first time rule in Colorado

2026We thereby reiterated that the defendant could not selectively present facts that created a factually incorrect or misleading impression while simultaneously preventing the prosecution from explaining or providing context to correct the misimpression created by the defense. 40 ¶67 Thus, in Miller, we articulated for the first time the rule for "opening the door" as we use it today: "This concept of 'opening the door' represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being

2026We thereby reiterated that the defendant could not selectively present facts that created a factually incorrect or misleading impression while simultaneously preventing the prosecution from explaining or providing context to correct the misimpression created by the defense. 40 ¶67 Thus, in Miller, we articulated for the first time the rule for "opening the door" as we use it today: "This concept of 'opening the door' represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being

2026We thereby reiterated that the defendant could not selectively present facts that created a factually incorrect or misleading impression while simultaneously preventing the prosecution from explaining or providing context to correct the misimpression created by the defense. 40 ¶67 Thus, in Miller, we articulated for the first time the rule for "opening the door" as we use it today: "This concept of 'opening the door' represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being

2022In Deck, the Supreme Court explained that shackling the defendant undermined “three fundamental legal principles”: the defendant’s presumption of innocence, the defendant’s right to counsel, and “maintain[ing] a judicial process that is a dignified process.” 544 U.S. at 630-32 . ¶ 25 As an initial matter, references to “the defendant” in jury instructions do not undermine a defendant’s presumption of innocence.

2021The prosecutor asserted that, even if testing revealed DNA on the handgun, such evidence would not be determinative of Sauser’s coercion theory because “all of the evidence puts the [handgun] in [Sauser’s] hand.” ¶ 16 The court denied the motion for continuance, noting that defense counsel had made the request for DNA testing “more than a little belatedly,” the jury was present in the courthouse, defense counsel had not previously made such a request, and the evidence did not appear essential to the issues in the case. ¶ 17 On appeal, Sauser contends that, by denying his motion for continuance

2021We are confronted with whether, under the reasonableness standard adopted by our supreme court in Peopl e in Interest of P.E.A. , 754 P.2d 382 , 3 87 (Colo. 1988), the Fourth Amendment is satisfied in the cont ext of this case where a search of a student by school officials was based on anonymous information received through Colorado’s Saf e2Tell hotline.

2021The prosecutor asserted that, even if testing revealed DNA on the handgun, such evidence would not be determinative of Sauser’s coercion theory because “all of the evidence puts the [handgun] in [Sauser’s] hand.” ¶ 16 The court denied the motion for continuance, noting that defense counsel had made the request for DNA testing “more than a little belatedly,” the jury was present in the courthouse, defense counsel had not previously made such a request, and the evidence did not appear essential to the issues in the case. ¶ 17 On appeal, Sauser contends that, by denying his motion for continuance

2021The prosecutor asserted that, even if testing revealed DNA on the handgun, such evidence would not be determinative of Sauser’s coercion theory because “all of the evidence puts the [handgun] in [Sauser’s] hand.” ¶ 16 The court denied the motion for continuance, noting that defense counsel had made the request for DNA testing “more than a little belatedly,” the jury was present in the courthouse, defense counsel had not previously made such a request, and the evidence did not appear essential to the issues in the case. ¶ 17 On appeal, Sauser contends that, by denying his motion for continuance

2013Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); see also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954).

2013Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); see also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954).

1984Rather, in his new trial motion, he asserted for the first time that the instruction was deficient on the basis of People v. Hoehl, 193 Colo. 557 , 568 P.2d 484 (1977).

1984Rather, in his new trial motion, he asserted for the first time that the instruction was deficient on the basis of People v. Hoehl, 193 Colo. 557 , 568 P.2d 484 (1977).