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10 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Hallgreen2 sentences2009See Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320 (requiring findings before trial court could make a distribution contrary to the general rule that a party is entitled to separate property, including its appreciation); of Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (remanding where in the "[albsen{ce of] findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution," the trial court awarded the wife a reimbursement for her premarital contribution to the marital home with marital assets). 1999Likewise, marital property may be allocated unequally where circumstances “justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution.” Hall, 858 P.2d at 1023 . ¶ 23 The trial court’s findings are ambiguous concerning whether the/Court considered Mr. Thomas’s premarital interest in the home to be his separate property, or whether it regai’ded the home as marital property that equity required be divided unequally. | 1 | 2 |
Burt v. Burtgreen2 sentences2007Id. 1993See Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170, 1172 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2019IV ; see also State v. James , 2000 UT 80 , ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 576 (explaining that there "are a number of exceptions to the presumptive rule" that "searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause" (quotation simplified)). 2019IV ; see also State v. James , 2000 UT 80 , ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 576 (explaining that there "are a number of exceptions to the presumptive rule" that "searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause" (quotation simplified)). | 1 | 1 |
Prosper, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servicesgreen1 sentence2017See id. | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Dunngreen1 sentence2009See Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320 (requiring findings before trial court could make a distribution contrary to the general rule that a party is entitled to separate property, including its appreciation); of Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (remanding where in the "[albsen{ce of] findings that would justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution," the trial court awarded the wife a reimbursement for her premarital contribution to the marital home with marital assets). | 1 | 1 |
Noble v. Noblegreen1 sentence2007"The overarching aim of a property division ... is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties ... [by] allocat[ing] property in the manner which 'best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives'" Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 185 (Utah 1987)). 15 We stress, however, that there is an order to this process. | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Burkegreen1 sentence2007"The overarching aim of a property division ... is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties ... [by] allocat[ing] property in the manner which 'best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives'" Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 185 (Utah 1987)). 15 We stress, however, that there is an order to this process. | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 2000See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Naranjo v. Naranjogreen1 sentence1999See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 849 (“ ‘Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that once a court has determined something is marital property, the court may distribute it equitably, notwithstanding which party’s name appears on the title.’” (Citation omitted.)); Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424 n. 1 (“[T]he trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide *894 the property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.”); Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146 (“There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of properties in a divorce action.”). | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. Waltersgreen1 sentence1993Such an unequal distribution of the parties’ marital property makes no sense in the absence of findings justifying the decision, see Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), especially since appellee did not seek this result on any particular basis and where appellee’s lack of education and the special needs of the children do appear to have been thoroughly dealt with in the award of permanent alimony and child support, which we do not disturb. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aura Spa & Boutique v. Department of Workforce Services
green
2 sentences2019Hearsay may be "legally competent evidence, given the multitude of exceptions to the presumptive bar on the admission of hearsay." Aura Spa & Boutique v. Department of Workforce Services , 2017 UT App 152 , ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 813 . 2019Hearsay may be "legally competent evidence, given the multitude of exceptions to the presumptive bar on the admission of hearsay." Aura Spa & Boutique v. Department of Workforce Services , 2017 UT App 152 , ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 813 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bradford v. Bradford
green
2 sentences2019“Generally, in a divorce proceeding each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent of the marital property,” but “this presumptive rule of thumb . . . does not supersede the trial court’s broad equitable power to distribute marital property.” Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 26 , 993 P.2d 887 (quotation simplified). 2019“Generally, in a divorce proceeding each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent of the marital property,” but “this presumptive rule of thumb . . . does not supersede the trial court’s broad equitable power to distribute marital property.” Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 26 , 993 P.2d 887 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Haumont v. Haumont
green
1 sentence1999See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 849 (“ ‘Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that once a court has determined something is marital property, the court may distribute it equitably, notwithstanding which party’s name appears on the title.’” (Citation omitted.)); Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424 n. 1 (“[T]he trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide *894 the property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.”); Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146 (“There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of properties in a divorce action.”). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.