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7 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 697green2 sentences2009Cf., e.g., In re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Opinion No. 697 , 911 A.2d 51, 59 (N.J. 2006) (noting that “vague[] and ambigu[ous]” provisions “are not appropriate as ethics standards”). 2009Cf., e.g., In re Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Opinion No. 697, 911 A.2d 51, 59 (N.J. 2006) (noting that “vague[] and ambigu[ous]” provisions “are not appropriate as ethics standards”). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Verburg & Wesco, Inc.green2 sentences2008Borrower relies on the interpretive principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” See In re Verburg, 159 Vt. 161, 165 , 616 A.2d 237, 239 (1992). 2008Borrower relies on the interpretive principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” See In re Verburg, 159 Vt. 161, 165 , 616 A.2d 237, 239 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Shermangreen2 sentences2019Harris v. Sherman, 167 Vt. 613, 614 , 708 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1988) (mem.) (“[W]here legislative intent can be ascertained on its face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to statutory construction.”); Flint v. Dept. of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 , 177 A.3d 1080 (“[W]e resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only when the statute is unclear or ambiguous.”). 2019Harris v. Sherman, 167 Vt. 613, 614 , 708 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1988) (mem.) (“[W]here legislative intent can be ascertained on its face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to statutory construction.”); Flint v. Dept. of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 , 177 A.3d 1080 (“[W]e resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only when the statute is unclear or ambiguous.”). | 1 | 1 |
Sofran Peachtree City, LLC v. Peachtree City Holdings, LLCgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Contegni v. Payne, 557 A.2d 122, 124-25 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (reaffirming principle that covenant exacted from grantee must be viewed as “presumptively ... for the benefit and protection of his adjoining land which [the grantor] retaine[d]” (quotation omitted)); Sofran Peachtree City, L.L.C., v. Peachtree City Holdings, L.L.C., 550 S.E.2d 429, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that evidence failed to “rebut the presumption that the . . . restriction was imposed for the benefit of the land retained by [grantor] after the sale”); see generally M. | 1 | 1 |
Contegni v. Paynegreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Contegni v. Payne, 557 A.2d 122, 124-25 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (reaffirming principle that covenant exacted from grantee must be viewed as “presumptively ... for the benefit and protection of his adjoining land which [the grantor] retaine[d]” (quotation omitted)); Sofran Peachtree City, L.L.C., v. Peachtree City Holdings, L.L.C., 550 S.E.2d 429, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that evidence failed to “rebut the presumption that the . . . restriction was imposed for the benefit of the land retained by [grantor] after the sale”); see generally M. | 1 | 1 |
Oxx v. Vermont Department of Taxesgreen2 sentences2008We have repeatedly stated that “the precept [of expressio unius] is only one aid to . . . interpretation and must give way to others in appropriate cases.” Id. at 166 , 616 A.2d at 239 ; Oxx v. Dep’t of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 375 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (the maxim “is relatively weak among rules of statutory construction”); Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625 , 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991) (maxim should be applied with caution). 2008We have repeatedly stated that “the precept [of expressio unius] is only one aid to . . . interpretation and must give way to others in appropriate cases.” Id. at 166 , 616 A.2d at 239 ; Oxx v. Dep’t of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 375 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (the maxim “is relatively weak among rules of statutory construction”); Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625 , 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991) (maxim should be applied with caution). | 1 | 1 |
Clymer v. Webstergreen2 sentences2008We have repeatedly stated that “the precept [of expressio unius] is only one aid to . . . interpretation and must give way to others in appropriate cases.” Id. at 166 , 616 A.2d at 239 ; Oxx v. Dep’t of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 375 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (the maxim “is relatively weak among rules of statutory construction”); Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625 , 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991) (maxim should be applied with caution). 2008We have repeatedly stated that “the precept [of expressio unius] is only one aid to . . . interpretation and must give way to others in appropriate cases.” Id. at 166 , 616 A.2d at 239 ; Oxx v. Dep’t of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 375 , 618 A.2d 1321, 1324 (1992) (the maxim “is relatively weak among rules of statutory construction”); Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625 , 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991) (maxim should be applied with caution). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Paul Flint v. Department of Labor
green
2 sentences2019Harris v. Sherman, 167 Vt. 613, 614 , 708 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1988) (mem.) (“[W]here legislative intent can be ascertained on its face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to statutory construction.”); Flint v. Dept. of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 , 177 A.3d 1080 (“[W]e resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only when the statute is unclear or ambiguous.”). 2019Harris v. Sherman, 167 Vt. 613, 614 , 708 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1988) (mem.) (“[W]here legislative intent can be ascertained on its face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to statutory construction.”); Flint v. Dept. of Labor, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 , 205 Vt. 558 , 177 A.3d 1080 (“[W]e resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only when the statute is unclear or ambiguous.”). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
cluster 783666
green
1 sentence2006Ctr., 344 F.3d at 874 n.63 (rejecting claim that EPA lacked authority to designate a “category” of discharges where the residual designation authority conferred by the CWA in § 402(p)(2)(E) referred only to “a discharge” in the singular, observing that the CWA tended to “refer to ‘discharge’ in the singular, even in reference to discharges clearly intended for categorical regulation,” and relying on the interpretive rule set forth in 1 U.S.C. § 1 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.