presumptive rule in Illinois

2023A report from the State’s DNA expert tendered in discovery stated that a swab taken from the footprint was “ ‘negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood.’ ” Id. at 113 .

2023In that case, a forensic scientist authored a report stating that an initial swab of tile where a victim was found dead “ ‘was negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood.’ ” Id. at 119 .

2019Berwyn, 34 Ill. 2d at 323 . ¶ 36 Collateral Estoppel ¶ 37 Having concluded that an NGRI judgment is not a presumptive bar to receiving from a decedent under the Slayer Statute, we now address the narrow question of whether the criminal court’s finding respondent NGRI of first degree murder acts to collaterally estop him from receiving from Decedent under the Slayer Statute.

2019Berwyn, 34 Ill. 2d at 323 . ¶ 36 Collateral Estoppel ¶ 37 Having concluded that an NGRI judgment is not a presumptive bar to receiving from a decedent under the Slayer Statute, we now address the narrow question of whether the criminal court’s finding respondent NGRI of first degree murder acts to collaterally estop him from receiving from Decedent under the Slayer Statute.

2016So it’s certainly not a very common—in fact, it’s a case report that is so uncommon that gets published because it’s so rare.” Dr. Holt acknowledged that she was not saying that “something couldn’t happen” if she had not seen it. - 20 - 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 ¶ 43 Kelly Lawrence, a forensic scientist with the Northeastern Illinois Regional Crime Laboratory, testified that a presumptive test for saliva on swabs taken from the left and right neck area of S.B. was positive.

2016So it’s certainly not a very common—in fact, it’s a case report that is so uncommon that gets published because it’s so rare.” Dr. Holt acknowledged that she was not saying that “something couldn’t happen” if she had not seen it. - 20 - 2016 IL App (2d) 130703 ¶ 43 Kelly Lawrence, a forensic scientist with the Northeastern Illinois Regional Crime Laboratory, testified that a presumptive test for saliva on swabs taken from the left and right neck area of S.B. was positive.

1896In Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171 , the court said: “ A court of equity will, however, often treat a lapse of a less period than that provided in actions of law as a presumptive bar, on the ground of discouraging stale claims or gross laches, or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right. 2 Story, Eq.

1890“A court of equity will, however, often treat a lapse of a less period than that provided in actions at law, as a presumptive bar, on the ground of discouraging stale claims, or gross laches, or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right.” Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171 ; 2 Story’s Eq.

2021Such an inference of penetration is unreasonable only if the victim denies that penetration occurred.” People v. Branch, 2017 IL App (5th) 130220, ¶ 12 . ¶ 37 In the present case, the State’s evidence showed the anal swab taken from J.A.W. during the sexual assault evidence collection examination tested positive for semen during the presumptive test, which the State’s expert testified “indicat[ed] the presence of semen.” Although - 14 - later testing did not confirm the presence of semen, the State’s expert determined the anal swab contained defendant’s DNA.

2016Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)). -9- Common-law local governmental tort immunity was eventually extended to townships (Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870)), drainage districts (Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill. 269 (1890)), and school districts (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332 (1898), overruled in part by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)).

2016Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)). -9- Common-law local governmental tort immunity was eventually extended to townships (Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870)), drainage districts (Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill. 269 (1890)), and school districts (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332 (1898), overruled in part by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)).

2016Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)). -8- “in those [governmental] matters the city acts only as the agent of the State, in the discharge of duties imposed by law for the promotion and preservation of the public and general welfare, as contradistinguished from mere corporate acts, having relation to the management of its corporate or private concerns, and from which it derives some special or immediate advantage or emolument in its corporate or private character.” Culver, 130 Ill. at 244-45 . ¶ 33 Thus, local governmental tort immunity varied, depending on whether the claim was made ag

2016Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)). -9- Common-law local governmental tort immunity was eventually extended to townships (Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870)), drainage districts (Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill. 269 (1890)), and school districts (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332 (1898), overruled in part by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)).

2016Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344-45 (1998)). -9- Common-law local governmental tort immunity was eventually extended to townships (Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870)), drainage districts (Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill. 269 (1890)), and school districts (Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332 (1898), overruled in part by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)).

2009However, as the Seventh Circuit reasoned in United States v. Steward, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004), where the initial violation of Miranda “was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.” Moving forward, in People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 , 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008), the Illinois Supreme Court concurred in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, holding that in applying Seibert, courts must first determine whether the detectives deliberately employed a question-first, warn-later strategy when interrogating a defendant.

2009However, as the Seventh Circuit reasoned in United States v. Steward, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004), where the initial violation of Miranda “was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.” Moving forward, in People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 , 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008), the Illinois Supreme Court concurred in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, holding that in applying Seibert, courts must first determine whether the detectives deliberately employed a question-first, warn-later strategy when interrogating a defendant.

1983Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L.

1983Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L.

1969Whitney v. Madden, supra. It further suggests that its motion is under oath, and that since plaintiff has not denied any of its allegations under oath, they must stand conceded.

1896“As a general rule, where the statute has fixed the period of limitation under which a claim in a court of law would be barred, courts of equity, by analogy, will adopt the limitation thus fixed. ‘A court of equity will, however, often treat a lapse of a less period than that provided in actions at law as a presumptive bar, on the ground of discouraging stale claims, or gross laches, or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right.’” (Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287 , and cases cited.) The question is, then, can it be said that the facts of this case bring it within the excepti