7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION v. Browngreen1 sentence2018Before applying the interpretive principle that an ambiguous writing is construed against the drafter, we first apply other rules, including that we read the contract as a whole, "giving effect to the main purpose of the instrument, and interpreting the contract so as to make it effective and reasonable." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Brown, 112 Ariz. 179, 181 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
The Texas Co. v. Blackmon-Scarbrough Inc.green1 sentence2015But they, along with several of cases Crown cites from other jurisdictions, collectively show the importance of Arizona’s interpretive rule that courts must look “to the plain meaning of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 259 , 681 P.2d at 411 ; see also Tex. Co. v. Blackmon-Scarbrough, Inc., 38 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (“The word ‘at’ in this contract, is equivalent in meaning to ’after’”) (emphasis added); Cent. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2010We need not decide, however, whether § 42-12153(B) is more specific for these purposes than §§ 42-16201(A) and 42-15104 because this interpretive principle “applies only when there is a conflict between the specific and the general law.” See State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 534 , 582 P.2d 175, 180 (1978). 2010We need not decide, however, whether § 42-12153(B) is more specific for these purposes than §§ 42-16201(A) and 42-15104 because this interpretive principle “applies only when there is a conflict between the specific and the general law.” See State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 534 , 582 P.2d 175, 180 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Sharpe v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment Systemgreen2 sentences2010Under the interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when statutes or rules set forth a requirement in one provision but do not include it in another, "we assume the absence of the requirement was intentional." See Sharpe v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 220 Ariz. 488, 496, ¶ 25 , 207 P.3d 741, 749 (App.2009). 2010Under the interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when statutes or rules set forth a requirement in one provision but do not include it in another, "we assume the absence of the requirement was intentional." See Sharpe v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 220 Ariz. 488, 496, ¶ 25 , 207 P.3d 741, 749 (App.2009). | 1 | 1 |
Lake Havasu City v. Mohave Countygreen2 sentences2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin 2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Rotter v. Coconino Countygreen2 sentences2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin 2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Irwin
green
1 sentence2024But we disagree with the Irwin court’s interpretation of § 33-1101(A) for several reasons. ¶29 First, the bankruptcy court did not engage in an interpretive analysis of § 33-1101(A) when it concluded that “a motor home can satisfy the definition and purpose of Arizona’s homestead law.” Irwin, 293 B.R. at 29 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2015But they, along with several of cases Crown cites from other jurisdictions, collectively show the importance of Arizona’s interpretive rule that courts must look “to the plain meaning of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 259 , 681 P.2d at 411 ; see also Tex. Co. v. Blackmon-Scarbrough, Inc., 38 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (“The word ‘at’ in this contract, is equivalent in meaning to ’after’”) (emphasis added); Cent. 2015But they, along with several of cases Crown cites from other jurisdictions, collectively show the importance of Arizona’s interpretive rule that courts must look “to the plain meaning of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 259 , 681 P.2d at 411 ; see also Tex. Co. v. Blackmon-Scarbrough, Inc., 38 S.E.2d 890, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (“The word ‘at’ in this contract, is equivalent in meaning to ’after’”) (emphasis added); Cent. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Department of Revenue v. Southern Union Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2012As observed by our supreme court in Southern Union in an analogous context, “had the Legislature intended such a consequence, it could have plainly spelled it out in appropriate language.” 119 Ariz. at 514 , 582 P.2d at 160 . 2012As observed by our supreme court in Southern Union in an analogous context, “had the Legislature intended such a consequence, it could have plainly spelled it out in appropriate language.” 119 Ariz. at 514 , 582 P.2d at 160 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.