), reh. deni

1991To demonstrate this ‘the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ Id., 687-88 . ‘In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.’ Id., 688 . ‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,’ and courts ‘must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circums

1995In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.' Id., 688 . `Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and courts `must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id., 689 , quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), reh. deni

1991To demonstrate this `the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' Id., 687-88 . `In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.' Id., 688 . `Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and courts `must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circums

2021Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.’’ Id., 695–96. ‘‘[T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.’’ Id., 696 . ‘‘Although a petitioner can succeed only if he satisfies both prongs, a reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 520, 538 , 198 A.3d 52 (2019).

2021Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.’’ Id., 695–96. ‘‘[T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.’’ Id., 696 . ‘‘Although a petitioner can succeed only if he satisfies both prongs, a reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 520, 538 , 198 A.3d 52 (2019).

2017See, e.g., State v. Shadden , 290 Kan. 803 , 820-25, 235 P.3d 436 (2010) ; Wilson v. State , 124 Md.App. 543 , 553-59, 723 A.2d 494 (1999) ; State v. Fisken , 138 Or.App. 396 , 398-99, 909 P.2d 206 (1996).

2017See, e.g., State v. Shadden , 290 Kan. 803 , 820-25, 235 P.3d 436 (2010) ; Wilson v. State , 124 Md.App. 543 , 553-59, 723 A.2d 494 (1999) ; State v. Fisken , 138 Or.App. 396 , 398-99, 909 P.2d 206 (1996).

2017Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

2017Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

2017Pursuant to the doctrine of substantial performance, a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused, not because compliance with the terms is objectively impossible, but because actual performance is so similar to the required performance that any breach that may have been committed is immaterial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mastroianni v. Fairfield County Paving, LLC , 106 Conn.App. 330 , 340-41, 942 A.2d 418 (2008).

2017Pursuant to the doctrine of substantial performance, a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused, not because compliance with the terms is objectively impossible, but because actual performance is so similar to the required performance that any breach that may have been committed is immaterial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mastroianni v. Fairfield County Paving, LLC , 106 Conn.App. 330 , 340-41, 942 A.2d 418 (2008).

2017Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

2017Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

1999Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls CT Page 15183 within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." (Citations omitted.) Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180 , 193-194 , 612 A.2d 1161 (1992); see also Tillman v. Commissioner, 54 Conn. App. 749 , 753 , ___ A.2d ___ (1999).

1999Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls CT Page 15183 within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." (Citations omitted.) Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180 , 193-194 , 612 A.2d 1161 (1992); see also Tillman v. Commissioner, 54 Conn. App. 749 , 753 , ___ A.2d ___ (1999).

1995Daly and Sons v. New Haven Hotel Co., 91 Conn. 280 , 287 (1917); Vincenzi v. Cerro, 186 Conn. 612 , 615 (1982).

1991Commercial Discount Co. v. Town of Plainfield, 120 Conn. 274 (1935); Vincenzi v. Cerro, 186 Conn. 612 , 615-16 (1982).

1993In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. [Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 688 , 490 A.2d 82 (1985)].

1993In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. [Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 688 , 490 A.2d 82 (1985)].

1991To demonstrate this `the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' Id., 687-88 . `In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.' Id., 688 . `Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and courts `must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circums

1991Ed. 83 (1955), reh. denied, 350 U.S. 955 , 76 S. Ct. 340 , 100 L.

2025Pursuant to the doctrine of substantial performance, a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused, not because compliance with the terms is objectively impossible, but because actual performance is so simi- lar to the required performance that any breach that may have been committed is immaterial.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) EH Investment Co., LLC v. Chappo, LLC, 174 Conn. App. 344 , 367 n.12, 166 A.3d 800 (2017). ‘‘[T]he general rule is that a contractor who substantially performs under a building or construction contract is entitled to recover the contract price minus

2025Pursuant to the doctrine of substantial performance, a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused, not because compliance with the terms is objectively impossible, but because actual performance is so simi- lar to the required performance that any breach that may have been committed is immaterial.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) EH Investment Co., LLC v. Chappo, LLC, 174 Conn. App. 344 , 367 n.12, 166 A.3d 800 (2017). ‘‘[T]he general rule is that a contractor who substantially performs under a building or construction contract is entitled to recover the contract price minus

2025Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Koskerides [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 188 . ‘‘Causation [is] a question of fact for the [fact finder] to determine . . . and, thus, is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winakor v. Savalle, 198 Conn. App. 792 , 813, 234 A.3d 1122 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 773 , 276 A.3d 407 (2022). ‘‘The doctrine of substantial performance,’’ mean- while, ‘‘shields co

2025Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Koskerides [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 188 . ‘‘Causation [is] a question of fact for the [fact finder] to determine . . . and, thus, is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winakor v. Savalle, 198 Conn. App. 792 , 813, 234 A.3d 1122 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 773 , 276 A.3d 407 (2022). ‘‘The doctrine of substantial performance,’’ mean- while, ‘‘shields co

2025Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Koskerides [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 188 . ‘‘Causation [is] a question of fact for the [fact finder] to determine . . . and, thus, is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winakor v. Savalle, 198 Conn. App. 792 , 813, 234 A.3d 1122 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 773 , 276 A.3d 407 (2022). ‘‘The doctrine of substantial performance,’’ mean- while, ‘‘shields co

2024Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor- mance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal- lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investiga- tion of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brewer v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 189 Conn. App.

2024Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor- mance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal- lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investiga- tion of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brewer v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 189 Conn. App.

2024As such, that question requires ple- nary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erro- neous standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 173 , 187–88, 256 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 339 Conn. 916 , 262 A.3d 137 (2021). ‘‘In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assis- tance was reasonable considering all the circum- stances. . . .

2024Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor- mance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal- lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investiga- tion of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brewer v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 189 Conn. App.

2024Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor- mance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal- lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investiga- tion of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brewer v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 189 Conn. App.

2022In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a habeas petition.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 1 , 11–13, 242 A.3d 107 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 983 , 242 A.3d 105 (2020). ‘‘In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assis- tance was reasonable considering all the circum- stances.

2021As such, that question requires ple- nary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erro- neous standard.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jordan v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App. 822 , 829–31, 234 A.3d 78 , cert. granted, 335 Conn. 931 , 236 A.3d 218 (2020). ‘‘In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assis- tance was reasonable considering all the circum- stances.

2021Although a petitioner can succeed only if he satisfies both prongs, a reviewing court can find against the petitioner on either ground.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 198 Conn. App. 345 , 352–53, 233 A.3d 1106 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 948 , 238 A.3d 18 (2020). ‘‘In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assis- tance was reasonable considering all the circum- stances.

2019In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 291 Conn. 62 , 79-80, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) ; Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction , 290 Conn. 502 , 512-13, 964 A.2d 1186 , cert. denied sub nom.

2019In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction , 291 Conn. 62 , 79-80, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) ; Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction , 290 Conn. 502 , 512-13, 964 A.2d 1186 , cert. denied sub nom.

2018Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

2018Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th

2018Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.... [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent th