interpretive rule in Michigan

2018It could of course have reached the opposite conclusion by following the interpretive principle that a later-adopted statute controls over an earlier-adopted conflicting statute.1 Choosing between the statutes is therefore, a somewhat arbitrary process.2 1 “Statutes enacted by the Legislature on a later date take precedence over those enacted on an earlier date.” Baumgartner v Perry Pub Sch, 309 Mich App 507, 521 ; 872 NW2d 837 (2015). 2 The dissent does not dispute that MCL 691.1404 was adopted after MCL 224.21.

2018It could of course have reached the opposite conclusion by following the interpretive principle that a later-adopted statute controls over an earlier-adopted conflicting statute.1 Choosing between the statutes is therefore, a somewhat arbitrary process.2 1 “Statutes enacted by the Legislature on a later date take precedence over those enacted on an earlier date.” Baumgartner v Perry Pub Sch, 309 Mich App 507, 521 ; 872 NW2d 837 (2015). 2 The dissent does not dispute that MCL 691.1404 was adopted after MCL 224.21.

2023Thus, while an administrative rule may be invalidated if it is “arbitrary or capricious,” Mich Farm Bureau v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 292 Mich App 106, 129 ; 807 NW2d 866 (2011), the question in this case simply appears to be whether MDOC policy directive 04.07.112, as an interpretative rule, “conflict[s] with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue,” see In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 103 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

2023Thus, while an administrative rule may be invalidated if it is “arbitrary or capricious,” Mich Farm Bureau v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 292 Mich App 106, 129 ; 807 NW2d 866 (2011), the question in this case simply appears to be whether MDOC policy directive 04.07.112, as an interpretative rule, “conflict[s] with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue,” see In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 103 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

2023No sanction attaches to the violation of an interpretive rule as such; the sanction attaches to the violation of the statute, which the rule merely interprets.” Id. (cleaned up).

2023Thus, while an administrative rule may be invalidated if it is “arbitrary or capricious,” Mich Farm Bureau v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 292 Mich App 106, 129 ; 807 NW2d 866 (2011), the question in this case simply appears to be whether MDOC policy directive 04.07.112, as an interpretative rule, “conflict[s] with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue,” see In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 103 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

2023Thus, while an administrative rule may be invalidated if it is “arbitrary or capricious,” Mich Farm Bureau v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 292 Mich App 106, 129 ; 807 NW2d 866 (2011), the question in this case simply appears to be whether MDOC policy directive 04.07.112, as an interpretative rule, “conflict[s] with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute at issue,” see In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 103 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

2022Contract interpretation begins “with the primary interpretive rule that courts should give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the language of their written agreement.” Sutton Bank v Progressive Polymers, LLC, 161 Ohio St 3d 387, 391; 2020-Ohio-5101 ; 163 NE3d 546 (2020).

2022Contract interpretation begins “with the primary interpretive rule that courts should give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the language of their written agreement.” Sutton Bank v Progressive Polymers, LLC, 161 Ohio St 3d 387, 391; 2020-Ohio-5101 ; 163 NE3d 546 (2020).

2021This interpretive principle is known as the ejusdem generis canon: “[Ejusdem generis] is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.” [Sands Appliance Servs, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242 ; 615 NW2d 241 (2000), quoting People v Brown, 406 Mich 215, 221 ; 277 NW2d 155 (1979) (alteration in original).] Put differe

2021This interpretive principle is known as the ejusdem generis canon: “[Ejusdem generis] is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.” [Sands Appliance Servs, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242 ; 615 NW2d 241 (2000), quoting People v Brown, 406 Mich 215, 221 ; 277 NW2d 155 (1979) (alteration in original).] Put differe

2021But the evolution of motorcycling as a sport does not change its traditional and historical roots. 9 This Court opined in Neal, 470 Mich at 669 , that the interpretive principle that forms the basis of the ejusdem generis canon is applicable to the RUA and strongly suggested that the catchall phrase should not be read literally.

2021This interpretive principle is known as the ejusdem generis canon: “[Ejusdem generis] is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.” [Sands Appliance Servs, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242 ; 615 NW2d 241 (2000), quoting People v Brown, 406 Mich 215, 221 ; 277 NW2d 155 (1979) (alteration in original).] Put differe

2021This interpretive principle is known as the ejusdem generis canon: “[Ejusdem generis] is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated.” [Sands Appliance Servs, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242 ; 615 NW2d 241 (2000), quoting People v Brown, 406 Mich 215, 221 ; 277 NW2d 155 (1979) (alteration in original).] Put differe

2020Nor does the concurrence consider the broader line of caselaw, including Bazzi and Marquis, which has clearly held that fraud and other common-law defenses were not abrogated.22 Also missing from the concurrence is any textual analysis to support its conclusion, which runs counter to the longstanding interpretive principle that legislative intent to abrogate the common law must be “clearly reflected in the language employed in the statute.” Bazzi, 502 Mich at 400 .

2018Hosp. , 477 Mich. 120 , 123, 730 N.W.2d 695 (2007), which held that such a choice need not be made. 3 Apsey was the last time Michigan was faced with the issue of two conflicting statutes governing the same procedural requirements.

2018Hosp. , 477 Mich. 120 , 123, 730 N.W.2d 695 (2007), which held that such a choice need not be made. 3 Apsey was the last time Michigan was faced with the issue of two conflicting statutes governing the same procedural requirements.

2018Under this interpretive principle, a statutory term must "be viewed in light of the words surrounding it." Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304 , 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002).

2018Under this interpretive principle, a statutory term must "be viewed in light of the words surrounding it." Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304 , 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002).

2016People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 304 ; 817 NW2d 33 (2012).

2016People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 304 ; 817 NW2d 33 (2012).

2014Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or share a common purpose must be read together as constituting one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates.21 Conflicting provisions of such statutes must be read together to produce a harmonious whole and to reconcile any 20 MCL 205.59(1). 21 Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136 ; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Crawford Co v Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 95 ; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). 9 inconsistencies wherever possible.22 The purpose of this interpretive rule is to give effect to the legislative pur

2014Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or share a common purpose must be read together as constituting one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates.21 Conflicting provisions of such statutes must be read together to produce a harmonious whole and to reconcile any 20 MCL 205.59(1). 21 Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136 ; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Crawford Co v Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 95 ; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). 9 inconsistencies wherever possible.22 The purpose of this interpretive rule is to give effect to the legislative pur

2014Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or share a common purpose must be read together as constituting one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates.21 Conflicting provisions of such statutes must be read together to produce a harmonious whole and to reconcile any 20 MCL 205.59(1). 21 Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136 ; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Crawford Co v Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 95 ; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). 9 inconsistencies wherever possible.22 The purpose of this interpretive rule is to give effect to the legislative pur

2014Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or share a common purpose must be read together as constituting one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates.21 Conflicting provisions of such statutes must be read together to produce a harmonious whole and to reconcile any 20 MCL 205.59(1). 21 Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 136 ; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); Crawford Co v Secretary of State, 160 Mich App 88, 95 ; 408 NW2d 112 (1987). 9 inconsistencies wherever possible.22 The purpose of this interpretive rule is to give effect to the legislative pur

1998As a result, I believe that the ada’s definition of disability “cannot bear the interpretation adopted by” the eeoc in 29 CFR 1630 App 1630.2(j), Sullivan v Everhart, 494 US 83, 92 ; 110 S Ct 960, 966 ; 108 L Ed 2d 72 (1990), and therefore, that this Court should not give effect to the eeoc’s interpretive rule.

1998As a result, I believe that the ada’s definition of disability “cannot bear the interpretation adopted by” the eeoc in 29 CFR 1630 App 1630.2(j), Sullivan v Everhart, 494 US 83, 92 ; 110 S Ct 960, 966 ; 108 L Ed 2d 72 (1990), and therefore, that this Court should not give effect to the eeoc’s interpretive rule.

1958Hughes, v. May, 3 Mich 598, 610 , the following: ■ “ ‘The framers of a Constitution are presumed to have a knowledge of existing laws, * * * and to act in reference to that knowledge.’ * “And in School District v. City of Pontiac, supra, 348 , we said: “ ‘ In drafting the amendment, as well as in its adoption, the people were mindful of existing conditions and sought to so frame the amendment as to be in accord with such existing conditions.’ “In 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 63, pp 676, 677, appears the following: “ ‘ A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adop

1958Hughes, v. May, 3 Mich 598, 610 , the following: *171 "`The framers of a Constitution are presumed to have a knowledge of existing laws, * * * and to act in reference to that knowledge.' [***] "And in School District v. City of Pontiac, supra, 348 , we said: "`In drafting the amendment, as well as in its adoption, the people were mindful of existing conditions and sought to so frame the amendment as to be in accord with such existing conditions.' "In 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 63, pp 676, 677, appears the following: "`A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and ad

1958Hughes, v. May, 3 Mich 598, 610 , the following: ■ “ ‘The framers of a Constitution are presumed to have a knowledge of existing laws, * * * and to act in reference to that knowledge.’ * “And in School District v. City of Pontiac, supra, 348 , we said: “ ‘ In drafting the amendment, as well as in its adoption, the people were mindful of existing conditions and sought to so frame the amendment as to be in accord with such existing conditions.’ “In 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 63, pp 676, 677, appears the following: “ ‘ A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adop

1958Hughes, v. May, 3 Mich 598, 610 , the following: *171 "`The framers of a Constitution are presumed to have a knowledge of existing laws, * * * and to act in reference to that knowledge.' [***] "And in School District v. City of Pontiac, supra, 348 , we said: "`In drafting the amendment, as well as in its adoption, the people were mindful of existing conditions and sought to so frame the amendment as to be in accord with such existing conditions.' "In 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, § 63, pp 676, 677, appears the following: "`A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and ad