51 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 32 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Waysgreen2 sentences2026The second prong of the Carter test recognizes another important principle in a system of justice: “that judgments must be accorded a degree of finality.” Ibid. 2026The second prong of the Carter test recognizes another important principle in a system of justice: “that judgments must be accorded a degree of finality.” Ibid. | 15 | 26 |
State v. Henriesgreen2 sentences2024Under prong one of the Carter test, "[m]aterial evidence is any evidence that would 'have some bearing on the claims being advanced.'" Ways, 180 N.J. at 188 (quoting State v. Henries, 306 N.J. 2024Under prong one of the Carter test, "[m]aterial evidence is any evidence that would 'have some bearing on the claims being advanced.'" Ways, 180 N.J. at 188 (quoting State v. Henries, 306 N.J. | 13 | 14 |
State v. Nashgreen2 sentences2025In State v. Nash, our Supreme Court remarked, "[a]s is evident, under the Carter analysis, prongs one and three are inextricably intertwined." 212 N.J. 518, 549 (2013). 2025In State v. Nash, our Supreme Court remarked, "[a]s is evident, under the Carter analysis, prongs one and three are inextricably intertwined." 212 N.J. 518, 549 (2013). | 7 | 10 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2026The first prong of the Carter test requires the newly discovered evidence to be material to the issue, not merely cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory. 85 N.J. 300 at 314 . 2026The first prong of the Carter test requires the newly discovered evidence to be material to the issue, not merely cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory. 85 N.J. 300 at 314 . | 6 | 27 |
State v. Behngreen2 sentences2025In this respect, the first and third prongs of the Carter test "are inextricably intertwined." Ibid.; see also State v. Behn, 375 N.J. 2025In this respect, the first and third prongs of the Carter test "are inextricably intertwined." Ibid.; see also State v. Behn, 375 N.J. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Fausto Camacho (072525)green2 sentences2019Accordingly, our Supreme Court "consistently mandated the trial court's use of the Carter instruction when it is requested by a defendant." Id. at 546 . 2019Accordingly, our Supreme Court "consistently mandated the trial court's use of the Carter instruction when it is requested by a defendant." Id. at 546 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2025See Allen, 398 N.J. 2025See Allen, 398 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Oscar Porter (069223)green2 sentences2022R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). 2022R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). | 2 | 2 |
Herrera v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2025"Newly discovered evidence must be reviewed with a certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication, and, if credible and material, is of sufficient weight that it would probably alter the outcome of the verdict in a new trial." Id. at 187-188. "[M]otions based solely upon affidavits are disfavored because the affiants' statements are obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and an opportunity to make credibility determinations." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). 2025"Newly discovered evidence must be reviewed with a certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication, and, if credible and material, is of sufficient weight that it would probably alter the outcome of the verdict in a new trial." Id. at 187-188. "[M]otions based solely upon affidavits are disfavored because the affiants' statements are obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and an opportunity to make credibility determinations." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whitakergreen2 sentences2024See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61 , 67 (2021) ("Although there are three types of accomplice liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1), all three require the accomplice to act or fail to act '[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 6(c)(1))); State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 179 (2016) ("Under accomplice liability, the accomplice is 'guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal.'" (quoting State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009))). 2024See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61 , 67 (2021) ("Although there are three types of accomplice liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1), all three require the accomplice to act or fail to act '[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 6(c)(1))); State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 179 (2016) ("Under accomplice liability, the accomplice is 'guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal.'" (quoting State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McQuaidgreen1 sentence2024See State v.McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997) (precluding PCR review of issues that are identical or substantially equivalent to an issue litigated below on the merits). [Defendant] could have raised the Brady claim in the prior PCR along with its Carter claim but failed to do so. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Raymond Daniels(073504)green2 sentences2024See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61 , 67 (2021) ("Although there are three types of accomplice liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1), all three require the accomplice to act or fail to act '[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 6(c)(1))); State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 179 (2016) ("Under accomplice liability, the accomplice is 'guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal.'" (quoting State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009))). 2024See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61 , 67 (2021) ("Although there are three types of accomplice liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1), all three require the accomplice to act or fail to act '[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 6(c)(1))); State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 179 (2016) ("Under accomplice liability, the accomplice is 'guilty of the same crime committed by the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal.'" (quoting State v. Whitaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2022"Courts generally regard recantation testimony as suspect and untrustworthy [and c]onsequently, the burden of proof rests on those presenting such testimony to establish that is it probably true and the trial testimony probably false." State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427 (1976) (first citing 58 Am. 2022"Courts generally regard recantation testimony as suspect and untrustworthy [and c]onsequently, the burden of proof rests on those presenting such testimony to establish that is it probably true and the trial testimony probably false." State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427 (1976) (first citing 58 Am. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Preciosegreen1 sentence2021Because Alvarado easily met the first two Carter factors, and Torres's statements, interpreted most favorably to Alvarado, see State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992), would make the letter "highly material, particularly with respect to whether Alvarado's conduct on the day of the underlying incident amounted to murder or one of the lesser A-0409-19 8 included offenses charged to the jury, which were aggravated manslaughter an d reckless manslaughter," the very reason the trial judge admitted the evidence Torres offered at trial, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing, "to evaluate fully t | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2020All three prongs of the Carter test must be satisfied before a new trial is warranted, Ways, 180 N.J. at 187 , and defendant bears the burden of establishing each prong, State v. Smith, 29 N.J. 561, 573 (1959). 2020All three prongs of the Carter test must be satisfied before a new trial is warranted, Ways, 180 N.J. at 187 , and defendant bears the burden of establishing each prong, State v. Smith, 29 N.J. 561, 573 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Olivergreen2 sentences2014In reaching its decision, the panel interpreted this Court’s opinion in Oliver, supra. In Oliver, supra, 133 N.J. at 149, 627 A.2d 144 , the Court applied a harmless-error analysis when, contrary to defendant’s request, the trial judge refused to provide the jury with a Carter instruction and told him it was “ ‘too late.’ ” The Court heard the case as an appeal as of right based on a dissent in the Appellate Division decision. 2014In reaching its decision, the panel interpreted this Court’s opinion in Oliver, supra. In Oliver, supra, 133 N.J. at 149, 627 A.2d 144 , the Court applied a harmless-error analysis when, contrary to defendant’s request, the trial judge refused to provide the jury with a Carter instruction and told him it was “ ‘too late.’ ” The Court heard the case as an appeal as of right based on a dissent in the Appellate Division decision. | 1 | 1 |
Ullmann v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014They too readily assume that those who invoke it are ... guilty of dime....” [Ibid, (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 500 , 100 L.Ed. 511, 518 (1956)).] This Court has consistently mandated the trial court’s use of the Carter instruction when it is requested by a defendant. 2014They too readily assume that those who invoke it are ... guilty of dime....” [Ibid, (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 500 , 100 L.Ed. 511, 518 (1956)).] This Court has consistently mandated the trial court’s use of the Carter instruction when it is requested by a defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2014We must now determine whether the trial judge’s inadvertent failure to provide the Carter instruction was harmless. *547 The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967), noted that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” However, the Court also recognized that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to 2014We must now determine whether the trial judge’s inadvertent failure to provide the Carter instruction was harmless. *547 The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967), noted that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” However, the Court also recognized that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fuscogreen2 sentences2014We must now determine whether the trial judge’s inadvertent failure to provide the Carter instruction was harmless. *547 The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967), noted that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” However, the Court also recognized that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to 2014We must now determine whether the trial judge’s inadvertent failure to provide the Carter instruction was harmless. *547 The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967), noted that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” However, the Court also recognized that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carter v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2017A non-testifying criminal defendant is entitled to a no- adverse-inference instruction, also known as a Carter instruction. 4 A-4003-14T4 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S. Ct. 1112 , 67 L. 2017A non-testifying criminal defendant is entitled to a no- adverse-inference instruction, also known as a Carter instruction. 4 A-4003-14T4 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S. Ct. 1112 , 67 L. | 3 | 2014–2019 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2025A-1045-22 16 defendant's guilt would not be considered merely cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory. [Id. at 189.] In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process rights are violated when: "(1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable to the [defendant], either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." Brown, 236 N.J. at 518 . 2025A-1045-22 16 defendant's guilt would not be considered merely cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory. [Id. at 189.] In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process rights are violated when: "(1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable to the [defendant], either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." Brown, 236 N.J. at 518 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2022The Court held the defendant had to satisfy the three- prong Carter test, positing that a new trial is warranted only if the evidence is[:] "(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." [Id. at 99 (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 549 ).] A trial court has discretion to grant post-conviction discovery "when justice so requires." Id. at 97 (quoting Marshall, 148 N.J. at 269 ). "[I]n 2022Ibid. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2019A-6021-17T4 8 Under prong one of the Carter test, a defendant must show the evidence "ha[s] some bearing on the claims being advanced." Id. at 188 (quoting State v. Henries, 306 N.J. 2019A-6021-17T4 8 Under prong one of the Carter test, a defendant must show the evidence "ha[s] some bearing on the claims being advanced." Id. at 188 (quoting State v. Henries, 306 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2014It is a type of error that concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant’s election not to testify on his or her own behalf. *552 Therefore, it is a trial error that has an effect that may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 307-08 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 330 . 2014It is a type of error that concerns the evidentiary value the jury may give to a defendant’s election not to testify on his or her own behalf. *552 Therefore, it is a trial error that has an effect that may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 307-08 , 111 S.Ct. at 1264 , 113 L.Ed.2d at 330 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Daniels
green
2 sentences2014In Daniels, supra, 182 N.J. at 90 , 861 A.2d 808 , the Court held that the “trial court, on request, must instruct the jury that it may draw no negative inferences from [a] defendant’s silence” at trial. 2014In Daniels, supra, 182 N.J. at 90 , 861 A.2d 808 , the Court held that the “trial court, on request, must instruct the jury that it may draw no negative inferences from [a] defendant’s silence” at trial. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.