presumptive standard in Washington

2025State v. Arndt, 179 Wn.

2024A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, the trial court uses the defendant’s prior convictions to determine an offender score, which (along with the seriousness level of the current offense) establishes the defendant’s presumptive standard sentencing range. 8 No. 58436-1-II State v. Arndt, 179 Wn.

2021Indeed, “[t]he defendant’s declaration under oath will suspend the use of the prior conviction in assessing the presumptive standard sentence range until the State proves by independent evidence . . . that the defendant before the court for sentencing and named in the prior conviction are the same.” Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 190 . 13 Neither was Derri entitled to a spoliation instruction.

2019RCW 9.94A.585(1) provides, in part, that "[a] sentence within the standard sentence range, under RCW 9.94A.510 or 9.94A.517, for an offense shall not be appealed." In State v. Ammons, our Supreme Court interpreted this statutory preclusion on appealing a standard range sentence and noted: When the sentence given is within the presumptive standard range then as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion and there is no right to appeal that aspect. 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 (1986).

2009Montana ultimately decided to apply retroactivity as the presumptive rule but retained Chevron Oil’s prospectivity analysis as an exception when all of its factors favor prospectivity. ¶47 In Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 118 N.M. 391 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994), cited in Audett, 158 Wn.2d at 722 , the New Mexico court acknowledged the “compelling force of the desirability of treating similarly situated parties alike” and accordingly adopted a “presump tion of retroactivity for a new rule imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case.” Beavers, 118 N.M. at 398 .

2009Montana ultimately decided to apply retroactivity as the presumptive rule but retained Chevron Oil’s prospectivity analysis as an exception when all of its factors favor prospectivity. ¶47 In Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 118 N.M. 391 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994), cited in Audett, 158 Wn.2d at 722 , the New Mexico court acknowledged the “compelling force of the desirability of treating similarly situated parties alike” and accordingly adopted a “presump tion of retroactivity for a new rule imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case.” Beavers, 118 N.M. at 398 .

2008E.g., State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wn.2d 472, 475 , 886 P.2d 138 (1994) (“An enhanced sentence is not an exceptional sentence, which allows the court to sentence outside the presumptive or standard sentencing range.”); State v. Williams, 70 Wn.

2008E.g., State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d 472, 475 , 886 P.2d 138 (1994) ("An enhanced sentence is not an exceptional sentence, which allows the court to sentence outside the presumptive or standard sentencing range."); State v. Williams, 70 Wash. App. 567, 571-573 , 853 P.2d 1388 (1993), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1011 , 869 P.2d 1085 (1994). ¶ 9 This approach is also consistent with the command of the first sentence of RCW 9.94A.533(6) that the enhancement be added to the range rather than treated as a separate sentencing provision.

2007Absent that indication, Washington courts rely on the presumptive test for legislative intent articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2007Absent that indication, Washington courts rely on the presumptive test for legislative intent articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2006Because the jury did not determine the particular substance underlying her conviction, Forrester reasons that the trial court should have sentenced her under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), a statute with a lower seriousness level that would have resulted in a presumptive standard range sentence of 12-14 months. ¶ 20 Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) provided: (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture... a controlled substance. (1) Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: .... (ii) amphetamine or methamphetamine, is guilty of a crime ... (

2006App. 467, 474 , 98 P.3d 513 (2004), we held that former RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii)’s language was “unambiguous” and that it prohibited manufacturing methamphetamine base, not methamphetamine hydrochloride.

2006Because the jury did not determine the particular substance underlying her conviction, Forrester reasons that the trial court should have sentenced her under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), a statute with a lower seriousness level that would have resulted in a presumptive standard range sentence of 12-14 months. ¶ 20 Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) provided: (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture... a controlled substance. (1) Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: .... (ii) amphetamine or methamphetamine, is guilty of a crime ... (

2006Because the jury did not determine the particular substance underlying her conviction, Forrester reasons that the trial court should have sentenced her under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(iii), a statute with a lower seriousness level that would have resulted in a presumptive standard range sentence of 12-14 months. ¶20 Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii)-(iii) provided: (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture ... a controlled substance. (1) Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: (ii) amphetamine or methamphetamine, is guilty of a crime

1999And generally, the SRA statute governing at the time of sentencing is used to determine a defendant's presumptive standard range sentence.... 86 Wash.App. at 855 , 939 P.2d 1243 .

1999And generally, the SRA statute governing at the time of sentencing is used to determine a defendant's presumptive standard range sentence.... 86 Wash.App. at 855 , 939 P.2d 1243 .

1997The defense sought to exclude this evidence, the State agreed, and it was excluded by the trial court. [7] There is no challenge to the validity of these tests or the result that the blood stain on Stenson's right pants leg was Frank Hoerner's blood. [8] The evidence indicates that luminol is a presumptive test, like the phenolphthalein test, but that the luminol test is more likely to result in false positives because it is so sensitive and reacts to more non-blood substances (phenolphthalein is a much more specific test; it is not absolutely specific, but is more specific for blood than lumi

1997The defense sought to exclude this evidence, the State agreed, and it was excluded by the trial court. [7] There is no challenge to the validity of these tests or the result that the blood stain on Stenson's right pants leg was Frank Hoerner's blood. [8] The evidence indicates that luminol is a presumptive test, like the phenolphthalein test, but that the luminol test is more likely to result in false positives because it is so sensitive and reacts to more non-blood substances (phenolphthalein is a much more specific test; it is not absolutely specific, but is more specific for blood than lumi

1997State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986).

1992RCW 9.94A.360, .370; State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 187 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986).

2024“Where that sentence falls above or below the presumptive standard range, the reason for deviating from the presumptive range must be a ‘substantial and compelling’ reason, in light of the purposes of the SRA[,]” and “‘[be] consistent with the interests of justice . . .’” Id. (quoting RCW 9.94A.090(1)).

2021State v. Howe, 116 Wn.2d 466 , 805 P.2d 806 (1991).

2021State v. Howe, 116 Wn.2d 466 , 805 P.2d 806 (1991).

2021Indeed, Washington law regarding spoliation provides that “for a direct sanction to apply the spoliation must in some way be connected to the party against whom the sanction is directed.” Henderson v. Tyrrell, 80 Wn.

2020Nickels, No. 96943-4 (Yu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) No. 96943-4 YU,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part) — The lead opinion's presumptive rule of office-wide disqualification is not supported by State v. Stenger, 111 Wn.2d 516 , 760 P.2d 357 (1988), and directly conflicts with the current Rules of Professional Conduct(RPCs).

2020Nickels, No. 96943-4 (Yu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) No. 96943-4 YU,J.(concurring in part and dissenting in part) — The lead opinion's presumptive rule of office-wide disqualification is not supported by State v. Stenger, 111 Wn.2d 516 , 760 P.2d 357 (1988), and directly conflicts with the current Rules of Professional Conduct(RPCs).

2020State v. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d 468, 472 , 325 P.3d 187 (2014).

2020State v. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d 468, 472 , 325 P.3d 187 (2014).

2019It follows, the Mohamed court concluded, that "a sentencing court may waive the enhancements as part of the standard sentence range under a DOSA ...." 187 Wash. App. at 641 , 350 P.3d 671 .

2019It follows, the Mohamed court concluded, that "a sentencing court may waive the enhancements as part of the standard sentence range under a DOSA ...." 187 Wash. App. at 641 , 350 P.3d 671 .

2016Similarly, in Fowler. 145 Wn.2d at 409 , the court rejected the trial court's consideration of the defendant's risk to reoffend because protection of the public had already been considered by the legislature in computing the presumptive standard range.

2016Cf State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (where exceptional sentence exceeded standard sentence by almost six times, it was unclear whether trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had only considered the valid aggravating factors).

2016Cf State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (where exceptional sentence exceeded standard sentence by almost six times, it was unclear whether trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had only considered the valid aggravating factors).

2014App. at 568-69. 28 \± at 568-70. 29 _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2013). 10 No. 70643-8-1/11 New Jersey30 and its progeny, for purposes ofthe Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, any fact (i.e., a sentencing factor) that increases the punishment for a crime is an "element" of that crime and must be found by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.31 Allevne determined that "facts increasing the legally prescribed floor [of the sentencing range] aggravate the punishment."32 Here, Juarez-Garcia argues that, because Allevne eliminated any distinction between sentencing enhan

2014App. at 568-69. 28 \± at 568-70. 29 _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2013). 10 No. 70643-8-1/11 New Jersey30 and its progeny, for purposes ofthe Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, any fact (i.e., a sentencing factor) that increases the punishment for a crime is an "element" of that crime and must be found by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.31 Allevne determined that "facts increasing the legally prescribed floor [of the sentencing range] aggravate the punishment."32 Here, Juarez-Garcia argues that, because Allevne eliminated any distinction between sentencing enhan

2014App. 545, 568-70 , 246 P.3d 234 (2011). 25 Rice noted that while "[sjentencing enhancements increase the presumptive or standard sentencing range, . .. they do not require a finding of an aggravating factor [under RCW 9.94A.535(3)] that allows the trial court to consider imposing an exceptional sentence outside the presumptive or standard sentencing range." Id. at 569. 26 Former RCW 9.94A.712 (2006), recodified as RCW 9.94A.507(3)(c)(ii). 27 Rjce, 159 Wn.

2014App. 545, 568-70 , 246 P.3d 234 (2011). 25 Rice noted that while "[sjentencing enhancements increase the presumptive or standard sentencing range, . .. they do not require a finding of an aggravating factor [under RCW 9.94A.535(3)] that allows the trial court to consider imposing an exceptional sentence outside the presumptive or standard sentencing range." Id. at 569. 26 Former RCW 9.94A.712 (2006), recodified as RCW 9.94A.507(3)(c)(ii). 27 Rjce, 159 Wn.

2014The under-15 sentence enhancement increased the defendant's presumptive or standard sentencing range,25 with the minimum term either becoming "the maximum of the standard sentence range for the offense or twenty-five years, whichever is greater."26 The defendant argued that because the predicate first degree child molestation charge used to charge first degree kidnapping involved a victim less than 12 years old, a sentence enhancement based on the victim's age constituted a second punishment for the same offense.27 Although the sentence enhancement coincided with an underlying element of the p

2013Id.

2011Id. at 568-69, 192 P.3d 345 . ¶ 20 Here, the trial court concluded that "[i]ndependent of any argument by the State relating to notice given of an exceptional sentence, . . . the Court has reached its own determination that the defendant should receive an exceptional sentence over the presumptive standard range based on RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c)." CP at 24.

2009Montana ultimately decided to apply retroactivity as the presumptive rule but retained Chevron Oil's prospectivity analysis as an exception when all of its factors favor prospectivity. ¶ 47 In Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 118 N.M. 391 , 881 P.2d 1376 (1994), cited in Audett, 158 Wash.2d at 722, 147 P.3d 982 , the New Mexico court acknowledged the "compelling force of the desirability of treating similarly situated parties alike" and accordingly adopted a "presumption of retroactivity for a new rule imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case." Beavers, 118 N.M. at 398 ,

2007Jackman, 156 Wash.2d at 746 , 132 P.3d 136 (citing Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 778 , 888 P.2d 155 ).