Mendoza-Martinez factors in Michigan

2025PUNITIVE EFFECTS AS A WHOLE When considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors cumulatively, defendant has met his burden to show by “the clearest proof” 48 that the 2021 SORA “is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil[.]” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (citation modified).

2025PUNITIVE EFFECTS AS A WHOLE When considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors cumulatively, defendant has met his burden to show by “the clearest proof” 48 that the 2021 SORA “is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil[.]” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (citation modified).

2024See Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 97 ; 123 S Ct 1140 ; 155 L Ed 2d 164 (2003) (“the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts”); Does 1-7 v Abbott, 945 F3d 307 , 313 n 9 (CA 5, 2019).

2024See Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 97 ; 123 S Ct 1140 ; 155 L Ed 2d 164 (2003) (“the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts”); Does 1-7 v Abbott, 945 F3d 307 , 313 n 9 (CA 5, 2019).

2026This Court then held in People v Lymon, 342 Mich App 46 , 81; 993 NW2d 24 (2022) (Lymon I), aff’d in part, vacated in part 515 Mich 145 (2024), that the 2021 SORA was a punishment under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.

2026This Court then held in People v Lymon, 342 Mich App 46 , 81; 993 NW2d 24 (2022) (Lymon I), aff’d in part, vacated in part 515 Mich 145 (2024), that the 2021 SORA was a punishment under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.

2021See also Earl, 495 Mich at 43-44 (noting the Mendoza-Martinez factors as the proper avenue of analysis for this issue).] 11 Further, the Legislature’s manifest intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added).

2021See also Earl, 495 Mich at 43-44 (noting the Mendoza-Martinez factors as the proper avenue of analysis for this issue).] 11 Further, the Legislature’s manifest intent will be rejected only when “a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361 ; 117 S Ct 2072 ; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; emphasis added).

2021The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is “frightening and high.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 , 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002); see also id., at 33 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 (“When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault” (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 27 (1997); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997))). [Smith, 538 US at 103 .] Taking into account all t

2021The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is “frightening and high.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 , 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002); see also id., at 33 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 (“When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault” (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 27 (1997); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997))). [Smith, 538 US at 103 .] Taking into account all t

2024To aid in that analysis, this Court has adopted from the United States Supreme Court the following nonexhaustive factors to be considered (i.e., “the Mendoza-Martinez factors”): Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is as

2024To aid in that analysis, this Court has adopted from the United States Supreme Court the following nonexhaustive factors to be considered (i.e., “the Mendoza-Martinez factors”): Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is as

2024See Does #1-5, 834 F3d at 701-702 (finding the 1,000-foot school restriction similar to banishment in large part because it limits where an offender can live and work), 703 (considering the 1,000-foot restriction to be “most significant” in terms of a restraint on offenders, making it dissimilar to what was involved in Smith), and 705 (discussing the restriction in terms of excessiveness).

2024See Does #1-5, 834 F3d at 701-702 (finding the 1,000-foot school restriction similar to banishment in large part because it limits where an offender can live and work), 703 (considering the 1,000-foot restriction to be “most significant” in terms of a restraint on offenders, making it dissimilar to what was involved in Smith), and 705 (discussing the restriction in terms of excessiveness).

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024It therefore requires “the clearest proof” that the statute can only be considered punitive, “transform[ing] what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 20 To resolve this question, the Court referred to the nonexhaustive Mendoza-Martinez factors. 21 Paris, 78 F4th 389, 400 (CA 7, 2023) (analyzing the standard with crossovers from rational-basis review); compare Armour v Indianapolis, 566 US 673, 685 ; 132 S Ct 2073 ; 182 L Ed 2d 998 (2012) (explaining that rational basis does not require a “perfect” or even a “superior” choice, but instead one that is “rational”). 19 Sm

2024See In re Certified Question, 447 Mich 765 , 776 & n 13; 527 NW2d 468 (1994). 6 traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963) (citations omitted).

2024See In re Certified Question, 447 Mich 765 , 776 & n 13; 527 NW2d 468 (1994). 6 traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. [Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963) (citations omitted).

2015See id. at 262 .

2015See id. at 262 .