Carter challenge in District of Columbia

2024In addition, his proffered testimony would have had to satisfy the additional Carter requirement that it be “material,” i.e., that it would “give rise to a reasonable 25 See Carter, 684 A.2d at 345 ; Young, 143 A.3d at 756 . 29 probability of a different outcome.” 26 For essentially the same reasons, this too is highly doubtful.

2016But on the morning of jury selection, counsel for Mr. Young raised a “Carter issue,” indicating that Maurice had been the last one to drive the car and that the drugs belonged to him. 2 See Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331, 344-45 (D.C.1996) (en banc) (outlining process for judicial review of government’s decision not to grant immunity to a “crucial defense witness” who invokes his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).

2015Accord Fla. Bar v. Stein, 916 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla.2005) (concluding that an attorney undertook ethical responsibility for a case pursued by a disbarred attorney authorizing the disbarred attorney to sign the pleading using her name and bar number). *1031 Because respondent entered into an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Carter, he was obliged to exercise all ethical duties arising opt of that relationship.

2008See, e.g., McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 290 (D.C.1997)(‘'the evasive actions of the driver in response to the police, along with his proximity to the gun, was sufficient to prove constructive possession by the driver”); see also Burwell v. United States, 901 A.2d 763, 769 (D.C.2006) (reasoning that the “presence of marijuana on the tip of the automobile's lighter” and other circumstances “reinforce[d] ... the inference [of joint constructive possession] to be drawn from Bur-well's control and operation of the car”); Rivas, 783 A.2d at 135 ("the jury could reasonably infer that Melga

2008See, e.g., McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 290 (D.C.1997)(‘'the evasive actions of the driver in response to the police, along with his proximity to the gun, was sufficient to prove constructive possession by the driver”); see also Burwell v. United States, 901 A.2d 763, 769 (D.C.2006) (reasoning that the “presence of marijuana on the tip of the automobile's lighter” and other circumstances “reinforce[d] ... the inference [of joint constructive possession] to be drawn from Bur-well's control and operation of the car”); Rivas, 783 A.2d at 135 ("the jury could reasonably infer that Melga

2008See, e.g., McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 290 (D.C.1997)(‘'the evasive actions of the driver in response to the police, along with his proximity to the gun, was sufficient to prove constructive possession by the driver”); see also Burwell v. United States, 901 A.2d 763, 769 (D.C.2006) (reasoning that the “presence of marijuana on the tip of the automobile's lighter” and other circumstances “reinforce[d] ... the inference [of joint constructive possession] to be drawn from Bur-well's control and operation of the car”); Rivas, 783 A.2d at 135 ("the jury could reasonably infer that Melga

2008See, e.g., McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 290 (D.C.1997)(‘'the evasive actions of the driver in response to the police, along with his proximity to the gun, was sufficient to prove constructive possession by the driver”); see also Burwell v. United States, 901 A.2d 763, 769 (D.C.2006) (reasoning that the “presence of marijuana on the tip of the automobile's lighter” and other circumstances “reinforce[d] ... the inference [of joint constructive possession] to be drawn from Bur-well's control and operation of the car”); Rivas, 783 A.2d at 135 ("the jury could reasonably infer that Melga

1992Because Carter’s challenge to Officer Nitz’s testimony is made for the first time on appeal, he cannot obtain reversal on this ground unless he demonstrates plain error, Le., error "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc). 11 .

1992Because Carter’s challenge to Officer Nitz’s testimony is made for the first time on appeal, he cannot obtain reversal on this ground unless he demonstrates plain error, Le., error "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc). 11 .