implicit waiver in California

2025As our high court stated in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 , “Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction.” (See also People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 49 [stipulated sentence pursuant to a plea “constitutes an implicit waiver of [the defendant’s] right to contend that the sentence imposed” is unlawful].) Wilcher cannot claim that the original sentencing court

2024The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process. [Citations.] While failure to object is not an implicit waiver of section 654 rights, acceptance of the plea bargain [can be]. ‘When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that

2022(See People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of § 654]; People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057 [“When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived any rights under such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain”].) There may be other schools of thought or other ways of looking at this issue.

2020The Advisory Committee comment to rule 4.412(b) states: “This subdivision is based on the fact that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expresses agreement to a specified prison term normally is acknowledging that the term is appropriate for his or her total course of conduct.” The court in Hester points out that rule 4.412(b) and its predecessor, former rule 412(b), are codifications of “the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed,” and acceptance of a plea bargain is an implicit waiver of section 654 rights. ( Hester, supra, at p

1992(Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 740 P.2d 404 ], quoting Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ].) An implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.

1992(Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 740 P.2d 404 ], quoting Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ].) An implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.

2016(Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 841 ; see also Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1388 (Tylo) [“[t]here can be no doubt that the marital relationship serves as a foundation for an assertion of the right to privacy”].) The filing of a sexual harassment suit, even one which alleges severe emotional distress, does not operate as an implicit waiver of the right to privacy in marital or sexual matters.

1992(Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 740 P.2d 404 ], quoting Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 574 P.2d 766 ].) An implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.

2026An acknowledgment made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation” but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73 .) By contrast, the “acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.) However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacra

2026An acknowledgment made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation” but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73.) By contrast, the “acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.) However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacram

2024To the extent that the trial court made factual findings, we review them to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Fuller, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 ; see also Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483, 487 .) 7 B.

2023To the extent that the trial court made factual findings, we review them to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Fuller, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 ; see also Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483, 487 .) 7 B.

2021Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1231 [same but in slander of title-breach of fiduciary duty claim]; In re Ivey (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 793 , 804–805 [imputing attorney knowledge of fees and costs to 15 jurisprudence for almost 400 years.’” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 732 .) It “is a legislative enactment, which courts have no power to expand or limit by creating exceptions” (McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100 ), including a purported exception imputing the knowledge or negligence of an attorney to the client so as to fashion an implicit waiver by the client.

2021Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1231 [same but in slander of title-breach of fiduciary duty claim]; In re Ivey (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 793 , 804–805 [imputing attorney knowledge of fees and costs to 15 jurisprudence for almost 400 years.’” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 732 .) It “is a legislative enactment, which courts have no power to expand or limit by creating exceptions” (McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100 ), including a purported exception imputing the knowledge or negligence of an attorney to the client so as to fashion an implicit waiver by the client.

2021Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Magallanes did not waive her right to claim the attorney-client privilege. // // // // // // // // // // // // // an alleged contemnor]; Sauer v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 213, 231 [imputing attorney’s wrongful withholding of material to client with respect to discovery sanctions].) 16 DISPOSITION The alternative writ is discharged.

2021Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Magallanes did not waive her right to claim the attorney-client privilege. // // // // // // // // // // // // // an alleged contemnor]; Sauer v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 213, 231 [imputing attorney’s wrongful withholding of material to client with respect to discovery sanctions].) 16 DISPOSITION The alternative writ is discharged.

2017(People v. Mahoney (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 781, 796 [ 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Under these principles, there is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on the prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it.

2017(People v. Mahoney (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 781, 796 [ 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Under these principles, there is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on the prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it.

2015The first question is one of statutory construction, and our goal is “ ‘to discern the probable intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the *317 purpose of the laws in question.’ [Citations.]” (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 961 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 , 342 P.3d 1217 ] (State Department).) Where, as here, the statutory language is genuinely ambiguous because it does not speak to the issue to be determined, we turn to the canons of statutory construction for guidance.

2015The first question is one of statutory construction, and our goal is “ ‘to discern the probable intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the *317 purpose of the laws in question.’ [Citations.]” (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 961 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 , 342 P.3d 1217 ] (State Department).) Where, as here, the statutory language is genuinely ambiguous because it does not speak to the issue to be determined, we turn to the canons of statutory construction for guidance.

2025This, however, does not necessarily mean a unanimity instruction was required. “[T]he presentation of evidence showing the commission of more than one act supporting a charged offense creates the requirement of either a unanimity instruction or the ‘ “prosecution must elect the specific act relied upon to prove the charge to the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128 , 162, italics omitted.) “The prosecution can make an election by ‘tying each specific count to specific criminal acts elicited from the victims’ testimony’— typically in opening statement and/or closing argument.

2023(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341 [“there is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on the prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it”].) III DISPOSITION We affirm the judgment.

2026In this respect, the situation is more akin to French, supra, 43 Cal.4th 36 .

2025As our high court stated in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 , “Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction.” (See also People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 49 [stipulated sentence pursuant to a plea “constitutes an implicit waiver of [the defendant’s] right to contend that the sentence imposed” is unlawful].) Wilcher cannot claim that the original sentencing court

2023(See Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 996-997 [“A probation officer cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the authority granted to the officer by the court.

2023(See Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 996-997 [“A probation officer cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the authority granted to the officer by the court.

2026An acknowledgment made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation” but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73 .) By contrast, the “acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.) However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacra

2026(Buescher, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 76 .) The court held that this unqualified recognition and acknowledgement of the expired obligation was by itself sufficient to revive the debt because it constituted an implicit waiver of the statute of limitations.

2026An acknowledgment made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation” but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73 .) By contrast, the “acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.) However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacra

2026An acknowledgment made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation” but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73.) By contrast, the “acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.) However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacram

2017Proc., rule 23(b)(3) (28 U.S.C.)].) Although Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23 does not refer to an ascertainability requirement, many federal courts "have held that it is an implicit requirement of class certification." (Cole v. City of Memphis (6th Cir. 2016) 839 F.3d 530, 541 (Cole) [citing other cases].) However, several federal circuit courts have also held that ascertainability is not required when a class is certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(2) (28 U.S.C.).

2017Proc., rule 23(b)(3) (28 U.S.C.) ].) Although Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23 does not refer to an ascertainability requirement, many federal courts "have held that it is an implicit requirement of class certification." ( Cole v. City of Memphis (6th Cir. 2016) 839 F.3d 530 , 541 ( Cole ) [citing other cases].) However, several federal circuit courts have also held that ascertainability is not required when a class is certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(2) (28 U.S.C.).

2008And so it is in the other published cases we have reviewed. [3] *379 To determine whether there is in fact an implicit requirement that the party on whom attorney fees are imposed be responsible for adversely affecting the public interest, we first look first to the words of the statute, "`because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.'" ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 155 P.3d 284 .) Although the statute does not explicitly address the type of conduct that would make a party liable for attorney f

2008And so it is in the other published cases we have reviewed. [3] *379 To determine whether there is in fact an implicit requirement that the party on whom attorney fees are imposed be responsible for adversely affecting the public interest, we first look first to the words of the statute, "`because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.'" ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 155 P.3d 284 .) Although the statute does not explicitly address the type of conduct that would make a party liable for attorney f