interpretive rule in Pennsylvania

1986See Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52 , 313 A.2d 156 (1973) (an interpretive rule, as opposed to a legislative rule depends for its validity on the willingness of a reviewing court to say that it in fact tracks the meaning of the statute it interprets); cf. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77 , 306 A.2d 308 , appeal dismissed 415 U.S. 903 , 94 S.Ct. 1395 , 39 L.Ed.2d 460 (1974) (courts are not bound by rulings contrary to the governing statutes).

1986See Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52 , 313 A.2d 156 (1973) (an interpretive rule, as opposed to a legislative rule depends for its validity on the willingness of a reviewing court to say that it in fact tracks the meaning of the statute it interprets); cf. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77 , 306 A.2d 308 , appeal dismissed 415 U.S. 903 , 94 S.Ct. 1395 , 39 L.Ed.2d 460 (1974) (courts are not bound by rulings contrary to the governing statutes).

2008An interpretive rule, on the other hand, “ ‘depends for its validity not upon a Law-making grant of power, but rather upon the willingness of a reviewing court to say that it in fact tracks the meaning of the statute it interprets.’ ” Id. (quoting Girard School District v. Pittenger, 481 Pa. 91, 95 , 392 A.2d 261, 263 (1978)).

2008An interpretive rule, on the other hand, “ ‘depends for its validity not upon a Law-making grant of power, but rather upon the willingness of a reviewing court to say that it in fact tracks the meaning of the statute it interprets.’ ” Id. (quoting Girard School District v. Pittenger, 481 Pa. 91, 95 , 392 A.2d 261, 263 (1978)).

2001For an interpretive rule to be viable, however, it “must genuinely track the meaning of the underlying statute, rather than establish an extrinsic substantive standard.” Id.; see also Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. Com., Board of Finance and Revenue, 535 Pa. 298 , 635 A.2d 116 (1993).

2001For an interpretive rule to be viable, however, it “must genuinely track the meaning of the underlying statute, rather than establish an extrinsic substantive standard.” Id.; see also Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. Com., Board of Finance and Revenue, 535 Pa. 298 , 635 A.2d 116 (1993).

2017Reynolds, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 661 A.2d 494, 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), the court recognized that an agency may render (and rely on) interpretive law as long as the interpretive rule tracks the meaning of the statute that it interprets, and does not expand the plain meaning of that statute.

2009Reynolds Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 661 A.2d 494 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), this Court found that a formula applied by the Department of Labor for calculating fringe benefit credits was an interpretive rule and, therefore, not subject to publication requirements of the CDL.

2025Preliminarily, an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with administering it, like the UCBR in this instant matter, is one factor to be considered when ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent, see Section 1921(c)(8) of the SCA, 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c)(8), and it “is normally accorded deference, unless clearly erroneous.” Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 207 A.3d 292, 299 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 920 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 2007)).23 Notwithstanding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “declined to accord any deference t

2014To that end however, we note that at least in regard to interpreting a statute, this Court has refused to give a state agency deference to its position when "there [was] nothing in the record indicating that the [agency] had considered and decided [the issue involved] at a point prior to the instant litigation.” Malt Beverages Distributors Ass’n v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 601 Pa. 449 , 974 A.2d 1144, 1154 (2009) (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.

2019Since the Commonwealth is merely construing section 201 of the Tax Code, its interpretation is consistent with the statutory language, and it is not expanding on the statutory language, the Commonwealth is rendering an interpretive rule that is not subject to the 12 requirements of the CDL.9 See, e.g., Borough of Pottstown, 712 A.2d at 743 ; Success Against All Odds, 700 A.2d at 1351 .

2009Bd., 551 Pa. 605, 610 , 712 A.2d 741, 743 (1998) (explaining that, where an administrative agency issues an interpretive rule construing a statute within its area of expertise, such a rule is viable so long as it tracks the meaning of the underlying statute). 10 This leads to the second inquiry: whether the challenged zoning restrictions accomplish the same purposes as set forth in the Act.

1988Compare Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Byrd, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 38 , 399 A.2d 425 (1979) (regulations promulgated pursuant to the agency’s interpretive rule-making power) and Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Slater, 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 310 , 462 *514 A.2d 870 (1983) (regulations promulgated pursuant to the agency’s legislative rule-making power under an express grant of legislative power).

1988Compare Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Byrd, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 38 , 399 A.2d 425 (1979) (regulations promulgated pursuant to the agency’s interpretive rule-making power) and Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Slater, 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 310 , 462 *514 A.2d 870 (1983) (regulations promulgated pursuant to the agency’s legislative rule-making power under an express grant of legislative power).

2025Preliminarily, an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with administering it, like the UCBR in this instant matter, is one factor to be considered when ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent, see Section 1921(c)(8) of the SCA, 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c)(8), and it “is normally accorded deference, unless clearly erroneous.” Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 207 A.3d 292, 299 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 920 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 2007)).23 Notwithstanding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “declined to accord any deference t

2025Preliminarily, an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with administering it, like the UCBR in this instant matter, is one factor to be considered when ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent, see Section 1921(c)(8) of the SCA, 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c)(8), and it “is normally accorded deference, unless clearly erroneous.” Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 207 A.3d 292, 299 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 920 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 2007)).23 Notwithstanding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “declined to accord any deference t

2025Preliminarily, an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with administering it, like the UCBR in this instant matter, is one factor to be considered when ascertaining the General Assembly’s intent, see Section 1921(c)(8) of the SCA, 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c)(8), and it “is normally accorded deference, unless clearly erroneous.” Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 207 A.3d 292, 299 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 920 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 2007)).23 Notwithstanding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “declined to accord any deference t

2024Providers’ Brief at 43 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991)).

2021See id.

2020See South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 61 P.3d 282, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 207 (Haw.

2020See South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 61 P.3d 282, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 207 (Haw.

2020See South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 61 P.3d 282, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 207 (Haw.

2019Since the Commonwealth is merely construing section 201 of the Tax Code, its interpretation is consistent with the statutory language, and it is not expanding on the statutory language, the Commonwealth is rendering an interpretive rule that is not subject to the 12 requirements of the CDL.9 See, e.g., Borough of Pottstown, 712 A.2d at 743 ; Success Against All Odds, 700 A.2d at 1351 .

2019In order “[t]o be viable, an interpretive rule must genuinely track the meaning of the underlying statute, rather than establish an extrinsic substantive standard.” Id.; see also Success Against All Odds, 700 A.2d at 1351 (holding that it is a well-established precept that an agency “may render interpretive law so long as the interpretation is one that a reviewing court determines is consistent with the meaning of the statute with respect to which it is rendered and that interpretive rules consistent with these principles are not subject to the publication requirements” of the CDL); Jay R.