performance defense in Ohio

2011Accordingly, his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and this assignment of error is overruled {¶ 41} “Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when trial counsel 16 failed to request a competency hearing of the minor witness’s testimony prior to the commencement of trial.” {¶ 42} “To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the performance of defense

2011Accordingly, his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and this assignment of error is overruled {¶ 41} “Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when trial counsel 16 failed to request a competency hearing of the minor witness’s testimony prior to the commencement of trial.” {¶ 42} “To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the performance of defense

2024Prevailing professional norms dictate that “a lawyer must have ‘full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’” State v. Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186 , 2009-Ohio-315 , 903 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 24 , quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). {¶91} Furthermore, “‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”’” Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273 , quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2022Prevailing professional norms dictate that “a lawyer must have ‘full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’” State v. Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186 , 2009-Ohio-315 , 903 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 24 , quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). {¶80} Furthermore, “‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the SCIOTO, 20CA3934 47 circumstances.”’” Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273 , quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2024Prevailing professional norms dictate that “a lawyer must have ‘full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’” State v. Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186 , 2009-Ohio-315 , 903 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 24 , quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). {¶91} Furthermore, “‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”’” Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273 , quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2024Prevailing professional norms dictate that “a lawyer must have ‘full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’” State v. Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186 , 2009-Ohio-315 , 903 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 24 , quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). {¶91} Furthermore, “‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”’” Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273 , quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2025Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009). (3) In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland at 689 .

2025Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009). {¶16} Importantly, due to “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland at 689 .

2022Accordingly, “[i]n order to show deficient performance, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonable representation.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412 , 2006–Ohio– 2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95 (citations omitted); accord Hinton, 134 S.Ct. at 1088, citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 ; State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2013–Ohio–4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 81 . {¶53} Moreover, when considering whether trial counsel’s representation amounts to deficient performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

2022Accordingly, “[i]n order to show deficient performance, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonable representation.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412 , 2006–Ohio– 2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95 (citations omitted); accord Hinton, 134 S.Ct. at 1088, citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 ; State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2013–Ohio–4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 81 . {¶53} Moreover, when considering whether trial counsel’s representation amounts to deficient performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

2020Strickland at 697 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 699 ; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2000-Ohio-448 , 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). {¶23} In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

2019Strickland at 697 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 699 ; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2000-Ohio-448 , 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). {¶26} In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

2025In reaching its decision, the court relied on the holding in the Ohio Supreme Court case of Hodges v. Ettinger, 127 Ohio St. 460 (1934), syllabus, that cases involving “settlements made upon consideration of marriage” must be "followed by actual marriage” in order for the partial performance exception to apply.

2019Hodges v. Ettinger, 127 Ohio St. 460, 466-467 , 189 N.E. 113 (1934).

2025“Substantial performance of a contract is interpreted to mean *** that slight departures, omissions and inadvertences should be disregarded.” Kichler’s, Inc. v. Persinger (1970), 24 Ohio App.2d 124, 126 , see also Thompson, supra. “For the doctrine of substantial performance to apply, the part unperformed must not destroy the value or purpose of the contract.” Hansel v. Creative Concrete & Masonry Constr.

2019“Substantial performance of a contract is interpreted to mean * * * that slight departures, omissions and inadvertences should be disregarded.” 6 Id., quoting Kichler’s, Inc. v. Persinger, 24 Ohio App.2d 124, 126 , (1st Dist.1970), see, also Thompson, supra. “For the doctrine of substantial performance to apply, the part unperformed must not destroy the value or purpose of the contract.” Hansel v. Creative Concrete & Masonry Constr.

2023Tier v. Singrey, 154 Ohio St. 521, 529 , 97 N.E.2d 20 (1951); Nofzinger v. Blood, 6th Dist.

2011Tier v. Singrey (1951), 154 Ohio St. 521, 526 , 97 N.E.2d 20 ; Snyder v. Warde (1949), 151 Ohio St.3d 426 , 434 (1949); Crabill v. Marsh (1882), 38 Ohio St. 331 , 338.” Monea II, supra, at ¶21. {¶ 53} We analyzed the Civ.R. 56 evidence before the Court and found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the actions by Paul Monea in this case met the requirements of the doctrine of partial performance. {¶ 54} Our ultimate holding in the case was therefore two-fold: (1) whether there existed an oral land contract, written lease agreement, or oral lease agreement, and (2) if there exi

2023Tier v. Singrey, 154 Ohio St. 521, 529 , 97 N.E.2d 20 (1951); Nofzinger v. Blood, 6th Dist.

2011Tier v. Singrey (1951), 154 Ohio St. 521, 526 , 97 N.E.2d 20 ; Snyder v. Warde (1949), 151 Ohio St.3d 426 , 434 (1949); Crabill v. Marsh (1882), 38 Ohio St. 331 , 338.” Monea II, supra, at ¶21. {¶ 53} We analyzed the Civ.R. 56 evidence before the Court and found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the actions by Paul Monea in this case met the requirements of the doctrine of partial performance. {¶ 54} Our ultimate holding in the case was therefore two-fold: (1) whether there existed an oral land contract, written lease agreement, or oral lease agreement, and (2) if there exi

2023Saydell v. Geppetto's Pizza & Ribs Franchise Sys., Inc., 100 Ohio App.3d 111, 121 , 652 N.E.2d 218 (1994). {¶46} For the doctrine of partial performance to apply, a plaintiff must establish both the existence of the oral contract and the applicability of the doctrine of partial performance by clear and convincing evidence.

2023Saydell v. Geppetto's Pizza & Ribs Franchise Sys., Inc., 100 Ohio App.3d 111, 121 , 652 N.E.2d 218 (1994). {¶46} For the doctrine of partial performance to apply, a plaintiff must establish both the existence of the oral contract and the applicability of the doctrine of partial performance by clear and convincing evidence.

2019At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 . {¶38} We note that any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect the accused's “substantial rights.” Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2019At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 . {¶38} We note that any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect the accused's “substantial rights.” Before constitutional error can be considered harmless, we must be able to “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2015Accordingly, this argument is moot because the oral modification is unenforceable under the statute of frauds pursuant to Inks. {¶26} Appellants' final contention under this assignment of error is that partial performance removes the oral modification from operation of the statute of frauds because the parties' acts were "clearly in furtherance of the [Short Sale Contract]." Conversely, U.S. Bank contends that the doctrine of partial performance does not apply to the oral modification because the parties' acts did not unequivocally suggest the existence of a contract. {¶27} Partial performance

1996As the trial court noted, the Supreme Court in Delfino v. Paul Davies Chevrolet, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 282 , 31 O.O.2d 557 , 209 N.E.2d 194 , paragraph four of the syllabus, held that failure to comply with the technical requirements of the conveyances statute could be overcome by application of the partial performance doctrine, as follows: “Part performance to be sufficient to remove an agreement from the operation of the statute of conveyances (Section 5301.01, Revised Code) must consist of unequivocal acts by the party relying upon the agreement, which are exclusively referable to the a

2011Specifically, Collins argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for stipulating to the accuracy of the laboratory report stating the amount and type of drugs involved, and failing to object to testimony of the detectives regarding the report, in violation of his right to confront witnesses against him as stated in Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 , and Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), 557 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 . {¶ 54} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Collins is require

2011Specifically, Collins argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for stipulating to the accuracy of the laboratory report stating the amount and type of drugs involved, and failing to object to testimony of the detectives regarding the report, in violation of his right to confront witnesses against him as stated in Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 , and Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), 557 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 . {¶ 54} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Collins is require

2011Specifically, Collins argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for stipulating to the accuracy of the laboratory report stating the amount and type of drugs involved, and failing to object to testimony of the detectives regarding the report, in violation of his right to confront witnesses against him as stated in Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 , and Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), 557 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 . {¶ 54} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Collins is require

2011Specifically, Collins argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for stipulating to the accuracy of the laboratory report stating the amount and type of drugs involved, and failing to object to testimony of the detectives regarding the report, in violation of his right to confront witnesses against him as stated in Crawford v. Washington (2004), 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 , and Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), 557 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 . {¶ 54} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Collins is require

2008Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 ; State v. Brooks (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 144 . {¶ 22} In evaluating whether a defendant has been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, the ultimate query is "whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done." State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

2007Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , State v. Brooks (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 144 . {¶ 28} In evaluating whether a defendant has been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, the ultimate query is "whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done." State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

2008To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687 . {¶ 67} "[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance * * * [and] the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-688 . {¶ 68} "In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances

2003State v. Smith (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 98 ; Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299 . {¶ 33} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant is required to demonstrate that: 1) the performance of defense counsel was seriously flawed and deficient; and 2) the result of the appellant's trial or legal proceeding would have been different had defense counsel provided proper representation.

2005United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. at 725,734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ; State v. Perry (2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 120 , 802 N.E.2d 643 , 646 .

2005United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. at 725,734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ; State v. Perry (2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 120 , 802 N.E.2d 643 , 646 .

2026Considering “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id.

2026At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id.

2025Prevailing professional norms dictate that “a lawyer must have ‘full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’ ” State v. Pasqualone, 2009-Ohio-315 , ¶ 24, quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988). {¶55} Further, “the performance inquiry must be whether [Cite as State v. Hughes, 2025-Ohio-894 .] counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .