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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeLoach v. Foremost Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2017Co., 147 Ga. App. 124, 124-125 (1) (A) ( 248 SE2d 193 ) (1978) (holding that, with regard to a theory raised by a plaintiff for the first time at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings were deemed amended to conform to the evidence presented and that the issue was properly considered on appeal). 4 The Johnsons allege that each member of the joint venture contributed to and profited from the arrangement in the following ways: Robert contributed to the joint venture by paying for the truck himself, and “profited” by having the company pay for the maintenance and insurance cost 2017Co., 147 Ga. App. 124, 124-125 (1) (A) ( 248 SE2d 193 ) (1978) (holding that, with regard to a theory raised by a plaintiff for the first time at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings were deemed amended to conform to the evidence presented and that the issue was properly considered on appeal). 4 The Johnsons allege that each member of the joint venture contributed to and profited from the arrangement in the following ways: Robert contributed to the joint venture by paying for the truck himself, and “profited” by having the company pay for the maintenance and insurance cost | 1 | 1 |
AMERICAN MATERIAL SERVICES, INC. v. Giddensgreen2 sentences2017Co., 147 Ga. App. 124, 124-125 (1) (A) ( 248 SE2d 193 ) (1978) (holding that, with regard to a theory raised by a plaintiff for the first time at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings were deemed amended to conform to the evidence presented and that the issue was properly considered on appeal). 4 The Johnsons allege that each member of the joint venture contributed to and profited from the arrangement in the following ways: Robert contributed to the joint venture by paying for the truck himself, and “profited” by having the company pay for the maintenance and insurance cost 2017Co., 147 Ga. App. 124, 124-125 (1) (A) ( 248 SE2d 193 ) (1978) (holding that, with regard to a theory raised by a plaintiff for the first time at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings were deemed amended to conform to the evidence presented and that the issue was properly considered on appeal). 4 The Johnsons allege that each member of the joint venture contributed to and profited from the arrangement in the following ways: Robert contributed to the joint venture by paying for the truck himself, and “profited” by having the company pay for the maintenance and insurance cost | 1 | 1 |
Shabazz v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Nevertheless, upon considering Dixon and McClellan, supra, the Court of Appeals in Shabazz v. State, 273 Ga. App. 389, 391 ( 615 SE2d 214 ) (2005) announced for the first time that the rule of lenity was inapplicable because the crimes at issue in that case both exacted felony punishments. 2013Nevertheless, upon considering Dixon and McClellan, supra, the Court of Appeals in Shabazz v. State, 273 Ga. App. 389, 391 ( 615 SE2d 214 ) (2005) announced for the first time that the rule of lenity was inapplicable because the crimes at issue in that case both exacted felony punishments. | 1 | 1 |
Wfse v. Ofmgreen2 sentences2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 1 |
Purkett v. Elemgreen1 sentence2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authoritygreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment will not be reversed on appeal for failing to consider argument not articulated by party); Ex parte Ryals, 773 So2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 2000) (“trial court cannot be reversed on any ground or argument not presented for or against the motion [for summary judgment]”); Washington Federation of State Employees v. Office of Financial Management, 849 P2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. 1993) (in reviewing summary judgment, appellate court considers “only evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial court”) 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 1 |
Roundtree v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Pauligreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment will not be reversed on appeal for failing to consider argument not articulated by party); Ex parte Ryals, 773 So2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 2000) (“trial court cannot be reversed on any ground or argument not presented for or against the motion [for summary judgment]”); Washington Federation of State Employees v. Office of Financial Management, 849 P2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. 1993) (in reviewing summary judgment, appellate court considers “only evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial court”) 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 1 |
Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allredgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment will not be reversed on appeal for failing to consider argument not articulated by party); Ex parte Ryals, 773 So2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 2000) (“trial court cannot be reversed on any ground or argument not presented for or against the motion [for summary judgment]”); Washington Federation of State Employees v. Office of Financial Management, 849 P2d 1201, 1203 (Wash. 1993) (in reviewing summary judgment, appellate court considers “only evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial court”) 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Trice v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Ryalsgreen1 sentence2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, 2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1991As to consideration of late affidavits, see Howell Mill/Collier Assoc, v. Gonzales, 186 Ga. App. 909 ( 368 SE2d 831 ); compare Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ). 2. 1991As to consideration of late affidavits, see Howell Mill/Collier Assoc, v. Gonzales, 186 Ga. App. 909 ( 368 SE2d 831 ); compare Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mayor of Macon v. Franklin
green
2 sentences1949In City of LaFayette v. Walker County, 151 Ga. 786 ( 108 S. E. 218 ), it is held: “It is not essential to constitute a valid dedication to the public that the right of use should be vested in a corporate body.” In this same case, on page 791, it is said: “Intention to dedicate may be inferred from acquiescence by the owner in the use of his land by the public, if the use be of such character as to clearly indicate that the public accepted the dedication to the public use.” As pointed out by this court, in Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co., 113 Ga. 481, 492 ( 39 S. E. 12 1901The first time that the doctrine of dedication was expounded by this court was in the case of the Mayor &c. of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239 , in which case Judge Nisbet (as he uniformly did in other cases) delivered an exhaustive and instructive opinion. | 2 | 1901–1949 |
McClellan v. State
green
1 sentence2013Nevertheless, upon considering Dixon and McClellan, supra, the Court of Appeals in Shabazz v. State, 273 Ga. App. 389, 391 ( 615 SE2d 214 ) (2005) announced for the first time that the rule of lenity was inapplicable because the crimes at issue in that case both exacted felony punishments. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jackson v. Ford
green
2 sentences2002For the sake of clarity, we refer to only the current plaintiff in interest. 2 (Punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. Ford, 252 Ga. App. 304 (1) ( 555 SE2d 143 ) (2001). 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. 4 Norwest contends that we cannot consider the agreement between Fowler and Lion-heart Legend, which was presented for the first time at the hearing on its motion for summary judgment. 2002For the sake of clarity, we refer to only the current plaintiff in interest. 2 (Punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. Ford, 252 Ga. App. 304 (1) ( 555 SE2d 143 ) (2001). 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. 4 Norwest contends that we cannot consider the agreement between Fowler and Lion-heart Legend, which was presented for the first time at the hearing on its motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Weitz
green
1 sentence2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Dental One Asssociates, Inc. v. JKR Realty Associates, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that 2002Co., 250 Ga. 83, 84 , 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982) (discussing inherent injustice if party appealing denial of motion for directed verdict is permitted to assert on appeal an issue not raised in motion). [10] Special circumstances could include "a jurisdictional challenge, a claim of sovereign immunity, a serious issue of public policy, a change in the law, or [an] error that works manifest injustice." See 19 Moore's Federal Practice, sec 205.05[2] at 205-58 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). [11] Whether a party should file a transcript or a stipulation under OCGA § 5-6-41(i) depends entirely on whether that | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2002Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). 2 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 3 See Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 292, 293 ( 548 SE2d 63 ) (2001). 4 Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 5 Jones v. State, 240 Ga. App. 339, 342 (1) ( 523 SE2d 402 ) (1999). 6 (Citation omitted.) Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151 (2). 7 Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) ( 464 SE2d 205 ) (1995); see Jones, supra, 240 Ga. App. at 342 (1). 8 See, e.g., Jones, | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Howell Mill/Collier Associates v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences1991As to consideration of late affidavits, see Howell Mill/Collier Assoc, v. Gonzales, 186 Ga. App. 909 ( 368 SE2d 831 ); compare Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ). 2. 1991As to consideration of late affidavits, see Howell Mill/Collier Assoc, v. Gonzales, 186 Ga. App. 909 ( 368 SE2d 831 ); compare Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ). 2. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Skrine v. State
green
1 sentence1987The appellant argues that in a line of cases commencing with Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 SE2d 900 ) (1979), the jury instructions under attack here had been repeatedly upheld by this court; however, the Supreme Court of the United States, on April 25, 1985, in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. _ (105 SC 1965, 85 LE2d 344) (1985), held that jury instructions virtually identical to those given here are unconstitutionally burden-shifting. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Craig v. Harney
green
2 sentences1978Attorney Farmer takes issue with our holding that the standard of proof to be applied in contempt actions such as this is the civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, insisting for the first time that this standard is contrary to the due process requirements established in Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (67 SC 1249, 91 LE 1546) (1947). 1978Attorney Farmer takes issue with our holding that the standard of proof to be applied in contempt actions such as this is the civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, insisting for the first time that this standard is contrary to the due process requirements established in Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (67 SC 1249, 91 LE 1546) (1947). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Eaves v. Field & Son
neutral
1 sentence1963Exceptions to the charge of the court can not be used as a substitute for timely objections to the introduction of testimony.” Eaves v. Field & Son, 8 Ga. App. 69 ( 68 SE 656 ). | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Dodd v. State
neutral
1 sentence1963Exceptions to the charge of the court can not be used as a substitute for timely objections to the introduction of testimony.” Eaves v. Field & Son, 8 Ga. App. 69 ( 68 SE 656 ). | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Smith v. Mayor C. of MacOn
green
2 sentences1954Burnett v. Burnett, 209 Ga. 353 ( 72 S. E. 2d 459 ); Smith v. Mayor &c. of Macon, 202 Ga. 68 ( 42 S. E. 2d 128 ). 2. 1954Burnett v. Burnett, 209 Ga. 353 ( 72 S. E. 2d 459 ); Smith v. Mayor &c. of Macon, 202 Ga. 68 ( 42 S. E. 2d 128 ). 2. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Burnett v. Burnett
green
2 sentences1954Burnett v. Burnett, 209 Ga. 353 ( 72 S. E. 2d 459 ); Smith v. Mayor &c. of Macon, 202 Ga. 68 ( 42 S. E. 2d 128 ). 2. 1954Burnett v. Burnett, 209 Ga. 353 ( 72 S. E. 2d 459 ); Smith v. Mayor &c. of Macon, 202 Ga. 68 ( 42 S. E. 2d 128 ). 2. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| City of La Fayette v. Walker County green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Penick v. Foster green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Dennard v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Chambliss v. State neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.