implicit waiver in Massachusetts

2025Because his rejection of the real estate purchase agreement was supported by the record, and because it involved the sort of credibility determinations that are "quintessentially the domain of the trial judge," Prenaveau v. 2 Prenaveau, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 496 (2012), we are unpersuaded by the defendant's implicit claim of error in this determination.

2011In the context of interest on damage awards imposed against public employers, “[r]ecent cases have recognized an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to interest when the Legislature has expressed an intent to provide complete relief by giving broad delegation to agencies.” Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. at 240 (referencing statutory authority afforded Labor Relations Commission and Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to fashion remedies). 13 See generally Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997), quoting from C & M Constr.

2011In the context of interest on damage awards imposed against public employers, “[r]ecent cases have recognized an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to interest when the Legislature has expressed an intent to provide complete relief by giving broad delegation to agencies.” Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. at 240 (referencing statutory authority afforded Labor Relations Commission and Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to fashion remedies). 13 See generally Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997), quoting from C & M Constr.

2007See DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, supra at 14-15; Brookfield v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 443 Mass. 315, 324-326 (2005).

2007See DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, supra at 14-15; Brookfield v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 443 Mass. 315, 324-326 (2005).

1999See, e.g., Matter of Gail, 417 Mass. 321, 324 (1994) (Juvenile Court may proceed with CHINS disposition absent parental consent, because “[n]owhere in [the CHINS statute] is there an authorization for a parent or guardian to terminate the proceedings, nor even an implicit requirement of parental consent to the proceedings”); Oscar F. v. County of Worcester, 412 Mass. 38, 41 (1992) (“If the Legislature had intended that § 39G [permit the Juvenile Court to mandate private schooling], § 39G would not have limited a judge to ordering educational services for a child only when such services are dir

1999See, e.g., Matter of Gail, 417 Mass. 321, 324 (1994) (Juvenile Court may proceed with CHINS disposition absent parental consent, because “[n]owhere in [the CHINS statute] is there an authorization for a parent or guardian to terminate the proceedings, nor even an implicit requirement of parental consent to the proceedings”); Oscar F. v. County of Worcester, 412 Mass. 38, 41 (1992) (“If the Legislature had intended that § 39G [permit the Juvenile Court to mandate private schooling], § 39G would not have limited a judge to ordering educational services for a child only when such services are dir

1997Nor are we impressed with the argument that the statute is justified because, to quote the district attorney’s brief, it “create[s] an atmosphere where citizens may go about their way free from being accused, intimidated, or harassed.” A listener’s annoyance or offense at a particular type of communicative activity does not provide a basis for a law burdening that activity, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-409 (1989), especially because people are free to ignore or walk away from the beggar’s request for money or attention.

1997The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards — that crime is being nipped in the bud — is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment.” Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).

1983See USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 11, 20-21 (1976); Campbell v. St.

1983See USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 11, 20-21 (1976); Campbell v. St.