Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2006In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted a "balancing test” for determining violations of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution but stated: "Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” Id., at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29, 33 L.Ed.2d at 115 n. 29 (emphasis added). 2006In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted a "balancing test” for determining violations of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution but stated: "Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” Id., at 530 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29, 33 L.Ed.2d at 115 n. 29 (emphasis added). | 1 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences1990Although our decision in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, supra [ 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972) ] indicated our intention of promulgating a presumptive rule for this jurisdiction, that did not in fact come to pass until the adoption of Rule 1100. 1990Although our decision in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, supra [ 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972) ] indicated our intention of promulgating a presumptive rule for this jurisdiction, that did not in fact come to pass until the adoption of Rule 1100. | 1 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Claytongreen1 sentence2023Finally, Officer Olszewski testified that a presumptive test of Johnson’s hands for nitrates— commonly found in gunshot residue—was positive. - 18 - J-S17013-23 Clayton, 816 A.2d 217 (Pa. 2002) (“[I]t is a well[-]settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are waived and unreviewable on appeal.”); see also Johnson, supra; Martz, supra. Judgment of sentence and conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license vacated. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2023Finally, Officer Olszewski testified that a presumptive test of Johnson’s hands for nitrates— commonly found in gunshot residue—was positive. - 18 - J-S17013-23 Clayton, 816 A.2d 217 (Pa. 2002) (“[I]t is a well[-]settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are waived and unreviewable on appeal.”); see also Johnson, supra; Martz, supra. Judgment of sentence and conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license vacated. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stallworthgreen2 sentences2003Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349 , 781 A.2d 110, 122 (2000). ‘Whether an expert’s testimony is persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter for the jury’s consideration.” Id. ¶ 56 We begin our analysis by recognizing that Hetzel does not challenge Ritter’s testimony based on Frye/Blum 16 or Dau-bert, 17 that is, she does not claim that the presumptive test utilized by Ritter is not generally accepted in the scientific community or that it is based on unreliable scientific methods. 2003Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349 , 781 A.2d 110, 122 (2000). ‘Whether an expert’s testimony is persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter for the jury’s consideration.” Id. ¶ 56 We begin our analysis by recognizing that Hetzel does not challenge Ritter’s testimony based on Frye/Blum 16 or Dau-bert, 17 that is, she does not claim that the presumptive test utilized by Ritter is not generally accepted in the scientific community or that it is based on unreliable scientific methods. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stensongreen1 sentence2003While there is no controlling case law in Pennsylvania, a number of other states have considered the very issue Hetzel raises. *762 ¶ 58 The test Ritter performed, the phenolphthalein (phenol) test, is one of many presumptive blood tests utilized by law enforcement nationwide. 19 The test involves the use of phenol, a chemical reagent that “causes blood and some other substances to turn a bright pink within a few seconds of application.” State v. Sten-son, 132 Wash.2d 668 , 940 P.2d 1239, 1262 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Briggs
green
1 sentence2018Briggs, 12 A.3d at 314 citing Com. v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519 , 17 uo_Leptinuii-Lnucu - nIw-I [WI IVIULIUllb%.21c1IIIVU PIO) L./Gillet] III ran-rieubai loUllICIVIILK 0-4-I I a p.111. kaLff .pui I 529 (Pa. 2003)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Tharp
green
1 sentence2018Briggs, 12 A.3d at 314 citing Com. v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519 , 17 uo_Leptinuii-Lnucu - nIw-I [WI IVIULIUllb%.21c1IIIVU PIO) L./Gillet] III ran-rieubai loUllICIVIILK 0-4-I I a p.111. kaLff .pui I 529 (Pa. 2003)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Estate of Brockerman
green
2 sentences2015Appellee responds by reiterating the trial court’s opinion that Armor had been "abrogated” when the Supreme Court declined, in a per curiam order, to take the. opportunity to "uphold the presumptive standard articulated in Armor ” and thus, "specifically rejected it.” Appellee’s Brief, at 18 (citing In re Estate of Brockerman, 332 Pa.Super. 88 , 480 A.2d 1199 , 1201 n. 3 (1984)). 2015Appellee responds by reiterating the trial court’s opinion that Armor had been "abrogated” when the Supreme Court declined, in a per curiam order, to take the. opportunity to "uphold the presumptive standard articulated in Armor ” and thus, "specifically rejected it.” Appellee’s Brief, at 18 (citing In re Estate of Brockerman, 332 Pa.Super. 88 , 480 A.2d 1199 , 1201 n. 3 (1984)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Stenson
green
1 sentence2003While there is no controlling case law in Pennsylvania, a number of other states have considered the very issue Hetzel raises. *762 ¶ 58 The test Ritter performed, the phenolphthalein (phenol) test, is one of many presumptive blood tests utilized by law enforcement nationwide. 19 The test involves the use of phenol, a chemical reagent that “causes blood and some other substances to turn a bright pink within a few seconds of application.” State v. Sten-son, 132 Wash.2d 668 , 940 P.2d 1239, 1262 (1997). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2000Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). 2000Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Fennell
green
2 sentences1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. 1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Jerry Grabina
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Arthur Tortorello
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Forrest Brooks, Jr. v. United States
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Douglas v. Maxwell
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Crockard v. Kent
neutral
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Brooks v. United States
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cleveland v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence1980Ctr., 443 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 , 91 S.Ct. 109 , 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 836 , 83 S.Ct. 1885 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1963); State v. Fennell, 218 Kan. 170 , 542 P.2d 686 (1975). [3] Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was promulgated by this Court to establish a presumptive standard of time within which a defendant must normally be brought to trial. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.