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19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fredericksgreen2 sentences2019Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d at 421 , 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 . ¶ 21 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2012 SORA in Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶ 58, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , and the 2014 SORA and Sex Offender Community Notification Law (Notification Law) ( 730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. 2019Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d at 421 , 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 . ¶ 21 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2012 SORA in Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶ 58, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , and the 2014 SORA and Sex Offender Community Notification Law (Notification Law) ( 730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. | 3 | 7 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2021The State, to its discredit, fails to address the manner in which defendant challenges the re-registration provision. -3- ¶ 14 On the merits, defendant, after recognizing a law must be both retroactive and disadvantageous to a defendant to violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, simply refers to the re-registration provision as retroactive and then presents a lengthy argument, using the Mendoza-Martinez factors (Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)) and case law, why SORA, as a whole, has become punitive and therefore disadvantageous to a defendant. 2021The State, to its discredit, fails to address the manner in which defendant challenges the re-registration provision. -3- ¶ 14 On the merits, defendant, after recognizing a law must be both retroactive and disadvantageous to a defendant to violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, simply refers to the re-registration provision as retroactive and then presents a lengthy argument, using the Mendoza-Martinez factors (Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)) and case law, why SORA, as a whole, has become punitive and therefore disadvantageous to a defendant. | 1 | 7 |
People v. Malchowgreen2 sentences2019Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d at 421 , 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 . ¶ 21 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2012 SORA in Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶ 58, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , and the 2014 SORA and Sex Offender Community Notification Law (Notification Law) ( 730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. 2019Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d at 421 , 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 . ¶ 21 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2012 SORA in Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶ 58, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , and the 2014 SORA and Sex Offender Community Notification Law (Notification Law) ( 730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. | 1 | 6 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2016Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-92, 98-103 . ¶76 More recently, in Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , our court undertook a Mendoza-Martinez analysis of a recent amendment to SORA which provided that a sex offender convicted of any subsequent felony was required to register for life and concluded that the sex offender registration scheme has not transformed into a punishment since Malchow. 2016Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-92, 98-103 . ¶76 More recently, in Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , our court undertook a Mendoza-Martinez analysis of a recent amendment to SORA which provided that a sex offender convicted of any subsequent felony was required to register for life and concluded that the sex offender registration scheme has not transformed into a punishment since Malchow. | 1 | 5 |
In re A.C.green2 sentences2018See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 421 . ¶ 16 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2013 SORA in Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶ 58 , and A.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶¶ 77-78 , and determined that the changes to SORA since Malchow did not render the Act punitive. 2018See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 421 . ¶ 16 We previously applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the 2013 SORA in Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶ 58 , and A.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶¶ 77-78 , and determined that the changes to SORA since Malchow did not render the Act punitive. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Dunngreen2 sentences2021See People v. Dunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 150198, ¶ 20 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “because his sex offender status prohibits him from certain residences or jobs, his liberty is effectively restrained”). ¶ 11 Moreover, our supreme court recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶¶ 67, 69 , holding that the defendant’s obligation to register for life under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. 2021See People v. Dunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 150198, ¶ 20 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “because his sex offender status prohibits him from certain residences or jobs, his liberty is effectively restrained”). ¶ 11 Moreover, our supreme court recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶¶ 67, 69 , holding that the defendant’s obligation to register for life under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See People v. Dunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 150198, ¶ 20 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “because his sex offender status prohibits him from certain residences or jobs, his liberty is effectively restrained”). ¶ 11 Moreover, our supreme court recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶¶ 67, 69 , holding that the defendant’s obligation to register for life under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. 2021See People v. Dunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 150198, ¶ 20 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “because his sex offender status prohibits him from certain residences or jobs, his liberty is effectively restrained”). ¶ 11 Moreover, our supreme court recently rejected a similar argument in People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶¶ 67, 69 , holding that the defendant’s obligation to register for life under the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020See People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 52 . - 13 - 1-18-1060 concluded the relevant version had no punitive intent or effect. 2020See People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 52 . - 13 - 1-18-1060 concluded the relevant version had no punitive intent or effect. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Tetter
green
2 sentences2019Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 59 . ¶ 61 The fourth and fifth Mendoza-Martinez factors—rational relationship to an alternative, nonpunitive purpose and whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to that nonpunitive purpose—were considered together in Tetter. 2018Tetter , 2018 IL App (3d) 150243 , ¶ 59. ¶ 61 The fourth and fifth Mendoza-Martinez factors-rational relationship to an alternative, nonpunitive purpose and whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to that nonpunitive purpose-were considered together in Tetter . | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Weaver v. Graham
green
2 sentences2019We agree with the State. ¶ 21 With respect to retroactivity, "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date." Weaver , 450 U.S. at 31 , 101 S.Ct. 960 . 2019We agree with the State. ¶ 21 With respect to retroactivity, "[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date." Weaver , 450 U.S. at 31 , 101 S.Ct. 960 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.