uncommon defense in California

2023(Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 521 .) Indeed, in this case, defendant’s primary 11. argument during closing was that the jury should mistrust various witnesses and the prosecution’s case in general due to the amount of time between the murder and trial.

2022Hence, such a violation may be premised ‘on delay occurring after the filing of the complaint and before the defendant was held to answer the charge in superior court.’ ” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 27 .) “[U]nlike other constitutional rights afforded the accused, deprivation of the right to a speedy trial ‘may work to the accused’s advantage,’ as ‘[d]elay is not an uncommon defense tactic.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s abili

2023Indeed, there are several plausible reasons to conclude otherwise.7 7 In analyzing the issue, we assume just for argument’s sake that defendant is correct in believing that references to his 10 First, the Attorney General correctly highlights case law suggesting a defendant might want the jury to know he or she is incarcerated “in the hope of eliciting sympathy.” (Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at 508 [“it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury”].) Because defendant did not dispute that he possessed and f

2015The defendant’s clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that . . . an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.” (Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501 , 504–505 [ 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 ].) Nevertheless, “instances frequently arise where a defendant prefers to stand trial before his peers in prison garments. . . . [I]t is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury.” (Id. at p. 508.) In People v. Williams (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 146, 151 , the cou

2013Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Because “[t]he speedy-trial right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘slippery,’ and ‘necessarily relative,’ ” the high court in Barker “refused to ‘quantify]’ the right ‘into a specified number of days or months’ or to hinge the right on a defendant’s explicit request for a speedy trial.” (Vermont v. Britton (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 89-90 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 231 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ] (Britton), quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522 .) Rather, to determine whether a speedy trial

2013Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Because “[t]he speedy-trial right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘slippery,’ and ‘necessarily relative,’ ” the high court in Barker “refused to ‘quantify]’ the right ‘into a specified number of days or months’ or to hinge the right on a defendant’s explicit request for a speedy trial.” (Vermont v. Britton (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 89-90 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 231 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ] (Britton), quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522 .) Rather, to determine whether a speedy trial

2013Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Because “[t]he speedy-trial right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘slippery,’ and ‘necessarily relative,’ ” the high court in Barker “refused to ‘quantify]’ the right ‘into a specified number of days or months’ or to hinge the right on a defendant’s explicit request for a speedy trial.” (Vermont v. Britton (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 89-90 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 231 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ] (Britton), quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522 .) Rather, to determine whether a speedy trial

2013Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Because “[t]he speedy-trial right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘slippery,’ and ‘necessarily relative,’ ” the high court in Barker “refused to ‘quantify]’ the right ‘into a specified number of days or months’ or to hinge the right on a defendant’s explicit request for a speedy trial.” (Vermont v. Britton (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 89-90 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 231 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ] (Britton), quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522 .) Rather, to determine whether a speedy trial

2011(Cf. People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 503 [that the prosecutor occasionally disdainfully glared at the defendant did not establish a pattern of egregious conduct that rendered the defendant‟s trial fundamentally unfair].) Nor are we persuaded that the prosecutor committed misconduct under state law.

2011(Cf. People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 503 [that the prosecutor occasionally disdainfully glared at the defendant did not establish a pattern of egregious conduct that rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair].) Nor are we persuaded that the prosecutor committed misconduct under state law.