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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025The performance inquiry “must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances,” and “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 688-89 . ¶ 30 Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 19 information supplied by the defendant. 2016Rather, Corson alleges the government’s failure to disclose K.B.’s false-reporting adjudication created the performance violation by interfering with plea counsel’s ability “to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2016See People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 941 (Colo.1991) ("In resolving an ineffective-assistance claim, a court is not required to first determine whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, for if the defendant fails to make an affirmative demonstration of prejudice, then the court may resolve the claim on that basis alone." (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 )). 39 So, is there a reasonable probability that Corson would have gone to trial if the People had disclosed K.B.'s false-reporting adjudication? 2016See People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 941 (Colo. 1991) (“In resolving an ineffective-assistance claim, a court is not required to first determine whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, for if the defendant fails to make an affirmative demonstration of prejudice, then the court may resolve the claim on that basis alone.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)). ¶39 So, is there a reasonable probability that Corson would have gone to trial if the People had disclosed K.B.’s false-reporting adjudication? | 2 | 2 |
American Pride Co-op v. Seewaldgreen1 sentence2025Pride Co-op. v. Seewald, 968 P.2d 139, 142 (Colo. App. 1998); Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53, ¶ 32 . ¶ 20 We conclude that the district court’s findings were sufficient to support the enforceability of the 2017 agreement under either the partial performance doctrine or promissory estoppel. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Lemoine-Hofmanngreen1 sentence2019See Lemoine-Hofmann, 827 P.2d at 590 . | 1 | 1 |
Newcomb v. Schaefflergreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56 , 279 P.2d 409 (1955); Louthan v. Carson, 63 Colo. 473 , 168 P. 656 (1917). 3 Whether performance is “substantial” is generally a question of fact that depends on the particular circumstances of the case. 1987See, e.g., Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56 , 279 P.2d 409 (1955); Louthan v. Carson, 63 Colo. 473 , 168 P. 656 (1917). 3 Whether performance is “substantial” is generally a question of fact that depends on the particular circumstances of the case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff
green
1 sentence2025Pride Co-op. v. Seewald, 968 P.2d 139, 142 (Colo. App. 1998); Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53, ¶ 32 . ¶ 20 We conclude that the district court’s findings were sufficient to support the enforceability of the 2017 agreement under either the partial performance doctrine or promissory estoppel. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
1 sentence2013In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that the surrogate testimony came from a person "who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification." Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Louthan v. Carson
green
1 sentence1987See, e.g., Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56 , 279 P.2d 409 (1955); Louthan v. Carson, 63 Colo. 473 , 168 P. 656 (1917). 3 Whether performance is “substantial” is generally a question of fact that depends on the particular circumstances of the case. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lamar Alfalfa Milling Co. v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1940Defendant relies upon Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. 140 , 173 Pac. 867 ; People v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121 , 218 Pac. 1047 , and Lamar Co. v. Bishop, 80 Colo. 369 , 250 Pac. 689 . 1940Defendant relies upon Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. 140 , 173 Pac. 867 ; People v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121 , 218 Pac. 1047 , and Lamar Co. v. Bishop, 80 Colo. 369 , 250 Pac. 689 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Hawbaker v. Laco Gas Burner Co.
neutral
2 sentences1940In none of the cases cited by defendant on this point was an agency contract involved and that such contracts were not within the contemplation of those adjudications is apparent from the opinion in the Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. case, supra, cited in the other two, where, in discussing the relationship of the parties, we said: “No agency is established and he [plaintiff] is not in any manner authorized or empowered to act for or on account of the motor company [defendant].” Comparable in principle to our disposition of this question, though arising under a different form of statute, are: Hawbake 1940In none of the cases cited by defendant on this point was an agency contract involved and that such contracts were not within the contemplation of those adjudications is apparent from the opinion in the Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. case, supra, cited in the other two, where, in discussing the relationship of the parties, we said: “No agency is established and he [plaintiff] is not in any manner authorized or empowered to act for or on account of the motor company [defendant].” Comparable in principle to our disposition of this question, though arising under a different form of statute, are: Hawbake | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Maxwell-Chamberlain Motor Co. v. Piatt
neutral
1 sentence1940Defendant relies upon Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. 140 , 173 Pac. 867 ; People v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121 , 218 Pac. 1047 , and Lamar Co. v. Bishop, 80 Colo. 369 , 250 Pac. 689 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Felger v. Walcher
neutral
1 sentence1940Defendant relies upon Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. 140 , 173 Pac. 867 ; People v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121 , 218 Pac. 1047 , and Lamar Co. v. Bishop, 80 Colo. 369 , 250 Pac. 689 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
People ex rel. Burton v. District Court
neutral
1 sentence1940Defendant relies upon Maxwell-Chamberlain Co. v. Piatt, 65 Colo. 140 , 173 Pac. 867 ; People v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121 , 218 Pac. 1047 , and Lamar Co. v. Bishop, 80 Colo. 369 , 250 Pac. 689 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.