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14 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1884–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Wolfgreen2 sentences2000See Marich v. Kragulac, 415 N.E.2d 91, 102-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (citing, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-10 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 , 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (finding that a state’s adoption of a presumptive rule of majority representation is consistent with both the neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment and noting that generally a majority faction can be identified without resolving any questions of religious doctrine)). 2000See Marich v. Kragulac, 415 N.E.2d 91, 102-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (citing, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-10 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 , 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (finding that a state’s adoption of a presumptive rule of majority representation is consistent with both the neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment and noting that generally a majority faction can be identified without resolving any questions of religious doctrine)). | 1 | 3 |
Strong v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Strong, 817 N.E.2d at 260 . 2005Because Blakely redefined the "statutory maximum" for purposes of Apprendi, a defendant ... who challenges his enhanced sentence but fails to do so on grounds of Appren-di has not waived his argument pursuant to Blakely. ~ Strong v. State, 817 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citations omitted), clarified on reh'g by 820 N.E.2d 688 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), pet. for trans. pending. | 1 | 2 |
Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Incorporated v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2023First Credit Union v. Rivera, 178 N.E.3d 1245 , 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). [27] To be sure, “an election to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is a presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.” Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Munster v. Grocegreen1 sentence2023T.R. 4.13(A) (emphasis added); see also Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52 , 58–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (describing this portion of the rule as a presumptive requirement that a party swear to due diligence in attempting to locate an interested party before he or she may seek service by publication). | 1 | 1 |
Smylie v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 688 (Ind.2005). | 1 | 1 |
AMERICAN FAMILY MUT. INS. v. Continental Cas.green1 sentence2004Id. at 667 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Marich v. Kragulacgreen1 sentence2000See Marich v. Kragulac, 415 N.E.2d 91, 102-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (citing, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-10 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 , 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (finding that a state’s adoption of a presumptive rule of majority representation is consistent with both the neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment and noting that generally a majority faction can be identified without resolving any questions of religious doctrine)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Donnegan v. State
green
1 sentence2016“We accord great deference to the trial court’s decision, as it is in the best position to gauge the circumstances and the probable impact on the jury.” Donnegan, 809 N.E.2d at 972 . [31] During direct examination, McGuire testified that she performed a presumptive test for blood on the reddish-brown stain on the back of the t-shirt and got a positive result. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Burkett v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. [16] In support of his argument, Scia-raffa references Doolin and Burkett v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, for the proposition that the testimony must include an explanation of the nature of the presumptive test and its reliability. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Markley v. State
green
1 sentence2015Both of these tests are “generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Markley v. State, 603 N.E.2d 891 , 893 n. 5 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied. [19] In order to identify a controlled substance in a specimen, Scientist Burrow is required to perform at least two tests: “one being a presumptive test and one being a confirmatory test.” (Tr. p. 206). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kyle L. Doolin v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015Id. [16] In support of his argument, Scia-raffa references Doolin and Burkett v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, for the proposition that the testimony must include an explanation of the nature of the presumptive test and its reliability. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strong v. State
green
1 sentence2005Because Blakely redefined the "statutory maximum" for purposes of Apprendi, a defendant ... who challenges his enhanced sentence but fails to do so on grounds of Appren-di has not waived his argument pursuant to Blakely. ~ Strong v. State, 817 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citations omitted), clarified on reh'g by 820 N.E.2d 688 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), pet. for trans. pending. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1992Barker, 407 U.S. at 430 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116 n. 29. 1992Barker, 407 U.S. at 430 n. 29, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 29, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116 n. 29. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. Wolf
green
2 sentences1981On remand the Georgia Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf (1979) 244 Ga. 388 , 260 S.E.2d 84 held that in local schism cases Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means. 1981On remand the Georgia Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf (1979) 244 Ga. 388 , 260 S.E.2d 84 held that in local schism cases Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hayward v. National Bank
green
1 sentence1884In Hayward v. Nat’l Bank, 96 U. S. 611 , it is said by the Supreme Court of the United States: “ Courts of equity often treat a lapse of time, less than that prescribed by the statute of limitations, as a presumptive bar, on the groun d of discouraging stale claims, or gross laches, or unexplained acquiescence in the assertion of an adverse right.’ 2 Story Eq. | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.