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37 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Butlerred2 sentences2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can 2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can | 2 | 6 |
Joseph v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. 2012See Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
STATE EX REL. BARDEN AND ROBESON v. Hillgreen2 sentences2007Barden and Robeson Corp. v. Hill , 539 S.E.2d 106, 112 (W.Va. 2000) (stating that unless defendant is able to show good cause for default, it has waived its right to assert arbitration as affirmative defense and that "[u]nexcused conduct that results in the entry of a default judgment is no less of an implicit waiver of a right to arbitration than any other procedural forfeiture"). 2007Barden and Robeson Corp. v. Hill, 208 W.Va. 163 , 539 S.E.2d 106, 112 (2000) (stating that unless defendant is able to show good cause for default, it has waived its right to assert arbitration as affirmative defense and that “[u]nex-cused conduct that results in the entry of a default judgment is no less of an implicit waiver of a right to arbitration than any other procedural forfeiture”). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1311, 1313 . 1999Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1311, 1313 . | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences2009“This is implicit in the requirement that the burning be intentional.” Miller, 566 S.W.2d at 618 . 2009"This is implicit in the requirement that the burning be intentional." Miller , 566 S.W.2d at 618 . | 1 | 3 |
Zimmerman v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483 n.12, 98 S. Ct. at 1934 n.12 (“The principal inaccuracy is the fact that it is not technically a ‘presumption[.]’”); Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. 2009Id. | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See id. at 18−19 (“Foreseeability is an implicit requirement for causation that criminal law addresses through culpability.”); see also id. at 21 (“Appellant’s arguments contest culpability, rather than allege concurrent causes.”). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2021See Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483 n.12, 98 S. Ct. at 1934 n.12 (“The principal inaccuracy is the fact that it is not technically a ‘presumption[.]’”); Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. 2021See Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483 n.12, 98 S. Ct. at 1934 n.12 (“The principal inaccuracy is the fact that it is not technically a ‘presumption[.]’”); Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen1 sentence2011See id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1979)); see also Marsh v. State , 140 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (construing Tex. Fam. | 1 | 1 |
Marsh v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1979)); see also Marsh v. State , 140 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (construing Tex. Fam. | 1 | 1 |
Flamer v. State of Delawaregreen1 sentence2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Luis Hernando Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
Bui v. DiPaologreen2 sentences2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can 2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can | 1 | 1 |
Russel William Burket v. Ronald Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can | 1 | 1 |
Beverly A. Seymour v. Diane Walker,respondent-Appelleegreen1 sentence2010Joseph Concurring Opinion Page 3 However, “an express statement is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” 7 Under some circumstances, if a suspect has been fully warned of his rights and has indicated that he understands those rights, a course of conduct consistent with waiver “may” support the conclusion that the suspect has waived his Miranda rights.8 However, [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can | 1 | 1 |
| Max Alexander Soffar v. Janie Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Turner v. State
green
2 sentences2012Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 583–84. 2012Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 583–84. | 5 | 2009–2012 |
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.
red
2 sentences2007Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 179 , 115 S.Ct. at 1335 . 2007Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 179 , 115 S.Ct. at 1335 . | 3 | 2007–2007 |
David Shapiro v. The Republic of Bolivia, the Bolivian Air Force and the Central Bank of Bolivia
green
2 sentences2002Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017 . 2002Shapiro , 930 F.2d at 1017 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
green
2 sentences2001Id. 2001Id. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Illinois v. Allen
green
1 sentence2025Although a category-two Marin waiver is typically an express act personally done by the defendant after being warned of the nature of the right at issue and the consequences of his waiver,10 that is not invariably so.11 The Legislature is free 7 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Gagnon, supra (quoting then R. 43(b)(2) (“after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause him to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom”)); FED. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Gagnon
green
1 sentence2025Although a category-two Marin waiver is typically an express act personally done by the defendant after being warned of the nature of the right at issue and the consequences of his waiver,10 that is not invariably so.11 The Legislature is free 7 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Gagnon, supra (quoting then R. 43(b)(2) (“after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause him to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom”)); FED. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re MS
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re KL
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
cluster 508215
green
1 sentence2019Co., 850 F.2d 342 , 344–45 (8th Cir. 1988)). 34 In Janvey, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the definition of “reasonably equivalent value” and held: While the definitions of “value” and “reasonably equivalent value” are expansive and nonexclusive, there is nevertheless an implicit requirement that the transfer confer some direct or indirect economic benefit to the debtor, as opposed to benefits conferred solely on a third- party, transfers that are purely gratuitous, and transactions that merely hold subjective value to the debtor or transferee. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Alabama v. Bozeman
green
2 sentences2015In Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 , 150 L.Ed.2d 188 , ~he leading case regarding the interpretation of the language of the IAD, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: "The agreements language militates. against an implicit exception, for it is an absolute as the word "shall" is the language of command". 2015In Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 , 150 L.Ed.2d 188 , ~he leading case regarding the interpretation of the language of the IAD, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: "The agreements language militates. against an implicit exception, for it is an absolute as the word "shall" is the language of command". | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Darrell W. McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges
green
1 sentence2015Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.1989 ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 , 110 S.Ct. 1141 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Parker v. United States
green
1 sentence2015Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.1989 ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 , 110 S.Ct. 1141 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Reneer v. Seabold
green
1 sentence2015Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.1989 ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 , 110 S.Ct. 1141 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McAfee v. Fifth Circuit Judges
green
1 sentence2015Conclusory allegations lacking reference to material facts are not sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under section 1983, McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.1989 ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 , 110 S.Ct. 1141 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1990). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Staley
green
1 sentence2013This clearly undermines the purpose of the subsequent- writ provisions.12 In order to avoid this anomaly in the non-capital habeas milieu as well, we extended the same implicit requirement of an allegation of facts sufficient to invoke the new law to Article 11.07, Section 4(a)(2): Similarly, while the text of section 4(a)(2) does not specifically state that the applicant must make a prima facie claim of actual innocence in addition to the claim of a constitutional violation, it is inherent in the subsequent-writ provisions that the applicant meet the threshold requirement before the merits 11 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Watson v. State
green
1 sentence2013Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State ex rel. Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Hill green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Luloc Oil Co. v. Caldwell County green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.