17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richard J. Malouf, DDS Richard J, Malouf, DDS, PC And Richard J. Malouf, DDS, PA v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Id. at 646 (“Under the common law, there is a longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, which may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”). 2024Id. at 646 (“Under the common law, there is a longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, which may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”). | 2 | 2 |
Duhart v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). 1991Duhart v. State , 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980). | 2 | 2 |
Colorado County, Texas, R.H. \curly\" Wiedgreen1 sentence2024See S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428 , 445 (Tex. 2022); see also Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 735 (discussing the interpretive principle that, “[i]n a given statute, the same term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different meanings” (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 170–71 (2012))).18 18 The dissent suggests we should strive to construe a statutory term consistently throughout a statute only if the term has acquired a “technical or particular meaning.” Post at 19 (Young, J., dissenting) (quoting Colo. County v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 452 (Tex. 2017)). | 1 | 1 |
Hollander v. Capongreen1 sentence2023To hold otherwise would contradict Mulley’s argument that the note is a negotiable is not barred in the state where the cause of action arose.” Hollander v. Capon, 853 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). 5 instrument that includes a “sum certain.”5 Because we conclude the note includes a sum certain, it is a negotiable instrument, and the six-year statute of limitations applies. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Bakergreen1 sentence2022Citing Walker v. Baker, the Gutierrez Plaintiffs rely on the interpretive principle that “where a power is expressly given [by the Constitution] and the means by which, or the manner in which, it is to be exercised is prescribed, such means or manner is exclusive of all others.” 196 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. 1946) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
CMH HOMES v. Perezgreen1 sentence2021Advantage Healthcare Sys. v. Shwarts, No. 10-18-00050-CV, 2019 WL 7374735 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Krumnow v. Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied); Alert Synteks, Inc. v. Jerry Spencer, L.P., 151 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); In re Estate of Dillard, No. 07-00-0504-CV, 2001 WL 139082 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 7 Feb. 5, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).1 These opinions have often relied on the interpretive rule that courts should “strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because | 1 | 1 |
Alert Synteks, Inc. v. Jerry Spencer, L.P.green1 sentence2021Advantage Healthcare Sys. v. Shwarts, No. 10-18-00050-CV, 2019 WL 7374735 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Krumnow v. Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied); Alert Synteks, Inc. v. Jerry Spencer, L.P., 151 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); In re Estate of Dillard, No. 07-00-0504-CV, 2001 WL 139082 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 7 Feb. 5, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).1 These opinions have often relied on the interpretive rule that courts should “strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because | 1 | 1 |
Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.green2 sentences2021BlueStone argues that the lease’s “gross value received” term can be melded with an “at the well” valuation point to produce a 50 See Judice, 939 S.W.2d at 136 (“The term ‘gross proceeds’ means that the royalty is to be based on the gross price received by [the working interest owner].”). 51 “Value received” means “[c]onsideration that has been delivered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see id. (defining “value” as the “monetary worth or price of something; [or] the amount of goods, services, or money that something commands in an exchange”). 52 “‘Gross’ means ‘[u]ndiminished by deduc 2021BlueStone argues that the lease’s “gross value received” term can be melded with an “at the well” valuation point to produce a 50 See Judice, 939 S.W.2d at 136 (“The term ‘gross proceeds’ means that the royalty is to be based on the gross price received by [the working interest owner].”). 51 “Value received” means “[c]onsideration that has been delivered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see id. (defining “value” as the “monetary worth or price of something; [or] the amount of goods, services, or money that something commands in an exchange”). 52 “‘Gross’ means ‘[u]ndiminished by deduc | 1 | 1 |
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hydergreen1 sentence2021BlueStone argues that the lease’s “gross value received” term can be melded with an “at the well” valuation point to produce a 50 See Judice, 939 S.W.2d at 136 (“The term ‘gross proceeds’ means that the royalty is to be based on the gross price received by [the working interest owner].”). 51 “Value received” means “[c]onsideration that has been delivered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see id. (defining “value” as the “monetary worth or price of something; [or] the amount of goods, services, or money that something commands in an exchange”). 52 “‘Gross’ means ‘[u]ndiminished by deduc | 1 | 1 |
Sabre Travel International, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Ag, Austrian Airlines Ag, Brussels Airlines, nv/sa, and Swiss International Air Lines, Ltd.green1 sentence2021Advantage Healthcare Sys. v. Shwarts, No. 10-18-00050-CV, 2019 WL 7374735 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Krumnow v. Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied); Alert Synteks, Inc. v. Jerry Spencer, L.P., 151 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); In re Estate of Dillard, No. 07-00-0504-CV, 2001 WL 139082 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 7 Feb. 5, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).1 These opinions have often relied on the interpretive rule that courts should “strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because | 1 | 1 |
Krumnow v. Krumnowgreen1 sentence2021Advantage Healthcare Sys. v. Shwarts, No. 10-18-00050-CV, 2019 WL 7374735 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Krumnow v. Krumnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied); Alert Synteks, Inc. v. Jerry Spencer, L.P., 151 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.); In re Estate of Dillard, No. 07-00-0504-CV, 2001 WL 139082 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 7 Feb. 5, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).1 These opinions have often relied on the interpretive rule that courts should “strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because | 1 | 1 |
Guthrie v. National Homes Corporationgreen1 sentence2015See Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.1965). *154 I. | 1 | 1 |
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplangreen1 sentence2014See shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has 514 U.S., at 942, 115 S.Ct. 1920 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ashley v. Hawkins
green
1 sentence2023For example, the Court asserts that this case is controlled by our decision in Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. 2009), but in doing so it makes a critical interpretive error. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hooper Associates Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022To ensure that the language of an indemnity/hold-harmless provision was not expanded to permit loose language in the provision to swallow the rule restricting the recovery of fees, Hooper articulated the following interpretive principle for resolving the question of whether an indemnity/hold-harmless provision embraced an interparty fee claim: Inasmuch as a promise by one party to a contract to indemnify the other for attorney’s fees incurred in litigation between them is contrary to the well-understood rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees, the court should not infer 2022Hooper concluded that the indemnity provisions that it had reviewed did not include interparty fee claims because “[n]one are exclusively or unequivocally referable to claims between the parties themselves or support an inference that defendant promised to indemnify plaintiff for counsel fees in an action on the contract.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank
green
1 sentence2015Conoco’s Shylockian interpretation, whereby the exception applies only when the Commission establishes a precise and invariable drilling-unit size, would deprive the exception of any meaning, because the Commission never does that -15- SP-#6737091-v1-Vaquillas_Brief_of_Appellee.docx and it would make no sense for the Commission ever to do that.11 It would thereby violate the interpretive presumption “that the parties to a contract intend every clause to have some effect.” See Heritage, 939 S.W.2d at 121 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d 220, **220 ; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1785 , ***1 In the absence of explicit language in a treaty demonstrating that the parties intended a different delegation of authority, a court’s ordinary interpretive framework applies. 2015Pp. ___ - ___, 188 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010In applying this interpretive rule, the Court in Howsam explained that not all “potentially dispositive gateway question[s]” constitute “questions of arbitrability.” Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Connick Ex Rel. Parish of Orleans v. Myers
green
2 sentences1985United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1981). 1985United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1981). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Turkette
green
1 sentence1985United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1981). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.