expanded standard (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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expanded standard in Illinois

7 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2010 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Eugene Robert Wallachgreen
ca2 · 1992 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916 (defendant’s case does not fall under new double jeopardy standard urged by the defendant).

2010See Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916 (defendant's case does not fall under new double jeopardy standard urged by the defendant).

22
People v. Straingreen
ill · 2000 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008"As a result of today's decision, other litigants will now demand that jurors be questioned about an endless list of potential biases and asked to explain their reactions." Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 484 (Heiple, J., dissenting).

2008“As a result of today’s decision, other litigants will now demand that jurors be questioned about an endless list of potential biases and asked to explain their reactions.” Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 484 (Heiple, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, J.).

22
Green v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1957 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

12

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Breit green
nm · 1996
2 sentences

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

22010–2010
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker green
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

1997Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354 , 76 L.

1997Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354 , 76 L.

21997–1997
Rhein v. ADT Automotive, Inc. green
nm · 1996
2 sentences

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

2010The State argued at oral argument that the expanded standard based on the "denial of a fair trial" premised on misconduct being so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial improperly "conflates" interests protected by the due process clause standard and the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. 25 No. 1-09-1001 To explain the interests protected by the double jeopardy clause, "[t]he words of Justice Black are often quoted." Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶9 , 122 N.M. 655 , 930 P.2d 792 . " 'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo- American system of

12010–2010
In Re Marriage of Schaefer green
illappct · 1987
2 sentences

1991The statute has been construed to acknowledge as a basis for name change the expanded standard of clear and convincing evidence necessary to the best interests of the child. ( In re Marriage of Schaefer (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 841 , 113 Ill.Dec. 725 , 515 N.E.2d 710 .) It is clear that use of the term "clear and convincing" imposes upon the petitioner an extraordinary burden under law and that the court must employ the standard imposed upon it by statute.

1991The statute has been construed to acknowledge as a basis for name change the expanded standard of clear and convincing evidence necessary to the best interests of the child. ( In re Marriage of Schaefer (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 841 , 113 Ill.Dec. 725 , 515 N.E.2d 710 .) It is clear that use of the term "clear and convincing" imposes upon the petitioner an extraordinary burden under law and that the court must employ the standard imposed upon it by statute.

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

CA 26 (1967–2026) FL 21 (1979–2014) NY 12 (1936–2023) OH 11 (1993–2025) NJ 10 (2002–2019) KS 9 (1986–2022) TX 9 (1987–2022) NC 8 (1983–2026) MS 8 (1985–2017) CO 7 (1991–2016) IL 7 (1991–2010) WI 7 (1972–2025) MI 6 (1970–2020) MD 6 (1997–2023) PA 6 (1993–2015) WA 5 (1976–2025) CT 5 (1979–2009) NM 5 (1982–2008) DC 5 (1984–2023) IA 5 (1966–2026) MO 4 (1984–2015) NE 3 (1997–2020) LA 3 (1970–2004) TN 3 (1998–2013) ND 3 (2000–2022) IN 3 (1985–2011) AR 2 (2008–2014) NV 2 (1996–2018) MT 2 (1986–1990) MA 2 (1973–1996) AZ 2 (1998–2009) MN 2 (1997–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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