interpretive principle in Oregon

2025Accordingly, we turn to the familiar interpretive framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 , to determine whether the legislature intended ORS 133.673 to create a statutory mechanism for suppression.

2025Accordingly, we turn to the familiar interpretive framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 , to determine whether the legislature intended ORS 133.673 to create a statutory mechanism for suppression.

2025Accordingly, we turn to the familiar interpretive framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 , to determine whether the legislature intended ORS 133.673 to create a statutory mechanism for suppression.

2025Accordingly, we turn to the familiar interpretive framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 , to determine whether the legislature intended ORS 133.673 to create a statutory mechanism for suppression.

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2023We concluded, “When applying terms of complete legislative expression, an agency may interpret statutory standards either by an interpretive rule or by order in a contested case.” Id. at 368- 69 (emphases added).

2023We concluded, “When applying terms of complete legislative expression, an agency may interpret statutory standards either by an interpretive rule or by order in a contested case.” Id. at 368- 69 (emphases added).

2022Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum, 361 Or 352, 365 , 393 P3d 1122 (2017) (Gordon) (quoting Goodwin v. Kingsman Plastering, Inc., 359 Or 694, 702 , 375 P3d 463 (2016)).

2022Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum, 361 Or 352, 365 , 393 P3d 1122 (2017) (Gordon) (quoting Goodwin v. Kingsman Plastering, Inc., 359 Or 694, 702 , 375 P3d 463 (2016)).

2018Moreover, the legislature’s use of the distinct term “report” in ORS 162.375(1) suggests that the legislature intended to describe something different from a “statement.” See also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 323 , 374 P3d 829 (2016) (“[I]f the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, it likely intended them to have different meanings.” (emphasis in original.)).

2018Moreover, the legislature’s use of the distinct term “report” in ORS 162.375(1) suggests that the legislature intended to describe something different from a “statement.” See also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 323 , 374 P3d 829 (2016) (“[I]f the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, it likely intended them to have different meanings.” (emphasis in original.)).

2025Applying the interpretive framework set out in Hoffman Const. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469-71 , 836 P2d 703 (1992), plaintiffs con- tend that the meaning of “occurrence” is inherently ambig- uous and should be construed more broadly than the courts did below.

2025Applying the interpretive framework set out in Hoffman Const. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469-71 , 836 P2d 703 (1992), plaintiffs con- tend that the meaning of “occurrence” is inherently ambig- uous and should be construed more broadly than the courts did below.

2024That “special status” operates as an interpretive presumption: when the “legislature borrows wording from a statute originating in another jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the legisla- ture borrowed controlling case law interpreting the statute along with it.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 418 , 939 P2d 608 (1997); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad et al., Gray et ux., 233 Or 578, 585 , 379 P2d 880 (1963).

2024That “special status” operates as an interpretive presumption: when the “legislature borrows wording from a statute originating in another jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the legisla- ture borrowed controlling case law interpreting the statute along with it.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 418 , 939 P2d 608 (1997); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad et al., Gray et ux., 233 Or 578, 585 , 379 P2d 880 (1963).

2024The state argues that the Oregon legislature borrowed the relevant stat- utory text of ORS 166.255(3)(e) directly from federal law after the United States Supreme Court had interpreted the meaning of “force” in Castleman to mean “offensive touch- ing.” Accordingly, the state urges us to apply the “borrowed- statute rule.” That “rule” is an interpretive principle that, when Oregon enacts legislation that borrows from legis- lation in another jurisdiction, we “accord a special status to prior interpretation by the highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.” Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or at 29 .

2024The state argues that the Oregon legislature borrowed the relevant stat- utory text of ORS 166.255(3)(e) directly from federal law after the United States Supreme Court had interpreted the meaning of “force” in Castleman to mean “offensive touch- ing.” Accordingly, the state urges us to apply the “borrowed- statute rule.” That “rule” is an interpretive principle that, when Oregon enacts legislation that borrows from legis- lation in another jurisdiction, we “accord a special status to prior interpretation by the highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.” Guzman/Heckler, 366 Or at 29 .

2024That “special status” operates as an interpretive presumption: when the “legislature borrows wording from a statute originating in another jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the legisla- ture borrowed controlling case law interpreting the statute along with it.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 418 , 939 P2d 608 (1997); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad et al., Gray et ux., 233 Or 578, 585 , 379 P2d 880 (1963).

2024That “special status” operates as an interpretive presumption: when the “legislature borrows wording from a statute originating in another jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the legisla- ture borrowed controlling case law interpreting the statute along with it.” Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 418 , 939 P2d 608 (1997); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad et al., Gray et ux., 233 Or 578, 585 , 379 P2d 880 (1963).

2013Generally, we use “the same interpretive framework with respect to administrative rules that we use with respect to statutes.” Gafur v. Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital, 344 Or 525, 532 , 185 P3d 446 (2008).

2013Generally, we use “the same interpretive framework with respect to administrative rules that we use with respect to statutes.” Gafur v. Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital, 344 Or 525, 532 , 185 P3d 446 (2008).

2013Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 693-94 , 261 P3d 1 (2011) (reviewing considerations that warrant overruling prior constitutional case law), it has determined that the need to correct past errors may outweigh the importance of stability when the application of the court’s interpretive analysis in Priest demonstrates that the earlier case or cases find little or no support in the text or history of a disputed constitutional provision.

2013Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 693-94 , 261 P3d 1 (2011) (reviewing considerations that warrant overruling prior constitutional case law), it has determined that the need to correct past errors may outweigh the importance of stability when the application of the court’s interpretive analysis in Priest demonstrates that the earlier case or cases find little or no support in the text or history of a disputed constitutional provision.

2010Springfield, supra, 290 Or at 226 .

1982Springfield, supra, 290 Or at 226 .

2025ORS 174.010; see also State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 755 , 359 P3d 232 (2015) (in conducting a statutory analysis we “assume that the legislature did not intend any portion of its enactments to be meaningless surplusage”); State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (observing that “an interpretation that renders a statutory provision mean- ingless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that took the trouble Cite as 342 Or App 250 (2025) 253 to enact the provision into law and as a matter of comply- ing with the interpretive pri

2022Klein I, 289 Or App at 543-50 .

2022There is a second noteworthy feature of ORS 419C.255: Under paragraph (1)(b), the petition must include the facts that “bring the youth within the jurisdiction of the court,” which, again, refers to the factual determina- tion that the youth has violated a particular law, 318 Or App at 575 , and, under ORS 419C.400(2), it is the facts in Cite as 318 Or App 571 (2022) 579 the petition “showing the youth to be within the jurisdic- tion of the court” that must be established beyond a rea- sonable doubt.

2021Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (describing the principle as useful to discern what the legislature intended by a general term for which it provided specific examples).

2021Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (describing the principle as useful to discern what the legislature intended by a general term for which it provided specific examples).

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2020Under the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, “ ‘a non- specific or general phrase that appears at the end of a list of items in a statute is to be read as referring only to other items of the same kind.’ ” McLaughlin v. Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551 , 449 P3d 492 (2019) (quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Multnomah County v. Mehrwein, 366 Or 295 , 462 P3d 706 (2020)).8 We agree with respondent that the structure of the statute as a whole suggests that the legislature intended the other circumstances listed in ORS 236.010(1) to de

2020Applying the interpretive framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 331 Or 606 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modi- fied in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009), the court focused on text and context.

2014Thus, the interpretive principle that the legislature’s inclusion of a provision in one statute, while omitting it from another, suggests that the omission was purposeful, see City of Mosier v. Hood River Sand, 206 Or App 292, 309 , 136 P3d 1160 (2006) (so stating), is not particularly persuasive here.

2014Thus, the interpretive principle that the legislature’s inclusion of a provision in one statute, while omitting it from another, suggests that the omission was purposeful, see City of Mosier v. Hood River Sand, 206 Or App 292, 309 , 136 P3d 1160 (2006) (so stating), is not particularly persuasive here.

2014See, e.g., Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381-82 , 8 P3d 200 (2000) (applying canon to text of rule of civil procedure); Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 341, 353 , 898 P2d 1333 (1995) (applying canon to text of statute).

2014See, e.g., Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or 376, 381-82 , 8 P3d 200 (2000) (applying canon to text of rule of civil procedure); Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 341, 353 , 898 P2d 1333 (1995) (applying canon to text of statute).

2013In Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 53 , 11 P3d 228 (2000), this court explained that the question whether to overrule a prior constitutional decision entails balancing two competing considerations: stability in the law and “the need to be able to correct past errors.” Sometimes, the court said, the need to correct past errors can outweigh the importance of stability.

2013In Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 53 , 11 P3d 228 (2000), this court explained that the question whether to overrule a prior constitutional decision entails balancing two competing considerations: stability in the law and “the need to be able to correct past errors.” Sometimes, the court said, the need to correct past errors can outweigh the importance of stability.