8 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yerrington v. Anchoragegreen1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barsnessgreen1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
City of Bellevue v. Ohlsongreen2 sentences2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc 2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
Sites v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc 2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Juarezgreen2 sentences2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc 2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spencergreen2 sentences2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc 2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sadekgreen1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
Busch v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib 1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leegreen2 sentences1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib 1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib | 1 | 1 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib 1992See also People v. Lee, 234 Cal.App.3d 1214 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121 (1991) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 (1966)) recognizing that "`[o]nly such felonies as are in themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can support the application of the felony-murder rule.'" [8] Long before Sandstrom , this court also, in a murder case which reversed a conviction based on a presumptive instruction, stated in part: "Every person possessed of a sound mind is presumed to intend and contemplate the necessary, and even probable, consequences of his delib | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stitzelgreen2 sentences1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: "Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought." State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn. App. 1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). 1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Ron Champion
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 1560 . 2015Id. at 1560 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Copelin v. State
green
1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bland v. United States
green
1 sentence2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Witherspoon v. Cordier
green
2 sentences2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc 2001Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App.1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 430 , 83 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juares, 161 Ariz. 76 , 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow acc | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hasty v. Hasty
green
1 sentence1994Id. at 99 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sorola v. Texas
green
2 sentences1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . 7 Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). 1991App.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Alabama v. Smith
green
2 sentences1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . 7 Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). 1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . [7] Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ex Parte Sorola v. State
green
2 sentences1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . 7 Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). 1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . [7] Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bullington v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1991Certainly, acquittal on the merits of the double jeopardy concept of Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 , 104 S.Ct. 2305 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) and Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) will not apply in this case where the guilty plea was reversed for retrial. 1991Certainly, acquittal on the merits of the double jeopardy concept of Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 , 104 S.Ct. 2305 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) and Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) will not apply in this case where the guilty plea was reversed for retrial. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Arizona v. Rumsey
green
2 sentences1991Certainly, acquittal on the merits of the double jeopardy concept of Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 , 104 S.Ct. 2305 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) and Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) will not apply in this case where the guilty plea was reversed for retrial. 1991Certainly, acquittal on the merits of the double jeopardy concept of Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 , 104 S.Ct. 2305 , 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) and Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) will not apply in this case where the guilty plea was reversed for retrial. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Tate v. Lenhardt
green
2 sentences1991When a sentence imposed after trial is more severe than that previously applied after a guilty plea, the specific issue of whether the Pearce prescription applied against the vindictiveness was specifically considered and explicitly settled in Smith, 109 S.Ct. 2201 . 7 Application of vindictiveness to increase the penalty to death upon re-prosecution was also rejected as a presumptive error in Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.), ce rt. denied - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). 1991App.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 569 , 107 L.Ed.2d 563 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Bean
neutral
2 sentences1989Cf. State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389 , 691 P.2d 30 (1984). 1989Cf. State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389 , 691 P.2d 30 (1984). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). 1989The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in establishing a supervisory rule: “Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Slack v. Villari
green
1 sentence1989The brief now filed on appeal more nearly fits a third category claim founded in ordinance violation as a basis for liability. [6] It is apparent that had the ordinance been pleaded in this case, the culpability criteria of Endresen for an ordinance violation theory of recovery could have been found in the admitted voluntary release of the dogs to the front yard and uncontrolled as they left the yard, if they did, to go to the adjoining house where appellant was standing. [7] Another rule evidenced in these cases is if the name of the dog is given in the opinion, the decision for defendant dog | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.