performance test in Georgia

2021See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305, 307 (I), 311 (II) ( 129 SCt 2527 , 174 LE2d 314) (2009) (sworn certificates of state crime lab analysts admitted into evidence to prove that material seized by police was contraband were testimonial; thus, defendant’s confrontation rights were violated when the analysts 13 who wrote the certificates did not testify in person at trial).

2021See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305, 307 (I), 311 (II) ( 129 SCt 2527 , 174 LE2d 314) (2009) (sworn certificates of state crime lab analysts admitted into evidence to prove that material seized by police was contraband were testimonial; thus, defendant’s confrontation rights were violated when the analysts 13 who wrote the certificates did not testify in person at trial).

2021In Bullcoming, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the prosecution may introduce into evidence a forensic laboratory report via the “surrogate testimony” of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally conduct or observe the performance of the test reported in the certified lab report prepared by another analyst, and ruled that “it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.” 564 U. S. at 657 (I) (C).

2019In Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 564 U. S. 647 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the prosecution may introduce into evidence a forensic laboratory report via the "surrogate testimony" of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally conduct or observe the performance of the test reported in the certified lab report prepared by another analyst, and ruled that "it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront t

2014While the statute of limitation for simple contracts is six years, see OCGA § 9-3-24, the statute of limitation for equity suits, such as a claim for specific performance, is seven years. 5 See Knight v. Dept. of Transp., 239 Ga. 368, 370 (3) ( 236 SE2d 826 ) (1977); Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga. App. 294, 297 (4) ( 568 SE2d 157 ) (2002) (a claim for specific performance lies in equity).

2014While the statute of limitation for simple contracts is six years, see OCGA § 9-3-24, the statute of limitation for equity suits, such as a claim for specific performance, is seven years. 5 See Knight v. Dept. of Transp., 239 Ga. 368, 370 (3) ( 236 SE2d 826 ) (1977); Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga. App. 294, 297 (4) ( 568 SE2d 157 ) (2002) (a claim for specific performance lies in equity).

2014While the statute of limitation for simple contracts is six years, see OCGA § 9-3-24, the statute of limitation for equity suits, such as a claim for specific performance, is seven years. 5 See Knight v. Dept. of Transp., 239 Ga. 368, 370 (3) ( 236 SE2d 826 ) (1977); Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga. App. 294, 297 (4) ( 568 SE2d 157 ) (2002) (a claim for specific performance lies in equity).

2014While the statute of limitation for simple contracts is six years, see OCGA § 9-3-24, the statute of limitation for equity suits, such as a claim for specific performance, is seven years. 5 See Knight v. Dept. of Transp., 239 Ga. 368, 370 (3) ( 236 SE2d 826 ) (1977); Ellis v. Stanford, 256 Ga. App. 294, 297 (4) ( 568 SE2d 157 ) (2002) (a claim for specific performance lies in equity).

2025See Chadwick v. Brazell, 331 Ga. App. 373, 382 (5) ( 771 SE2d 75 ) (2015).

2025See Chadwick v. Brazell, 331 Ga. App. 373, 382 (5) ( 771 SE2d 75 ) (2015).

2025See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000) (rejecting bright-line deficiency rule of First and Ninth Circuits “as inconsistent with Strickland’s holding that the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances”).

2024See Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 423 (2) ( 405 SE2d 36 ) (1991) (recognizing that “proof of value” is an “essential element” of specific performance); Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 460-461 (2) ( 314 SE2d 874 ) (1984).

2024See Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 423 (2) ( 405 SE2d 36 ) (1991) (recognizing that “proof of value” is an “essential element” of specific performance); Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 460-461 (2) ( 314 SE2d 874 ) (1984).

2024See Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 423 (2) ( 405 SE2d 36 ) (1991) (recognizing that “proof of value” is an “essential element” of specific performance); Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 460-461 (2) ( 314 SE2d 874 ) (1984).

2024See Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 423 (2) ( 405 SE2d 36 ) (1991) (recognizing that “proof of value” is an “essential element” of specific performance); Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 460-461 (2) ( 314 SE2d 874 ) (1984).

2013Any conflicting expert testimony or video evidence challenging the officer’s performance of the test goes to 8 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 406 . 9 See id. at 407 (1). 6 the weight of the HGN test results and the officer’s conclusions of Johnson’s impairment, not the admissibility of the HGN test results themselves.10 2.

2013Any conflicting expert testimony or video evidence challenging the officer’s performance of the test goes to 8 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 406 . 9 See id. at 407 (1). 6 the weight of the HGN test results and the officer’s conclusions of Johnson’s impairment, not the admissibility of the HGN test results themselves.10 2.

2012Likewise, in Crawford v. City of Forest Park, 215 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 450 SE2d 237 ) (1994), this Court held that although the officer must not prevent a defendant from exercising his right to an independent test, it is not his duty to ensure the performance of such a test. ...

2012Likewise, in Crawford v. City of Forest Park, 215 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 450 SE2d 237 ) (1994), this Court held that although the officer must not prevent a defendant from exercising his right to an independent test, it is not his duty to ensure the performance of such a test. ...

2009See generally Wyrick, 256 Ga. at 409-410 (as to alleged contract to make a will, summary judgment was proper as to specific performance claim, but grant of summary judgment reversed as to quantum meruit claim).

2008That provision states that a justification defense can be claimed “[i]n all other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in [OCGA§ 16-3-20 et seq.].” See Grauitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 34 (2) ( 608 SE2d 202 ) (2005).

2008That provision states that a justification defense can be claimed “[i]n all other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in [OCGA§ 16-3-20 et seq.].” See Grauitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 34 (2) ( 608 SE2d 202 ) (2005).

2008See Brinson v. McMillan, 263 Ga. 802 (2) ( 440 SE2d 22 ) (1994).

2008See Brinson v. McMillan, 263 Ga. 802 (2) ( 440 SE2d 22 ) (1994).

2006Domingues v. State, 277 Ga. 373, 374 (2) ( 589 SE2d 102 ) (2003).

2006Domingues v. State, 277 Ga. 373, 374 (2) ( 589 SE2d 102 ) (2003).

1994See State v. Buffington, 189 Ga. App. 800 ( 377 SE2d 548 ) (1989).

1994See State v. Buffington, 189 Ga. App. 800 ( 377 SE2d 548 ) (1989).

1992However, ‘(t)he justifiable failure or inability to obtain an additional test shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer. . . .’ [Cit.] The law enforcement authority has the duty not to prevent a defendant from exercising his right to an independent test but not the duty to insure the performance of such a test. [Cit.]” Gray v. State, 194 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 392 SE2d 290 ) (1990).

1992However, ‘(t)he justifiable failure or inability to obtain an additional test shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer. . . .’ [Cit.] The law enforcement authority has the duty not to prevent a defendant from exercising his right to an independent test but not the duty to insure the performance of such a test. [Cit.]” Gray v. State, 194 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 392 SE2d 290 ) (1990).

1991As to the performance inquiry under Strickland , the question is “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” In measuring this assistance, “[e]very effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time; . . . counsel is entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ (which the defendant must overcome) that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct and that all significant decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Smith

1977See Thornton v. REB Properties, 237 Ga. 59 ( 226 SE2d 741 ) (1976); and Deal v. Dickson, 231 Ga. 366 ( 202 SE2d 41 ) (1973).

1977See Thornton v. REB Properties, 237 Ga. 59 ( 226 SE2d 741 ) (1976); and Deal v. Dickson, 231 Ga. 366 ( 202 SE2d 41 ) (1973).