implicit requirement in Arizona

2007It is well established that "[s]tatutory provisions are to be read in the context of related provisions and of the overall statutory scheme," and "[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony." Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).

2007It is well established that "[s]tatutory provisions are to be read in the context of related provisions and of the overall statutory scheme," and "[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony." Goulder v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 Ariz. 414, 416 , 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993), aff'd, 179 Ariz. 181 , 877 P.2d 280 (1994).

1994That duty carries with it “ ‘an implicit requirement that the defendant act reasonably in light of the known and foreseeable risks.’” Ballesteros, 161 Ariz. at 627 , 780 P.2d at 460 (quoting Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board, 146 Ariz. 352, 356-57 , 706 P.2d 364, 368-69 (1985)).

1994That duty carries with it “ ‘an implicit requirement that the defendant act reasonably in light of the known and foreseeable risks.’” Ballesteros, 161 Ariz. at 627 , 780 P.2d at 460 (quoting Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board, 146 Ariz. 352, 356-57 , 706 P.2d 364, 368-69 (1985)).

1984See Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F.Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977)(“secondary” client did not have any expectation that his communication would be kept secret from “primary” clients); Petty, supra, 116 Cal.App.2d at 29 , 253 P.2d at 34 (client being jointly represented did not assert that information given out of the presence of other client was confidential and therefore no confidential communication found); Udall & Livermore, supra, at 142 (“if the client were to tell people what he told his lawyer, the privilege could be found no longer to attach either on the gr

1984See Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F.Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977)(“secondary” client did not have any expectation that his communication would be kept secret from “primary” clients); Petty, supra, 116 Cal.App.2d at 29 , 253 P.2d at 34 (client being jointly represented did not assert that information given out of the presence of other client was confidential and therefore no confidential communication found); Udall & Livermore, supra, at 142 (“if the client were to tell people what he told his lawyer, the privilege could be found no longer to attach either on the gr

1984See Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F.Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977)(“secondary” client did not have any expectation that his communication would be kept secret from “primary” clients); Petty, supra, 116 Cal.App.2d at 29 , 253 P.2d at 34 (client being jointly represented did not assert that information given out of the presence of other client was confidential and therefore no confidential communication found); Udall & Livermore, supra, at 142 (“if the client were to tell people what he told his lawyer, the privilege could be found no longer to attach either on the gr

1984See Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F.Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977)(“secondary” client did not have any expectation that his communication would be kept secret from “primary” clients); Petty, supra, 116 Cal.App.2d at 29 , 253 P.2d at 34 (client being jointly represented did not assert that information given out of the presence of other client was confidential and therefore no confidential communication found); Udall & Livermore, supra, at 142 (“if the client were to tell people what he told his lawyer, the privilege could be found no longer to attach either on the gr