expanded claim (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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expanded claim in Ohio

11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
In re L.S.green
ohioctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Allowing this court to review testimony and video evidence regarding the same event, without comparing them, essentially allows this court to conduct a de novo review of only the evidence we choose to review in direct contrast to Tedford. {¶ 22} The dissent rationalizes this expanded standard because this court is authorized to affirm a trial court’s decision that is “right for the wrong reason,” citing State v. Albright, 2021-Ohio-292 , ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), quoting In re L.S., 2016-Ohio-5582, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.) (additional citations omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Arizona v. Johnson green
scotus · 2009
2 sentences

2025Appellant, however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.” However, in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded inquiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than

2025Appellant, however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.” However, in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded inquiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than

22025–2025
State v. Netter green
ohioctapp · 2024
2 sentences

2025However, appellees argue that this court’s recent decision in State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 (4th Dist.), held that Rodriguez “prohibits seizures that result from inquires unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” Id. at ¶ 22. {¶38} In Netter, during a traffic stop an officer continued to request and enter information from the driver at minute 8:30 of the [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241 .] dash camera video, while another officer approached the vehicle at 10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol.

2025However, appellees argue that this court’s recent decision in State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 (4th Dist.), held that Rodriguez “prohibits seizures that result from inquires unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” Id. at ¶ 22. {¶38} In Netter, during a traffic stop an officer continued to request and enter information from the driver at minute 8:30 of the dash camera video, while another officer approached the vehicle at 10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol.

22025–2025
State ex rel. Firstenergy/Toledo Edison v. Indus. Comm. neutral
ohio · 2001
2 sentences

2016The court also gave the OJI instruction of “substantial risk,” which defines it as a “strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or even a significant possibility that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.” Id. {¶82} Upon review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Joneses’ request for an expanded instruction on recklessness.

2016The court also gave the OJI instruction of “substantial risk,” which defines it as a “strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or even a significant possibility that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.” Id. {¶82} Upon review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Joneses’ request for an expanded instruction on recklessness.

22016–2016
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. green
ohio · 1987
2 sentences

1993Co. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 60 , 30 OBR 165, 507 N.E.2d 331 , adopted the traditional test or the expanded test to determine whether a successor corporation is a mere continuation of a predecessor corporation.

1993Co. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 60 , 30 OBR 165, 507 N.E.2d 331 , adopted the traditional test or the expanded test to determine whether a successor corporation is a mere continuation of a predecessor corporation.

21993–1993
State v. Lansing neutral
ohioctapp · 2025
2 sentences

2025Appellant, however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.” However, in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded inquiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than

2025However, appellees argue that this court’s recent decision in State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 (4th Dist.), held that Rodriguez “prohibits seizures that result from inquires unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” Id. at ¶ 22. {¶38} In Netter, during a traffic stop an officer continued to request and enter information from the driver at minute 8:30 of the [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241 .] dash camera video, while another officer approached the vehicle at 10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol.

12025–2025
State v. Ballein green
ohioctapp · 2025
1 sentence

2025Appellant, however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.” In Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded inquiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful

12025–2025
Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals green
ohio · 1966
2 sentences

2010We hold that the expanded claim of exemption under 5709.121 is barred in this case for the same reasons we set forth in NBC-Five. {¶ 6} NBC-Thirteen also contends that Philada Home Fund v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 135 , 34 O.O.2d 262 , 214 N.E.2d 431 , does not bar a charitable exemption in this case for various reasons.

2010We hold that the expanded claim of exemption under 5709.121 is barred in this case for the same reasons we set forth in NBC-Five. {¶ 6} NBC-Thirteen also contends that Philada Home Fund v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 135 , 34 O.O.2d 262 , 214 N.E.2d 431 , does not bar a charitable exemption in this case for various reasons.

12010–2010
NBC-USA Hous., Inc. — Five v. Levin green
ohio · 2010
2 sentences

2010We addressed substantially the same contentions in NBC-Five, and we find they are equally without merit in the present case. 1 Accordingly, NBC-Thirteen’s claim must fail because of the “consistent and longstanding doctrine that a distinctly residential use of real property defeats a claim of charitable exemption, even where attendant circumstances indicate the existence of charitable motives.” (Emphasis sic.) NBC-Five, 125 Ohio St.3d 394 , 2010-Ohio-1553 , 928 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 9 .

2010We addressed substantially the same contentions in NBC-Five, and we find they are equally without merit in the present case. 1 Accordingly, NBC-Thirteen’s claim must fail because of the “consistent and longstanding doctrine that a distinctly residential use of real property defeats a claim of charitable exemption, even where attendant circumstances indicate the existence of charitable motives.” (Emphasis sic.) NBC-Five, 125 Ohio St.3d 394 , 2010-Ohio-1553 , 928 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 9 .

12010–2010
Norman v. Ohio State University Hospitals green
ohioctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2006Hosp. (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 69, 77 , 686 N.E.2d 1146 , however, the court expanded its analysis to examine the physician’s relationship with the patient in addition to the university’s financial benefit from the medical treatment at issue.

2006Hosp. (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 69, 77 , 686 N.E.2d 1146 , however, the court expanded its analysis to examine the physician’s relationship with the patient in addition to the university’s financial benefit from the medical treatment at issue.

12006–2006
Neal v. McGill Septic Tank Co. neutral
ohioctapp · 1996
1 sentence

2001Neal v. McGill Septic Tank Company (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 272 , 273 .

12001–2001
Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies green
ohio · 1993
1 sentence

1996The Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently released its decision in Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 344 , 617 N.E.2d 1129 .

11996–1996

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.08 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 26 (1967–2026) FL 21 (1979–2014) NY 12 (1936–2023) OH 11 (1993–2025) NJ 10 (2002–2019) KS 9 (1986–2022) TX 9 (1987–2022) NC 8 (1983–2026) MS 8 (1985–2017) CO 7 (1991–2016) IL 7 (1991–2010) WI 7 (1972–2025) MI 6 (1970–2020) MD 6 (1997–2023) PA 6 (1993–2015) WA 5 (1976–2025) CT 5 (1979–2009) NM 5 (1982–2008) DC 5 (1984–2023) IA 5 (1966–2026) MO 4 (1984–2015) NE 3 (1997–2020) LA 3 (1970–2004) TN 3 (1998–2013) ND 3 (2000–2022) IN 3 (1985–2011) AR 2 (2008–2014) NV 2 (1996–2018) MT 2 (1986–1990) MA 2 (1973–1996) AZ 2 (1998–2009) MN 2 (1997–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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