8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Hughesgreen2 sentences2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o 2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o | 2 | 3 |
State v. Pollardgreen2 sentences2019State v. Pollard , 908 N.E.2d 1145 , 1150 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations omitted). *580 "No one factor is determinative. [O]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them." Id. 2019State v. Pollard , 908 N.E.2d 1145 , 1150 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations omitted). *580 "No one factor is determinative. [O]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them." Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Seeringgreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 357 Ill.App.3d 530 , 293 Ill.Dec. 459 , 828 N.E.2d 769, 780-81 (2005) ("Put simply, the restrictions placed on the defendant by [the residency statute] in no way resemble the historical punishment of banishment...."); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Iowa 2005) (finding Iowa's residency statute was "far removed from the traditional concept of banishment" because it restricted only residence, allowing offenders to freely "engage in most community activities"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leroygreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 357 Ill.App.3d 530 , 293 Ill.Dec. 459 , 828 N.E.2d 769, 780-81 (2005) ("Put simply, the restrictions placed on the defendant by [the residency statute] in no way resemble the historical punishment of banishment...."); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Iowa 2005) (finding Iowa's residency statute was "far removed from the traditional concept of banishment" because it restricted only residence, allowing offenders to freely "engage in most community activities"). 2009See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 357 Ill.App.3d 530 , 293 Ill.Dec. 459 , 828 N.E.2d 769, 780-81 (2005) ("Put simply, the restrictions placed on the defendant by [the residency statute] in no way resemble the historical punishment of banishment...."); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Iowa 2005) (finding Iowa's residency statute was "far removed from the traditional concept of banishment" because it restricted only residence, allowing offenders to freely "engage in most community activities"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. United States
green
2 sentences2016In Lewis v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to 18 U.S.CApp. § 1202(a)(1), 13 which prohibited a convicted felon from possessing a firearm. 445 U.S. 55, 57-58 , 100 S.Ct. 915 , 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). 2016In Lewis v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to 18 U.S.CApp. § 1202(a)(1), 13 which prohibited a convicted felon from possessing a firearm. 445 U.S. 55, 57-58 , 100 S.Ct. 915 , 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Flanders v. State
green
2 sentences2015In this regard, the Wallace court concluded that “as applied to Wallace, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because it imposes burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his crime was committed.” Id. at 384 . [30] As discussed above, we concluded that factor one, two, four, and five of the Mendoza-Martinez factors were punitive as applied to Ammons. 2015In this regard, the Wallace court concluded that “as applied to Wallace, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because it imposes burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his crime was committed.” Id. at 384 . [30] As discussed above, we concluded that factor one, two, four, and five of the Mendoza-Martinez factors were punitive as applied to Ammons. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o 2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wallace v. State
green
2 sentences2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o 2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Healey v. State
green
2 sentences2012In analyzing the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we adopt the reasoning and holding from Healey – only two of the seven factors “lean in favor of treating the effects of the 1995 amendment as punitive when applied to Healey.” 969 N.E.2d at 616 . 2012Therefore, after analyzing the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we agree with the previous panel of this Court that found that “Healey has not carried his burden of demonstrating that as applied to him, the 1995 amendment violates the Indiana constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.” Healey, 969 N.E.2d at 616 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2011I cannot find fault with the majority's methodical analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, especially in light of the Hudson statement that only the clearest proof will suffice to "override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." 522 U.S. at 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . 2011I cannot find fault with the majority's methodical analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, especially in light of the Hudson statement that only the clearest proof will suffice to "override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." 522 U.S. at 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.