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14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021When evaluating whether counsel’s representation is deficient, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . 2006Even if counsel gave weight to Crawford’s wishes in proceeding to trial, it was unreasonable under the circumstances to neglect to investigate Crawford’s prior convictions. 124 In evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
Jacobson v. Gulbransengreen2 sentences2007Whatever the rationale, however, it is clear when a party breaches a contract to convey real property, the presumptive remedy is specific performance. 71 AM.JUR.2D Specific Performance § 133 (2001); see Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33 , 623 N.W.2d 84, 91 (2001) ("Specific performance is `[t]he presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to transfer real property.'") (quoting Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 115 (S.D.1985)). [8] At oral argument, Pitts' counsel claimed if we allow the Crafts' specific performance claim to stand, then a bankruptcy court could never discharge a real pro 2007Whatever the rationale, however, it is clear when a party breaches a contract to convey real property, the presumptive remedy is specific performance. 71 AM.JUR.2D Specific Performance § 133 (2001); see Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33 , 623 N.W.2d 84, 91 (2001) ("Specific performance is `[t]he presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to transfer real property.'") (quoting Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 115 (S.D.1985)). [8] At oral argument, Pitts' counsel claimed if we allow the Crafts' specific performance claim to stand, then a bankruptcy court could never discharge a real pro | 1 | 1 |
Wiggins v. Shewmakegreen1 sentence2007Whatever the rationale, however, it is clear when a party breaches a contract to convey real property, the presumptive remedy is specific performance. 71 AM.JUR.2D Specific Performance § 133 (2001); see Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33 , 623 N.W.2d 84, 91 (2001) ("Specific performance is `[t]he presumed remedy for the breach of an agreement to transfer real property.'") (quoting Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 115 (S.D.1985)). [8] At oral argument, Pitts' counsel claimed if we allow the Crafts' specific performance claim to stand, then a bankruptcy court could never discharge a real pro | 1 | 1 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Isadoregreen2 sentences2006Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 303, 88 P.3d 390 (2004) (concluding that, because the State “ha[d] not objected to the defendant’s chosen remedy and in oral argument could not assert any reasons why specific performance would be unjust,” Isadore was entitled to specific performance of the original sentence). ¶[19 While the State argues that the sole available remedy is the withdrawal of Bisson’s entire plea (complete rescission), Bisson contends that he should be permitted to choose between the two remedies: the withdrawal of the plea to the enhancements only (partial rescission of the ag 2006Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wash.2d 294, 303 , 88 P.3d 390 (2004) (concluding that, because the State "ha[d] not objected to the defendant's chosen remedy and in oral argument could not assert any reasons why specific performance would be unjust," Isadore was entitled to specific performance of the original sentence). ¶ 19 While the State argues that the sole available remedy is the withdrawal of Bisson's entire plea (complete rescission), Bisson contends that he should be permitted to choose between the two remedies, the withdrawal of the plea to the enhancements only (partial rescission of the | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Huhndorfgreen2 sentences1986Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261, 263 (1981); see also Cannon v. Huhndorf, 67 Wn.2d 778 , 409 P.2d 865 (1966). 1986Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261, 263 (1981); see also Cannon v. Huhndorf, 67 Wn.2d 778 , 409 P.2d 865 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bertrand
green
1 sentence2026Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
City of Seattle v. Heatley
green
1 sentence2023He also testified, “‘I determined that Mr. Heatley was obviously intoxicated and affected by the alcoholic drink that he’d been, he could not drive a motor vehicle in a safe manner.’” Id. at 576 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Kyllo
green
1 sentence2018"When counsel's conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not deficient." KvIlo, 166 Wn.2d at 863 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Berg v. Ting
green
2 sentences2017Berg v. Ting, 125 Wn.2d 544, 556 , 886 P.2d 564 (1995). 2017Berg v. Ting, 125 Wn.2d 544, 556 , 886 P.2d 564 (1995). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Navlet v. Port of Seattle
green
1 sentence2014Specifically, petitioners argue that because the faculty class had worked for most of the 2008-2009 academic year in reliance on the university’s promise of a raise in salary for the 2009-2010 academic year, they had substantially performed and thereby accepted the university’s offer. ¶15 Pointing to our decision in Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 818 , 194 P.3d 221 (2008), petitioners urge that this court has adopted the substantial performance doctrine. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Navlet v. Port of Seattle
green
1 sentence2014Specifically, petitioners argue that because the faculty class had worked for most of the 2008-2009 academic year in reliance on the university’s promise of a raise in salary for the 2009-2010 academic year, they had substantially performed and thereby accepted the university’s offer. ¶15 Pointing to our decision in Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 818 , 194 P.3d 221 (2008), petitioners urge that this court has adopted the substantial performance doctrine. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Isadore
green
2 sentences2006Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 303, 88 P.3d 390 (2004) (concluding that, because the State “ha[d] not objected to the defendant’s chosen remedy and in oral argument could not assert any reasons why specific performance would be unjust,” Isadore was entitled to specific performance of the original sentence). ¶[19 While the State argues that the sole available remedy is the withdrawal of Bisson’s entire plea (complete rescission), Bisson contends that he should be permitted to choose between the two remedies: the withdrawal of the plea to the enhancements only (partial rescission of the ag 2006Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wash.2d 294, 303 , 88 P.3d 390 (2004) (concluding that, because the State "ha[d] not objected to the defendant's chosen remedy and in oral argument could not assert any reasons why specific performance would be unjust," Isadore was entitled to specific performance of the original sentence). ¶ 19 While the State argues that the sole available remedy is the withdrawal of Bisson's entire plea (complete rescission), Bisson contends that he should be permitted to choose between the two remedies, the withdrawal of the plea to the enhancements only (partial rescission of the | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bulmon v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1977The law is well stated by the court in Bulmon v. Bailey, 22 Wn.2d 372 , 156 P.2d 231 (1945), at 376-77: Time of payment of the installments of purchase price was made of the essence of the contracts, and if the vendors had from the beginning insisted upon strict performance they could have forfeited either contract upon the happening of the first default thereof. 1977The law is well stated by the court in Bulmon v. Bailey, 22 Wn.2d 372 , 156 P.2d 231 (1945), at 376-77: Time of payment of the installments of purchase price was made of the essence of the contracts, and if the vendors had from the beginning insisted upon strict performance they could have forfeited either contract upon the happening of the first default thereof. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Harrild v. Spokane School District
neutral
2 sentences1925App. 489 , wherein the court relying oh Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill. 467 , and Keeler v. Kerr, 157 Ill. 57 , 41 N. E. 750 , said: “Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of law, and the submission of that question to a jury without informing them what constitutes a substantial performance is error.” This view is in harmony with what was said in Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266 , 192 Pac. 1 , 19 A. L. 1925App. 489 , wherein the court relying oh Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill. 467 , and Keeler v. Kerr, 157 Ill. 57 , 41 N. E. 750 , said: “Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of law, and the submission of that question to a jury without informing them what constitutes a substantial performance is error.” This view is in harmony with what was said in Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266 , 192 Pac. 1 , 19 A. L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Estep v. Fenton
neutral
1 sentence1925App. 489 , wherein the court relying oh Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill. 467 , and Keeler v. Kerr, 157 Ill. 57 , 41 N. E. 750 , said: “Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of law, and the submission of that question to a jury without informing them what constitutes a substantial performance is error.” This view is in harmony with what was said in Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266 , 192 Pac. 1 , 19 A. L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Keeler v. Herr
green
2 sentences1925App. 489 , wherein the court relying oh Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill. 467 , and Keeler v. Kerr, 157 Ill. 57 , 41 N. E. 750 , said: “Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of law, and the submission of that question to a jury without informing them what constitutes a substantial performance is error.” This view is in harmony with what was said in Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266 , 192 Pac. 1 , 19 A. L. 1925App. 489 , wherein the court relying oh Estep v. Fenton, 66 Ill. 467 , and Keeler v. Kerr, 157 Ill. 57 , 41 N. E. 750 , said: “Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of law, and the submission of that question to a jury without informing them what constitutes a substantial performance is error.” This view is in harmony with what was said in Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266 , 192 Pac. 1 , 19 A. L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Wadham v. McVicar
green
2 sentences1924In support of this contention appellant relies on the doctrine announced in Wadham v. McVicar, 115 Wash. 503 , 197 Pac. 616 , and cases there cited, to the effect that where, under a contract calling for payment at designated times and for strict performance, the vendor receives payments after the times provided therefor or grants other indulgences, he thereby waives the strict performance clause of his contract and cannot claim forfeiture until he has given the vendee notice of intention so to do and a reasonable time within which tO'make the overdue payments. 1924In support of this contention appellant relies on the doctrine announced in Wadham v. McVicar, 115 Wash. 503 , 197 Pac. 616 , and cases there cited, to the effect that where, under a contract calling for payment at designated times and for strict performance, the vendor receives payments after the times provided therefor or grants other indulgences, he thereby waives the strict performance clause of his contract and cannot claim forfeiture until he has given the vendee notice of intention so to do and a reasonable time within which tO'make the overdue payments. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.