first time hearing in California

2022The law is well settled that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 .) North American’s argument that the court abused its discretion because that late request was preceded by a successful demurrer is ostensibly an end run around the rule that requires amendments t

2021This is why courts consistently hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Liebert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 ; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 90 ; Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265 ; cf. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 [al

2022The law is well settled that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 .) North American’s argument that the court abused its discretion because that late request was preceded by a successful demurrer is ostensibly an end run around the rule that requires amendments t

2021This is why courts consistently hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Liebert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 ; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 90 ; Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265 ; cf. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 [al

2022The law is well settled that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 .) North American’s argument that the court abused its discretion because that late request was preceded by a successful demurrer is ostensibly an end run around the rule that requires amendments t

2021This is why courts consistently hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Liebert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 ; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 90 ; Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265 ; cf. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 [al

2022“In a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance based on preexisting statutes or the Constitution, plaintiffs are limited, under section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), to 90 days from the ordinance’s adoption, which is the first time such a challenge could be brought.” (Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 774 , first italics added.) “When the challenge is instead based on a later enacted state statute, the limitations period (under Code Civ.

2008As the Travis court explained, that provision—which governs an action to enforce a statutory obligation—“runs . . . from the first time the challenge could [have been] brought . . . .” ( 33 Cal.4th at p. 774 .) In this case, the complaint alleges that the City could not meet its obligations under the Regional Housing Needs Allocation in April 2006.

2021(Falcon, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280 .) This is particularly so where, as here, the party seeking leave to amend has proffered no reason for waiting until the hearing itself to so request.

2021(Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263 , 1280- 1281; 580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1 , 13 By asserting that the trial court treated the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, it appears that plaintiffs hope to take advantage of the “‘great liberality . . . used in allowing amendments’” to pleadings in response to a motion for judgement on the pleadings.

2026That procedure includes holding an APS hearing at the request of the licensee. (§§ 13353, subd. (e); 13558.) For a first-time violation of sections 23140, 23152, and 23153, a 6 person’s refusal to submit to chemical testing under section 23612 subjects them to a driver’s license suspension “for a period of one year.” (§ 13353, subd. (a)(1).) “An essential condition to the application of Vehicle Code section 13353 is that the suspect be lawfully arrested on probable cause to believe that he was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.” (Mueller v. Department of Moto

2026Corp. (1941) 19 Cal.2d 65, 70 .) This argument is forfeited as untimely.

2025Addressing itself to the ground on which the motion had been made—mistake—the court cited Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193 , 1206 for the proposition that: “ ‘[m]istake is not a ground for relief under section 473, subdivision (b), when “the court finds that the ‘mistake’ is simply the result of professional incompetence, general ignorance of the law, or unjustifiable negligence in discovering the law[.]” ’ ” And then it concluded: “[T]his is precisely what we have here.” Addressing itself to the topic of promptness, the court said: “[T]he People did not act promptly after learning

2025Trial Court’s Decision The trial court overruled plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, sustained defendants’ evidentiary objections, and granted defendants’ motion on the ground there were no triable issues of fact “as to the first, second and third causes of action based upon Plaintiff having signed a pre-event waiver and release of liability agreement on June 9, 2018.” The court determined “the language of the release is not limited to racing, or the operation of a motor vehicle as contended by Plaintiff.” The court stated the release’s language was “clear and unequivocal and is broad in scope

2025“We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief” (Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178 ), 18 K&R also assert that they were unable to calculate any damages because the Javaheris managed the joint venture and failed to provide K&R with accounting information.

2024(See Mackey v. Trustees of California State University, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 657 ; Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d).) In a variety of contexts, including in proceedings to compel arbitration, trial courts have acted within their discretion in refusing to consider materials offered for the first time at the hearing on the motion.

2024(See Mackey v. Trustees of California State University, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 657 ; Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d).) In a variety of contexts, including in proceedings to compel arbitration, trial courts have acted within their discretion in refusing to consider materials offered for the first time at the hearing on the motion.

2023To the extent that in doing so defendants have raised only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ on claims preserved below, that new 11 aspect of the claims is not forfeited.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant).) In this context, giving such a liberal interpretation to a defendant’s objections below is consistent with our high court’s description of a court’s “imperative task . . . to condemn any violation of th[e] prohibition” against cruel or unusual punishment as our “duty” and “responsibility.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 , 414–415 (Lynch).) Here, Roberts’

2023Under section 745, a defendant must “make[ ] a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (c).) If he succeeds in doing so, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 745, subd. (c)(1).) A first-time claim under section 745 would therefore be “ ‘dependent upon evidence and matters not reflected in the record on appeal,’ ” violating the rule that an appellate court’s “ ‘review on direct appeal is limited to the appellate record.’ ” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 952 .) We also observe that by seeking relief under subdivision (e) of section 745 on

2023(People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856 .) Notwithstanding the People’s procedural objections, we elect to reach the merits of Frazier’s appeal.

2022“First, the party objecting to the strike must establish a prima facie case by showing facts sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory purpose. [Citation.] Second, if the objector succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to offer a permissible, nonbiased justification for the strike. [Citation.] Finally, if the proponent does offer a nonbiased justification, the trial court must decide whether that justification is genuine or instead whether impermissible discrimination in fact motivated the strike.” (People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5

2022(Blazevich, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1125 .) Thus, we reject his contention that the superior court erred by failing to apply an independent judgment standard of review or to “admit” new evidence for the first time at the hearing. 5 person seeking compensation has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 13959, subd. (c).) First and foremost, the loss must be “verif[ied]” by the applicant’s treating health care provider, who “shall” include a “certification that the disability resulted directly from the qualifying crime.” (Cal. Code.

2021This is why courts consistently hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for leave to amend made for the first time at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. (580 Folsom Assocs. v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 ; Shugart v. Regents of University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 508 ; Liebert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1693, 1699 ; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 90 ; Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265 ; cf. Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 [al