58 California opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gray v. County of Maderagreen2 sentences2021(See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 [“[t]he 50 term[] ‘increase’ . . . — even though preceded by the mandatory term ‘shall’ . . . — [is] not [a] specific performance standard[]”].) It is instead “the sort[] of speculative mitigation measure[] that do[es] not comply with CEQA.” (California Clean Energy Committee, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 [finding inadequate fair-share mitigation requirements that “d[id] not estimate how much the mitigation measures . . . w[ould] cost or how they might be implemen 2013(Gray v. County of Madera, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119 .) It explained: "While we generally agree that CEQA permits a lead agency to defer specifically detailing mitigation measures as long as the lead agency commits itself to mitigation and to specific performance standards, we conclude that here the County has not committed itself to a specific performance standard. | 2 | 3 |
MURRAY'S IRON WORKS, INC. v. Boycegreen2 sentences2026“What constitutes substantial performance is a question of fact, but it is essential that there be no wilful departure from the terms of the contract, and that the defects be such as may be easily remedied or compensated, so that the promisee may get practically what the contract calls for.” (Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 169, 187 ; see Murray’s Iron Works, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [substantial performance on construction contract was shown where the jury could reasonably have concluded that the amount of work remaining could be easily fixed].) Cal Garden fails to cit 2025Under the doctrine of substantial performance, by contrast, “the contractor may, in an action upon the contract, recover the amount unpaid of his contract price, less the amount allowed as damages for the failure in strict performance.” (Id. at p. 289; accord, Murray’s Iron Works, Inc. v. Boyce (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1291- 1292.) 34 delays beyond the contractor’s control—unless the contractor follows the required procedures for notifying the owner of its intent to claim a right to an extension.” (Ibid.) b. | 2 | 2 |
California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruzgreen2 sentences2023(See California Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001 [“an alternative that ‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected as infeasible’ ”].) The wind mitigation measure’s use of the term properly takes into account such objectives. 78 impacts. 2023(See California Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001 [“an alternative that ‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected as infeasible’ ”].) The wind mitigation measure’s use of the term properly takes into account such objectives. 78 impacts. | 2 | 2 |
California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodlandgreen2 sentences2021(See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 [“[t]he 50 term[] ‘increase’ . . . — even though preceded by the mandatory term ‘shall’ . . . — [is] not [a] specific performance standard[]”].) It is instead “the sort[] of speculative mitigation measure[] that do[es] not comply with CEQA.” (California Clean Energy Committee, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 [finding inadequate fair-share mitigation requirements that “d[id] not estimate how much the mitigation measures . . . w[ould] cost or how they might be implemen 2021(See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 858 [“[t]he 50 term[] ‘increase’ . . . — even though preceded by the mandatory term ‘shall’ . . . — [is] not [a] specific performance standard[]”].) It is instead “the sort[] of speculative mitigation measure[] that do[es] not comply with CEQA.” (California Clean Energy Committee, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 [finding inadequate fair-share mitigation requirements that “d[id] not estimate how much the mitigation measures . . . w[ould] cost or how they might be implemen | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2014(In re Resendiz, at pp. 240-242.) “[T]hat a defendant may have received valid section 1016.5 advisements from the court does not entail that he has received effective assistance of counsel in evaluating or responding to such advisements.” (Id. at p. 241.) 13 Constitutionally adequate assistance “ ‘must be determined by a standard bottomed on the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.’ ” (In re Resendiz, at p. 244.) Therefore “[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s 2001Ordinarily, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 478 [ 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 ] [rejecting per se rule that counsel must file notice of appeal unless defendant instructs otherwise as "inconsistent with Strickland's holding that `the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering | 2 | 2 |
Todd v. Vestermarkgreen2 sentences1960The doctrine of substantial performance does not apply.” (Todd v. Vestermark, 145 Cal.App.2d 374,377 [ 302 P.2d 347 ].) Beebe was in position to produce forthwith the cash required of him and he was entitled to terminate the escrow and have his trust deeds returned when it appeared on the 27th of December that the time specified in the instructions had elapsed and it was no longer possible for Cowpland to perform. 1960The doctrine of substantial performance does not apply.” (Todd v. Vestermark, 145 Cal.App.2d 374,377 [ 302 P.2d 347 ].) Beebe was in position to produce forthwith the cash required of him and he was entitled to terminate the escrow and have his trust deeds returned when it appeared on the 27th of December that the time specified in the instructions had elapsed and it was no longer possible for Cowpland to perform. | 2 | 2 |
Altadena Escrow Corp. v. Beebegreen2 sentences1968The doctrine of substantial performance does not apply.’ [Citation.]” (Altadena Escrow Corp. v. Beebe, 181 Cal.App.2d 743, 745 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 530 ]; Weisberg v. Ashcraft, 194 Cal.App.2d 225, 231 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 817 ].) “The right to make written demand for return of the money or instruments was an integral, clear and unequivocal clause in the instructions. 1968The doctrine of substantial performance does not apply.’ [Citation.]” (Altadena Escrow Corp. v. Beebe, 181 Cal.App.2d 743, 745 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 530 ]; Weisberg v. Ashcraft, 194 Cal.App.2d 225, 231 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 817 ].) “The right to make written demand for return of the money or instruments was an integral, clear and unequivocal clause in the instructions. | 1 | 2 |
McGuire v. More-Gas Invistment, LLCgreen1 sentence2024(See McGuire, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 522 [“[A] provision in a contract that appears at first glance to be either a liquidated damages clause or an unenforceable penalty provision may instead merely be a provision that permissibly calls for alternative performance by the obligor”].) The cotenancy provision “clearly reserves to [JJD] the power to make a realistic and rational choice.” (Blank, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 971 .) JJD can choose to provide a higher level of service (i.e., a mall with anchor tenants or specified 10 JJD-HOV ELK GROVE, LLC v. JO-ANN STORES, LLC Opinion of the Court by | 1 | 1 |
Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orangegreen1 sentence2024(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) The identified actions are not final and, because the relief granted in the disposition includes setting aside the project’s approval and accompanying certifications, Fresno may ensure its listed potential actions are not vague and do not invite discretion, e.g., failing to define “adequate” in “demonstrate an adequate number of electrical service connections ….” (See Golden Door, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 520-521 [mitigation must contain “objective and measurable standard for what ‘feasible’ ” means]; King & Gardiner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 86 | 1 | 1 |
City of Hayward v. Trustees of the California State Universitygreen1 sentence2024(City of Hayward v. Trustees of California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 855 (City of Hayward) [“The Master Plan goal to reduce drive alone vehicle trips is the performance standard that the TDM plan will strive to meet”].) Third, the TDM identifies nearly a dozen strategies that can feasibly achieve that goal because they are “expected to collectively reduce vehicle trips by 3 to 20 percent.” One, for example, includes public and private shuttle services, the latter of which is “expected to accommodate approximately 40 [percent] of resort patrons,” and which together, along wit | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Asimosgreen1 sentence2024(See Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983 [explaining doctrine of implied findings].) KBC asks that we affirm the trial court’s purportedly merits-based ruling by implying a finding, based on substantial evidence in the record, either that (1) “Starflinger was not ready and willing at all times to buy the [P]roperty” and thus failed to satisfy all the elements needed for specific performance (italics omitted); or (2) “Starflinger acted with unclean 16 hands by: ([a]) submitting a false affidavit and perpetuating that testimony at trial; and/or ([b]) by gamesmanship in testing his p | 1 | 1 |
| Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Secrest v. SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2002-2green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Sade C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Asdourian v. Arajgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agencygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maxwell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Lockhartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roe v. Flores-Ortegagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| McMann v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weisberg v. Ashcraftgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hildebrand v. Beckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spangler v. Castellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Southern Title & Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pothast v. Kindgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Watts v. Mohrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCarthy & Myer v. Bank of Italygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles City High School District v. Quinngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shreeves v. Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blood v. La Serena Land & Water Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Connell v. Higginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond
green
2 sentences2014Even if the study is subject to administrative approval, it is analogous to the sort of post hoc rationalization of agency actions that has been repeatedly condemned in decisions construing CEQA.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 , quoting Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 307 .) The City argues the market study mitigation requirement has a specific performance standard in that each market study will have to show there is “adequate retail demand for the proposed tenants at the site.” (Italics added.) A showing of sufficient deman 2014Even if the study is subject to administrative approval, it is analogous to the sort of post hoc rationalization of agency actions that has been repeatedly condemned in decisions construing CEQA.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 , quoting Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 307 .) The City argues the market study mitigation requirement has a specific performance standard in that each market study will have to show there is “adequate retail demand for the proposed tenants at the site.” (Italics added.) A showing of sufficient deman | 4 | 2014–2020 |
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024(See Gupta v. Trustees of California State University, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 520 [referring to individuals allegedly “treated more favorably” than the plaintiff as “comparator[s]”]; see also Allen v. Staples, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 188 , 194; 10 “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; see Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. 2024(See Gupta v. Trustees of California State University, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 520 [referring to individuals allegedly “treated more favorably” than the plaintiff as “comparator[s]”]; see also Allen v. Staples, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 188 , 194; 10 “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; see Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Southern California Gas Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District
green
2 sentences2022We independently review “whether defendants have exceeded the scope of authority delegated by the Legislature to them.” (Southern California Gas Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 .) Here, however, appellants do not argue the Board does not have authority to enact prescriptive standards. 2022We independently review “whether defendants have exceeded the scope of authority delegated by the Legislature to them.” (Southern California Gas Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 .) Here, however, appellants do not argue the Board does not have authority to enact prescriptive standards. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Escamilla v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n
green
2 sentences2018The cases they cite as authority, including Escamilla v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 53 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 463 , concern whether parties waived their right to a jury trial, not whether they waived their right to appeal errors that occurred before they requested the court to decide a controversy, which is the particular issue here. 2018The cases they cite as authority, including Escamilla v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 53 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 463 , concern whether parties waived their right to a jury trial, not whether they waived their right to appeal errors that occurred before they requested the court to decide a controversy, which is the particular issue here. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Resendiz
red
2 sentences2016(In re Resendiz [(2001) 25 Cal.4th 230 ], 240–242.)[2] ‘[T]hat a defendant may have received valid section 1016.5 advisements from the court does not entail that he has received effective assistance of counsel in evaluating or responding to such advisements.’ [Citation.] Constitutionally adequate assistance ‘“must be determined by a standard bottomed on the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.”’ [Citation.] Therefore ‘[i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assist 2001Section 1016.5 The Attorney General argues, as does Justice Brown in her concurring and dissenting opinion, that a trial court's having provided a section 1016.5 advisement "should shield pleas from collateral attack" (cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 453, 19 P.3d at p. 1192 ) based on immigration consequences. | 2 | 2001–2016 |
Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino
green
2 sentences2014Even if the study is subject to administrative approval, it is analogous to the sort of post hoc rationalization of agency actions that has been repeatedly condemned in decisions construing CEQA.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 , quoting Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 307 .) The City argues the market study mitigation requirement has a specific performance standard in that each market study will have to show there is “adequate retail demand for the proposed tenants at the site.” (Italics added.) A showing of sufficient deman 2014Even if the study is subject to administrative approval, it is analogous to the sort of post hoc rationalization of agency actions that has been repeatedly condemned in decisions construing CEQA.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 , quoting Sundstrom, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 307 .) The City argues the market study mitigation requirement has a specific performance standard in that each market study will have to show there is “adequate retail demand for the proposed tenants at the site.” (Italics added.) A showing of sufficient deman | 2 | 2014–2014 |
California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova
green
2 sentences2010To enforce this performance standard, the EIR provides a list of potential mitigation strategies . . . .” Chevron contends that the mitigation strategy employed in this case is similar to the mitigation plans upheld in California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ] (CNPS) and in SOCA, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1011 . 2010To enforce this performance standard, the EIR provides a list of potential mitigation strategies . . . .” Chevron contends that the mitigation strategy employed in this case is similar to the mitigation plans upheld in California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ] (CNPS) and in SOCA, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 1011 . | 2 | 2010–2014 |
Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026“What constitutes substantial performance is a question of fact, but it is essential that there be no wilful departure from the terms of the contract, and that the defects be such as may be easily remedied or compensated, so that the promisee may get practically what the contract calls for.” (Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 169, 187 ; see Murray’s Iron Works, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [substantial performance on construction contract was shown where the jury could reasonably have concluded that the amount of work remaining could be easily fixed].) Cal Garden fails to cit | 1 | 2026–2026 |
C. Robert Nattress & Associates v. Cidco
green
1 sentence2024Robert Nattress & Associates v. Cidco (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 55, 64 .) However, when the context of the statement is considered, we have no doubt that the trial court was not commenting on the merits of the specific performance claim; rather, it was explaining that 18 Starflinger had, in fact, elected damages as remedy since he did not “really want[ ]” the Property. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Alvernaz
green
1 sentence2024(Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 933 .) Tellez’s counsel failed to advise him of these consequences even though “Sexually Violent Predator Law” (item 14) was listed but not circled on his plea form under a heading that says “My attorney has explained to me that other possible consequences of this plea may be: (Circle applicable consequences.)” (The relevant part of the form is reprinted below.) This fact alone may be dispositive for the performance inquiry in this case. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Blank v. Borden
green
1 sentence2024(See McGuire, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 522 [“[A] provision in a contract that appears at first glance to be either a liquidated damages clause or an unenforceable penalty provision may instead merely be a provision that permissibly calls for alternative performance by the obligor”].) The cotenancy provision “clearly reserves to [JJD] the power to make a realistic and rational choice.” (Blank, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 971 .) JJD can choose to provide a higher level of service (i.e., a mall with anchor tenants or specified 10 JJD-HOV ELK GROVE, LLC v. JO-ANN STORES, LLC Opinion of the Court by | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mazda Motor of America, Inc. v. California New Motor Vehicle Board
green
1 sentence2023Forums for Resolution of Dealer-Manufacturer Disputes “[N]ot every . . . dispute” between dealers and manufacturers “is within the province of the Board.” (Mazda Motor of America, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456 .) The Board’s jurisdiction is “limited by its statutory authorization”—specifically, section 3050, subdivision (c) and section 3050, subdivision (d). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hoopes v. Dolan
green
1 sentence2023The rule minimizes inconsistencies, and avoids giving one side two bites of the apple. [Citation.] The rule also prevents duplication of effort.” (Hoopes, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 158 .) It is clear from the trial court’s ruling that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it ruled on the Company’s specific performance claim following the jury’s verdict. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Sierra Club v. County of Fresno
green
1 sentence2023(Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512 .) 13 As the EIR states, “The net additional GHG emissions associated with the proposed Project is defined as the difference in emissions between the A’s related existing emissions and the Project’s total operational emissions, including construction emissions amortized over the lifetime of the Project.” 35 project sponsor’s current activities and quantifies these emissions. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Poet v. State Air Resources Board
green
1 sentence2023Rather, it failed to meet the requirement of a specific performance standard because the mitigation measure called for a plan that would limit increases in GHG emissions by an amount “up to” no net additional emissions, with the ultimate acceptable reduction left to the discretion of the City Council. ( Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 91, 93.) As a result, the only enforceable requirement in the mitigation measure was that the plan reduce GHG emissions to a level that satisfied that body’s “subjective judgment.” (Id. at p. 93.) Communities therefore accurately labeled the purported | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State Department of Public Health v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023(Public Health, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 955-956; id. at p. 958 [the proposed harmonization impermissibly “result[ed] in a . . . scheme . . . inconsistent with the requirements of either statute”].) Under Barber’s theory, the words “as to that issue” would be added to the end of section 11713.13, subdivision (g)(2), so that the statute would read, in relevant part: “In any proceeding in which the reasonableness of a performance standard . . . is an issue, the manufacturer . . . shall have the burden of proof as to that issue.” (Cf. Evid. 2023(Public Health, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 960 .) In such a case, “ ‘more specific provisions take precedence over more general ones,’ ” even if the more general provisions were enacted later. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2021J. supra, 556 U.S. at p. 884 .) Ultimately, the judge’s comments disparaging the performance of defense counsel and witnesses, though highly inappropriate, did not convey an interest in defendant’s conviction or sentence; the misconduct thus falls short of the “extreme facts” that would raise an objective likelihood that the trial judge here was actually biased against the defendant. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2021(Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005 .) Accordingly, we find no structural error, and will assess the court’s misconduct for prejudice. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McKenzie
green
1 sentence2021Then the court’s power and duty to ensure fairness and preserve the credibility of its judgment extends to recusal even when an informed defendant, for whatever reason, is cooperating in counsel’s tactics.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 629 .) In support of their claim, defendants state competent individual counsel would have minimized the client’s role in the fight, a conflict-free attorney would have advised White not to take the stand and expose himself to impeachment with his prior convictions, and individual representation for White would cause counsel to move to | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of University of California green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bagley v. International Harvester Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Aguilar green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Cassim v. Allstate Insurance green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Sacramento Old City Ass'n v. City Council of Sacramento green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Bonin green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Crovedi green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| BGJ Associates, LLC v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Sava v. Fuller green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. v. Palermo green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Howard Construction Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Lucero green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Estate of Nelsen neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Pope green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Lowy v. United Pacific Insurance green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Love v. White green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Van Allen v. Francis green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Knight v. Black green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.