implicit requirement in Oregon

2022See Langley, 351 Or at 670 (“[R]ecalcitrant behavior toward counsel can move beyond noncooperation and become mis- conduct that defeats the ability of counsel to carry out the representation function.”).

2018See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist. , 318 Or. 99 , 104, 862 P.2d 1293 (1993) (elements of issue preclusion); see also Barackman v. Anderson , 338 Or. 365 , 109 P.3d 370 (2005) (insurance arbitration given preclusive effect on damages in personal injury action).

2018See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist. , 318 Or. 99 , 104, 862 P.2d 1293 (1993) (elements of issue preclusion); see also Barackman v. Anderson , 338 Or. 365 , 109 P.3d 370 (2005) (insurance arbitration given preclusive effect on damages in personal injury action).

2018See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist. , 318 Or. 99 , 104, 862 P.2d 1293 (1993) (elements of issue preclusion); see also Barackman v. Anderson , 338 Or. 365 , 109 P.3d 370 (2005) (insurance arbitration given preclusive effect on damages in personal injury action).

2018See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist. , 318 Or. 99 , 104, 862 P.2d 1293 (1993) (elements of issue preclusion); see also Barackman v. Anderson , 338 Or. 365 , 109 P.3d 370 (2005) (insurance arbitration given preclusive effect on damages in personal injury action).

2017See OAR 436-035-0007(1) (“[A] worker is entitled to a value under these rules only for those findings of impairment that are permanent and were caused by the accepted compensable condition and direct medical sequela.”); see also Multnomah County v. Shults, 243 Or App 354, 361-62 , 258 P3d 1263 (2011) (there is an implicit requirement that the rated impairment is compensable, i.e., caused by the compensable injury).

2017See OAR 436-035-0007(1) (“[A] worker is entitled to a value under these rules only for those findings of impairment that are permanent and were caused by the accepted compensable condition and direct medical sequela.”); see also Multnomah County v. Shults, 243 Or App 354, 361-62 , 258 P3d 1263 (2011) (there is an implicit requirement that the rated impairment is compensable, i.e., caused by the compensable injury).

2014See State v. Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or App 407, 413-14 , 780 P2d 234 , rev den, 308 Or 660 (1989) (policy requiring inventory of all cash and negotiable checks implicitly required an inventory of every container designed or objectively likely to contain money or other valuables; such “guidelines effectively eliminate any discretion on the part of the booking officer about whether to inventory the contents of a wallet. *** In other words, [the officer] did not have discretion whether to inventory the contents of a wallet; he had been instructed to do so.” (Emphasis in original.)).

2014See State v. Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or App 407, 413-14 , 780 P2d 234 , rev den, 308 Or 660 (1989) (policy requiring inventory of all cash and negotiable checks implicitly required an inventory of every container designed or objectively likely to contain money or other valuables; such “guidelines effectively eliminate any discretion on the part of the booking officer about whether to inventory the contents of a wallet. *** In other words, [the officer] did not have discretion whether to inventory the contents of a wallet; he had been instructed to do so.” (Emphasis in original.)).

2010See State v. Cook, 108 Or App 576, 582 , 816 P2d 697 (1991), rev den, 312 Or 588 (1992) (“If a sentencing court exceeds its statutory authority in imposing a specific sentence, that is an ‘error of law[.]’ ”).

2010See State v. Cook, 108 Or App 576, 582 , 816 P2d 697 (1991), rev den, 312 Or 588 (1992) (“If a sentencing court exceeds its statutory authority in imposing a specific sentence, that is an ‘error of law[.]’ ”).