implicit requirement in Rhode Island

2005We held that “[t]he duty of good faith and fair dealing, implied in every contract,” id. at 687 , requires some form of notice before a party to that contract can cancel the agreement: “the only way the agreement can be interpreted as a rational instrument * * * is to recognize, even in the absence of a formal notice requirement, an implicit requirement that, to bring into play the ‘null and void’ provision, one party communicate to the other some form of notice.” Id. (quoting Tremouliaris v. Pina, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 722 , 505 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1987)).

2005We held that “[t]he duty of good faith and fair dealing, implied in every contract,” id. at 687 , requires some form of notice before a party to that contract can cancel the agreement: “the only way the agreement can be interpreted as a rational instrument * * * is to recognize, even in the absence of a formal notice requirement, an implicit requirement that, to bring into play the ‘null and void’ provision, one party communicate to the other some form of notice.” Id. (quoting Tremouliaris v. Pina, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 722 , 505 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1987)).

2022Moreover, as this Court has explained many times, “virtually every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties[,]” McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 185 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I. 2002)), which “ensures that ‘contractual objectives may be achieved[.]’” Id. (quoting Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 110 R.I. 735, 739 , 297 A.2d 643, 645 (1972)). -6- In the case at bar, the motion justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because she found that “[p]lain

2022Moreover, as this Court has explained many times, “virtually every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties[,]” McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 185 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I. 2002)), which “ensures that ‘contractual objectives may be achieved[.]’” Id. (quoting Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 110 R.I. 735, 739 , 297 A.2d 643, 645 (1972)). -6- In the case at bar, the motion justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because she found that “[p]lain

2022Moreover, as this Court has explained many times, “virtually every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties[,]” McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 185 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I. 2002)), which “ensures that ‘contractual objectives may be achieved[.]’” Id. (quoting Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 110 R.I. 735, 739 , 297 A.2d 643, 645 (1972)). -6- In the case at bar, the motion justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because she found that “[p]lain

2022Moreover, as this Court has explained many times, “virtually every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties[,]” McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 185 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I. 2002)), which “ensures that ‘contractual objectives may be achieved[.]’” Id. (quoting Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 110 R.I. 735, 739 , 297 A.2d 643, 645 (1972)). -6- In the case at bar, the motion justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because she found that “[p]lain

2022Moreover, as this Court has explained many times, “virtually every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties[,]” McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 185 (R.I. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1115 (R.I. 2002)), which “ensures that ‘contractual objectives may be achieved[.]’” Id. (quoting Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 110 R.I. 735, 739 , 297 A.2d 643, 645 (1972)). -6- In the case at bar, the motion justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because she found that “[p]lain

2002And because “[t]he Legislature is [ ] presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts a statute,” State v. Reis, 430 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I.1981), the General Assembly must be deemed to have known that, upon passing legislation providing for compensation to be paid to commission members for attending meetings, it was providing this compensation as an incident to the public offices they held and that their legal right to enforce the payment thereof accompanied their legal title to their offices.

2002And because "[t]he Legislature is [ ] presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts a statute," State v. Reis, 430 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I.1981), the General Assembly must be deemed to have known that, upon passing legislation providing for compensation to be paid to commission members for attending meetings, it was providing this compensation as an incident to the public offices they held and that their legal right to enforce the payment thereof accompanied their legal title to their offices.

2002In LaBelle v. Hazard, 91 R.I. 42, 46-47 , 160 A.2d 723, 725 (1960) this Court stated that “[t]he salary of a public official is an incident to the office, and the legal right to receive or enforce the payment thereof goes with the legal title thereto.” (Emphasis added.); cf. State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614 , 448 A.2d 969, 972-73 (1982) (“Because the existence of a right to receive [government-employment] benefits implies the existence of an appropriate remedy for recovering these benefits, we hold that the * * * statute contains an implicit w

2002In LaBelle v. Hazard, 91 R.I. 42, 46-47 , 160 A.2d 723, 725 (1960) this Court stated that “[t]he salary of a public official is an incident to the office, and the legal right to receive or enforce the payment thereof goes with the legal title thereto.” (Emphasis added.); cf. State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614 , 448 A.2d 969, 972-73 (1982) (“Because the existence of a right to receive [government-employment] benefits implies the existence of an appropriate remedy for recovering these benefits, we hold that the * * * statute contains an implicit w

2002In LaBelle v. Hazard, 91 R.I. 42, 46-47 , 160 A.2d 723, 725 (1960) this Court stated that “[t]he salary of a public official is an incident to the office, and the legal right to receive or enforce the payment thereof goes with the legal title thereto.” (Emphasis added.); cf. State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614 , 448 A.2d 969, 972-73 (1982) (“Because the existence of a right to receive [government-employment] benefits implies the existence of an appropriate remedy for recovering these benefits, we hold that the * * * statute contains an implicit w

2002In LaBelle v. Hazard, 91 R.I. 42, 46-47 , 160 A.2d 723, 725 (1960) this Court stated that “[t]he salary of a public official is an incident to the office, and the legal right to receive or enforce the payment thereof goes with the legal title thereto.” (Emphasis added.); cf. State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Belknap County, 122 N.H. 614 , 448 A.2d 969, 972-73 (1982) (“Because the existence of a right to receive [government-employment] benefits implies the existence of an appropriate remedy for recovering these benefits, we hold that the * * * statute contains an implicit w

1997Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I.1984) (thirteen-month delay held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (three-year delay held unreasonable); Curtis, 440 A.2d at 749 (four- to seven-month delay held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 200 , 243 A.2d 738, 740 (1968) (delay for more than twelve months held unreasonable).

1997Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I.1984) (thirteen-month delay held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (three-year delay held unreasonable); Curtis, 440 A.2d at 749 (four- to seven-month delay held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 200 , 243 A.2d 738, 740 (1968) (delay for more than twelve months held unreasonable).

1997Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I.1984) (thirteen-month delay held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (three-year delay held unreasonable); Curtis, 440 A.2d at 749 (four- to seven-month delay held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 200 , 243 A.2d 738, 740 (1968) (delay for more than twelve months held unreasonable).

1997Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I.1984) (thirteen-month delay held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (three-year delay held unreasonable); Curtis, 440 A.2d at 749 (four- to seven-month delay held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 200 , 243 A.2d 738, 740 (1968) (delay for more than twelve months held unreasonable).

1997Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1083 (R.I.1984) (thirteen-month delay held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (three-year delay held unreasonable); Curtis, 440 A.2d at 749 (four- to seven-month delay held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 200 , 243 A.2d 738, 740 (1968) (delay for more than twelve months held unreasonable).