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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Johnsongreen1 sentence2023(Compare In re Johnson (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 290, 297 [declining to review prison disciplinary violation that did not result in the loss of good time credits] with In re Marti (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 561 , 566-567 [reviewing a habeas claim challenging a prison disciplinary violation that did not result in the loss of good time credits because it could affect future classification and parole suitability decisions].) Accordingly, we decline Aguilar’s request to exercise our discretion to address this issue. | 1 | 1 |
Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences1987(Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 802, 814, fn. 9 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 567 P.2d 1162 ].) In contrast, the prison disciplinary hearing in the instant case shared none of the above characteristics. 1987(Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 802, 814, fn. 9 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 567 P.2d 1162 ].) In contrast, the prison disciplinary hearing in the instant case shared none of the above characteristics. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences1975The Palmigiano opinion treated this fact as just one of many ways in which the accused in a prison disciplinary hearing is in a more disadvantageous position than the accused in a conventional criminal trial. 15 Palmigiano has recently been vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ], in which the Supreme Court for the first time set minimum procedural due process standards for prison disciplinary hearings. 1975The Palmigiano opinion treated this fact as just one of many ways in which the accused in a prison disciplinary hearing is in a more disadvantageous position than the accused in a conventional criminal trial. 15 Palmigiano has recently been vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 ], in which the Supreme Court for the first time set minimum procedural due process standards for prison disciplinary hearings. | 2 | 1975–2024 |
Baxter v. Palmigiano
green
2 sentences2021(Baxter, supra, 425 U.S. at p. 318 .) He determined the case did not support JP’s position about the arbitrator relying on adverse inferences in a civil action. 2021(Baxter, supra, 425 U.S. at p. 316 .) The arbitrator cited the Supreme Court’s statement the constitution does not preclude the use of adverse inferences in civil cases. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Ford
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Eggleston
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Gullatt
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Nicholas A. Palmigiano v. Joseph Baxter
green
1 sentence1975(Id, at p. 106.) The dissent relied primarily on Palmigiano v. Baxter (1st Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 1280, 1288-1290 , vacated (1974) 418 U.S. 908 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1155 , 94 S.Ct. 3200 ] (see fn. 15, infra), which held that “[w]here the possibility exists of [a state prison] inmate being penalized for the same criminal conduct in a disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial, he should be entitled to ‘use’ immunity for statements he might make within the prison disciplinary hearing.” (Id., at p. 1289.) Palmigiano deemed the “provision of use immunity” to be “a rational accommodation between the imperative | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
1 sentence1975In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.” (411 U.S. at pp. 790-791 [ 36 L.Ed.2d at p. 666 ].) 3 “In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however, we think the major consideration militating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Heffernan v. Thoms
green
1 sentence1975(Id, at p. 106.) The dissent relied primarily on Palmigiano v. Baxter (1st Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 1280, 1288-1290 , vacated (1974) 418 U.S. 908 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1155 , 94 S.Ct. 3200 ] (see fn. 15, infra), which held that “[w]here the possibility exists of [a state prison] inmate being penalized for the same criminal conduct in a disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial, he should be entitled to ‘use’ immunity for statements he might make within the prison disciplinary hearing.” (Id., at p. 1289.) Palmigiano deemed the “provision of use immunity” to be “a rational accommodation between the imperative | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Grossman v. Striepeke
green
1 sentence1975(Id, at p. 106.) The dissent relied primarily on Palmigiano v. Baxter (1st Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 1280, 1288-1290 , vacated (1974) 418 U.S. 908 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1155 , 94 S.Ct. 3200 ] (see fn. 15, infra), which held that “[w]here the possibility exists of [a state prison] inmate being penalized for the same criminal conduct in a disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial, he should be entitled to ‘use’ immunity for statements he might make within the prison disciplinary hearing.” (Id., at p. 1289.) Palmigiano deemed the “provision of use immunity” to be “a rational accommodation between the imperative | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.