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20 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1953–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Annemarie Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute(075074)green2 sentences2025"We owe no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of an arbitration provision, which we view 'with fresh eyes.'" Ibid. (quoting Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016)). 2025"We owe no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of an arbitration provision, which we view 'with fresh eyes.'" Ibid. (quoting Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016)). | 6 | 7 |
Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.green2 sentences2026"Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and we need not defer to the interpretive analysis of the trial . . . court [] unless we find it persuasive." Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 , 46 (2020) (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)). 2024"Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and we need not defer to the interpretive analysis of the trial . . . courts unless we find it persuasive." Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 , 46 (2020) (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)). | 2 | 2 |
McKenna v. Rosengreen1 sentence2026The starting point of the interpretive inquiry is the plain language of the contract, id. at 616 , construed "given its ordinary, reasonable meaning absent" a showing that "it was used in a different sense." McKenna v. Rosen, A-2565-24 12 239 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Nicholas v. Mynstergreen1 sentence2021See Nicholas 44 v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (“We do not defer to interpretative conclusions by the trial court or Appellate Division that we believe are mistaken.”). | 1 | 1 |
Southmark Corp. v. Marleygreen1 sentence2005See also Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.1995) (Health Care Financing Administration directive in an effort to give interpretive guidance to the states in advance of their submission of state Medicaid plans deemed an interpretive rule), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 , 116 S.Ct. 816 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 760 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knollgreen1 sentence2005See also Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.1995) (Health Care Financing Administration directive in an effort to give interpretive guidance to the states in advance of their submission of state Medicaid plans deemed an interpretive rule), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 , 116 S.Ct. 816 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 760 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Knoll v. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Womengreen2 sentences2005See also Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.1995) (Health Care Financing Administration directive in an effort to give interpretive guidance to the states in advance of their submission of state Medicaid plans deemed an interpretive rule), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 , 116 S.Ct. 816 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 760 (1996). 2005See also Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.1995) (Health Care Financing Administration directive in an effort to give interpretive guidance to the states in advance of their submission of state Medicaid plans deemed an interpretive rule), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 , 116 S.Ct. 816 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 760 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Gould v. Gouldgreen2 sentences1989While the Court noted that there has been some dissatisfaction with an interpretive principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 1917, nevertheless, it reaffirmed its viability and quoted approvingly from the opinion in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 , 38 S.Ct. 53, 53 , 62 L.Ed. 211, 213 (1917). 1989While the Court noted that there has been some dissatisfaction with an interpretive principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 1917, nevertheless, it reaffirmed its viability and quoted approvingly from the opinion in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 , 38 S.Ct. 53, 53 , 62 L.Ed. 211, 213 (1917). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence1978In holding that this defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter while armed, may be sentenced to an additional term for the armed feature, the Court not only effectively discards the established interpretive principle that penal statutes should be strictly construed, State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 (1952); Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229 (1957); State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 298 (1958); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19 , 24 (1962); see generally 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 59.03 at 6-8 (Sands 4th ed. 1974), but also misperceives the legislative intent, pays scant heed to the si | 1 | 1 |
State v. Meinkengreen1 sentence1978In holding that this defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter while armed, may be sentenced to an additional term for the armed feature, the Court not only effectively discards the established interpretive principle that penal statutes should be strictly construed, State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 (1952); Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229 (1957); State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 298 (1958); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19 , 24 (1962); see generally 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 59.03 at 6-8 (Sands 4th ed. 1974), but also misperceives the legislative intent, pays scant heed to the si | 1 | 1 |
Neeld v. Girouxgreen1 sentence1978In holding that this defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter while armed, may be sentenced to an additional term for the armed feature, the Court not only effectively discards the established interpretive principle that penal statutes should be strictly construed, State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 (1952); Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229 (1957); State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 298 (1958); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19 , 24 (1962); see generally 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 59.03 at 6-8 (Sands 4th ed. 1974), but also misperceives the legislative intent, pays scant heed to the si | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Mayor, Etc. of Borough of Moonachiegreen1 sentence1956Edwards v. Mayor, etc., of Moonachie, 3 N.J. 17, 23 (1949). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michael E. Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC (070751)
green
1 sentence2025Ibid. (citing Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 302-03 (2016)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute
green
1 sentence2019This interpretive rule "is based upon the fundamental [principle] of equality of the taxation burden." Twp. of Teaneck, 20 N.J. at 90 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Francis v. United Jersey Bank
green
2 sentences2004We are, however, guided by the interpretive principle that a court can find assistance in construing a statute by examining similar statutes in other states, 2B Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, *785 § 52.03 (6th ed.2000), particularly if they are statutes from which ours has been copied or derived, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 28 , 432 A. 2d 814 (1981), or a uniform act, Singer, supra, at § 52.05. 2004We are, however, guided by the interpretive principle that a court can find assistance in construing a statute by examining similar statutes in other states, 2B Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, *785 § 52.03 (6th ed.2000), particularly if they are statutes from which ours has been copied or derived, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 28 , 432 A. 2d 814 (1981), or a uniform act, Singer, supra, at § 52.05. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thiel v. Thiel
green
2 sentences1988The interpretive principle in general application elsewhere is that the essential purpose of such immunity from process is the protection not only of the pensioner, but of his family as well, from destitution and the need for public relief, and, absent a clear and definitive expression contra, the provision will not be read to enable the husband to claim the full benefit of the pension as against his dependent wife and children, and thus to subvert the laws enjoining upon the husband the performance of this basic obligation of the marriage state. [ 13 N.J. at 168 .] In Thiel v. Thiel, 41 N.J. 1988The interpretive principle in general application elsewhere is that the essential purpose of such immunity from process is the protection not only of the pensioner, but of his family as well, from destitution and the need for public relief, and, absent a clear and definitive expression contra, the provision will not be read to enable the husband to claim the full benefit of the pension as against his dependent wife and children, and thus to subvert the laws enjoining upon the husband the performance of this basic obligation of the marriage state. [ 13 N.J. at 168 .] In Thiel v. Thiel, 41 N.J. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Fischer v. Fischer
green
1 sentence1988The interpretive principle in general application elsewhere is that the essential purpose of such immunity from process is the protection not only of the pensioner, but of his family as well, from destitution and the need for public relief, and, absent a clear and definitive expression contra, the provision will not be read to enable the husband to claim the full benefit of the pension as against his dependent wife and children, and thus to subvert the laws enjoining upon the husband the performance of this basic obligation of the marriage state. [ 13 N.J. at 168 .] In Thiel v. Thiel, 41 N.J. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Carbone
green
1 sentence1978In holding that this defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter while armed, may be sentenced to an additional term for the armed feature, the Court not only effectively discards the established interpretive principle that penal statutes should be strictly construed, State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352 (1952); Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229 (1957); State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 298 (1958); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19 , 24 (1962); see generally 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 59.03 at 6-8 (Sands 4th ed. 1974), but also misperceives the legislative intent, pays scant heed to the si | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Winberry v. Salisbury
green
1 sentence1953Even under the interpretive principle of Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240 (1950), this must necessarily be so; for, if the exercise of legislative power were made absolutely dependent upon the provision of procedural due process by rule of court, the failure of such action by the court would subvert the legislative process. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Schlaefer v. Schlaefer
green
2 sentences1953This was the ruling in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, *169 71 App. D.C. 350 , 112 F. 2 d 177, 130 A.L.R. 1014 ( Ct. App. D.C. 1940). 1953This was the ruling in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, *169 71 App. D.C. 350 , 112 F. 2 d 177, 130 A.L.R. 1014 ( Ct. App. D.C. 1940). | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.