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7 Wisconsin opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2018The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, however, are only "guideposts" and the list is "not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive." Scruggs , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , ¶ 41, 891 N.W.2d 786 (quoting Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 ; citing Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ). f. 2018The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, however, are only "guideposts" and the list is "not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive." Scruggs , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , ¶ 41, 891 N.W.2d 786 (quoting Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 ; citing Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ). f. | 5 | 6 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2021See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 . 2017See majority op., ¶¶44-45. ¶71 The sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors, taken together, require courts to ask a two-part question: Is there a rational connection between the surcharge and the non-punitive purpose, and is the amount of the surcharge excessive in 10 "The Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a '[m]ost significant' factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)). 11 See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) ("[T]he | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jamal L. Williamsgreen2 sentences2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. 2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tabitha A. Scruggsgreen2 sentences2018The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, however, are only "guideposts" and the list is "not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive." Scruggs , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , ¶ 41, 891 N.W.2d 786 (quoting Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 ; citing Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ). f. 2018The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, however, are only "guideposts" and the list is "not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive." Scruggs , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , ¶ 41, 891 N.W.2d 786 (quoting Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 , 118 S.Ct. 488 ; citing Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ). f. | 2 | 2 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. 2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. | 1 | 5 |
United States v. Urserygreen2 sentences2017See majority op., ¶¶44-45. ¶71 The sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors, taken together, require courts to ask a two-part question: Is there a rational connection between the surcharge and the non-punitive purpose, and is the amount of the surcharge excessive in 10 "The Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a '[m]ost significant' factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)). 11 See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) ("[T]he 2002In United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), the Court recognized the narrowness of the Halper rule, found it inapplicable to a double jeopardy challenge of a "civil forfeiture," as opposed to a "civil penalty," and instead *233 applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors. | 1 | 2 |
Weaver v. Grahamgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1997) (the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors "must be considered in relation to the statute on its face."); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 34 (1981) ("the inquiry [whether the criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor] looks to the challenged provision, and not to any special circumstances that may mitigate its effect on the particular individual"); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) ("[T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to t | 1 | 1 |
Lindsey v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1997) (the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors "must be considered in relation to the statute on its face."); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 34 (1981) ("the inquiry [whether the criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor] looks to the challenged provision, and not to any special circumstances that may mitigate its effect on the particular individual"); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) ("[T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Radaj
green
2 sentences2017The sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors, taken together, require courts to ask a two-part question: Is there a rational connection between the surcharge and the non-punitive purpose, and is the amount of the surcharge excessive in relation to the non-punitive activities the surcharge funds? 12 "If there is no rational connection and the fee is excessive in relation to the activities it is intended to fund, then the fee in effect serves as an additional criminal fine, that is, the fee is punitive." Radaj, 363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 25 . ¶ 72. 2017See majority op., ¶¶44-45. ¶71 The sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors, taken together, require courts to ask a two-part question: Is there a rational connection between the surcharge and the non-punitive purpose, and is the amount of the surcharge excessive in 10 "The Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a '[m]ost significant' factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)). 11 See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) ("[T]he | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2002Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-64 . ¶ 31. 2002Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-64 . ¶ 31. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.