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7 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Urserygreen2 sentences2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective 2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective | 2 | 2 |
State v. Letaliengreen2 sentences2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa 2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa | 1 | 4 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa 2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa | 1 | 4 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2015"Although the Supreme Court warned against lifting a test for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another, [it has] applied the ‘intent-effects' test ... to both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.” State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154 , ¶ 9 n. 7, 784 A.2d 4 ; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (explaining that "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts" and have their “origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post 2015"Although the Supreme Court warned against lifting a test for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another, [it has] applied the ‘intent-effects' test ... to both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.” State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154 , ¶ 9 n. 7, 784 A.2d 4 ; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (explaining that "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts" and have their “origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post | 1 | 3 |
State v. Haskellgreen2 sentences2015"Although the Supreme Court warned against lifting a test for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another, [it has] applied the ‘intent-effects' test ... to both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.” State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154 , ¶ 9 n. 7, 784 A.2d 4 ; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (explaining that "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts" and have their “origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post 2015"Although the Supreme Court warned against lifting a test for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another, [it has] applied the ‘intent-effects' test ... to both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.” State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154 , ¶ 9 n. 7, 784 A.2d 4 ; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (explaining that "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts" and have their “origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post | 1 | 2 |
cluster 716733green2 sentences2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective 2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Kelleygreen2 sentences2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective 2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective | 1 | 1 |
Myrie v. Commissioner, N.J. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2015Dept. of Corr., 267 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir.2001) (applying the "intent-effects” test to the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Bill of Attainder Clauses). 14 . 2015Dept. of Corr., 267 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir.2001) (applying the "intent-effects” test to the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Bill of Attainder Clauses). 14 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cosgrogreen2 sentences2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa 2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31 , 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). [¶26] In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, “demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.” See State v. Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2 , 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶27] Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Fa | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Poritzgreen2 sentences2006The Letalien court distinguished Maine's then-applicable registration scheme from cases where the sex offender registration laws had been held not to impose a restraint "because the relevant laws afforded offenders the opportunity to seek the early termination of the registration requirement." Letalien, 2009 ME 130 , ~ 37 n. 9, 985 A.2d at 18 n.9 (citing Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d I263, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1997), amended on other grounds by 120 F.3d 1263 , 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing a duty to register in person every ninety days for a minimum often years); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 , 662 A.2d 3 2006The Letalien court distinguished Maine's then-applicable registration scheme from cases where the sex offender registration laws had been held not to impose a restraint "because the relevant laws afforded offenders the opportunity to seek the early termination of the registration requirement." Letalien, 2009 ME 130 , ~ 37 n. 9, 985 A.2d at 18 n.9 (citing Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d I263, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1997), amended on other grounds by 120 F.3d 1263 , 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing a duty to register in person every ninety days for a minimum often years); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 , 662 A.2d 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Malchowgreen2 sentences2001See People v. Ansell, 25 Cal.4th 868 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 24 P.3d 1174, 1186 (2001); cf. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d at 440 (stating that, because the notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions, the fifth factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of the defendant; however, the notification requirements were deemed constitutional when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors in whole). [¶ 21] Sixth, SORNA has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with the law. 2001See People v. Ansell, 25 Cal.4th 868 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 24 P.3d 1174, 1186 (2001); cf. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d at 440 (stating that, because the notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions, the fifth factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of the defendant; however, the notification requirements were deemed constitutional when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors in whole). [¶ 21] Sixth, SORNA has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with the law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ansellgreen2 sentences2001See People v. Ansell, 25 Cal.4th 868 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 24 P.3d 1174, 1186 (2001); cf. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d at 440 (stating that, because the notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions, the fifth factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of the defendant; however, the notification requirements were deemed constitutional when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors in whole). [¶ 21] Sixth, SORNA has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with the law. 2001See People v. Ansell, 25 Cal.4th 868 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 24 P.3d 1174, 1186 (2001); cf. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d at 440 (stating that, because the notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions, the fifth factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of the defendant; however, the notification requirements were deemed constitutional when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors in whole). [¶ 21] Sixth, SORNA has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with the law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
green
2 sentences2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective 2015See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277-78 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (articulating a two-part test for punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause that considers both intent and effects); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475 , 97 S.Ct. 2777 (applying an intent test and citing the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the bill of attainder context); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1996) (articulating a three-part test to identify punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, that "looks to the legislature's subjective | 1 | 2015–2015 |
John Doe I v. Robert Williams
green
2 sentences2015Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 44-55 , 985 A.2d 4 ; Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶¶ 36-44 , 61 A.3d 718 . 2015Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 44-55 , 985 A.2d 4 ; Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶¶ 36-44 , 61 A.3d 718 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Freeman
green
2 sentences2009In State v. Freeman, 487 A.2d 1175 (Me.1985), this Court held that a civil drunk driving law was determined to have sufficient criminal characteristics to require constitutional safeguards; that civil law was deemed void, however, because a complementary criminal drunk driving law was already in effect. 2009In State v. Freeman, 487 A.2d 1175 (Me.1985), this Court held that a civil drunk driving law was determined to have sufficient criminal characteristics to require constitutional safeguards; that civil law was deemed void, however, because a complementary criminal drunk driving law was already in effect. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Doe v. Pataki
green
1 sentence2006The Letalien court distinguished Maine's then-applicable registration scheme from cases where the sex offender registration laws had been held not to impose a restraint "because the relevant laws afforded offenders the opportunity to seek the early termination of the registration requirement." Letalien, 2009 ME 130 , ~ 37 n. 9, 985 A.2d at 18 n.9 (citing Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d I263, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1997), amended on other grounds by 120 F.3d 1263 , 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing a duty to register in person every ninety days for a minimum often years); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 , 662 A.2d 3 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Flemming v. Nestor
green
2 sentences2001It is well-established that “[a] law serving nonpunitive goals ‘is not punishment, even though it may bear harshly on one affected.’” Moore, 253 F.3d at 873 , (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). [¶ 15] Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors further supports a finding that SORNA requirements do not have a punitive effect. 9 First, SORNA does not place an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. 2001It is well-established that “[a] law serving nonpunitive goals ‘is not punishment, even though it may bear harshly on one affected.’” Moore, 253 F.3d at 873 , (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). [¶ 15] Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors further supports a finding that SORNA requirements do not have a punitive effect. 9 First, SORNA does not place an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
cluster 746284
green
1 sentence2001Gregoire, 124 F.3d at 1091 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center
green
2 sentences2001It is well-established that “[a] law serving nonpunitive goals ‘is not punishment, even though it may bear harshly on one affected.’” Moore, 253 F.3d at 873 , (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). [¶ 15] Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors further supports a finding that SORNA requirements do not have a punitive effect. 9 First, SORNA does not place an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. 2001It is well-established that “[a] law serving nonpunitive goals ‘is not punishment, even though it may bear harshly on one affected.’” Moore, 253 F.3d at 873 , (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). [¶ 15] Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors further supports a finding that SORNA requirements do not have a punitive effect. 9 First, SORNA does not place an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.