9 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Amanda v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2005Intrinsic fraud is “inherent in the matter considered and determined before the trial court ‘where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were, or could have been litigated therein.’ ” Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313 (emphasis added) (citing Mills v. Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1941, writ ref'd)); see also Amanda v. Montgomery, 877 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (Hedges, J., concurring) (providing an expanded analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). 2005App.–Austin 1941, writ ref’d)); see also Amanda v. Montgomery , 877 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (Hedges, J., concurring) (providing an expanded analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). | 2 | 2 |
Lemos v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000 pet. ref'd) (counsel’s comment “I withdraw my objection to that” waived complaint on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Holley v. Adamsgreen1 sentence2016See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424 , 428–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding parent’s drug and alcohol abuse constituted material change supporting custody change); Duggan v. Duggan, 446 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (noting mother was “running 3 In her appellate brief, Mother asserts “the trial court further abused its discretion when [Mother] was denied an expanded standard possession order and burdened with an injunction prohibiting her to drive without a driver’s license.” Other than this sentence, Mother d | 1 | 1 |
Duggan v. Duggangreen1 sentence2016See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424 , 428–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding parent’s drug and alcohol abuse constituted material change supporting custody change); Duggan v. Duggan, 446 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (noting mother was “running 3 In her appellate brief, Mother asserts “the trial court further abused its discretion when [Mother] was denied an expanded standard possession order and burdened with an injunction prohibiting her to drive without a driver’s license.” Other than this sentence, Mother d | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Kennedygreen1 sentence2005Intrinsic fraud is “inherent in the matter considered and determined before the trial court ‘where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were, or could have been litigated therein.’ ” Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313 (emphasis added) (citing Mills v. Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1941, writ ref'd)); see also Amanda v. Montgomery, 877 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (Hedges, J., concurring) (providing an expanded analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Bairdgreen1 sentence2005Intrinsic fraud is “inherent in the matter considered and determined before the trial court ‘where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were, or could have been litigated therein.’ ” Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313 (emphasis added) (citing Mills v. Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1941, writ ref'd)); see also Amanda v. Montgomery, 877 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (Hedges, J., concurring) (providing an expanded analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society
green
2 sentences1987And finally, in City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 530 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1975), the court expanded the doctrine of purely public charity to reach a situation in which "purely" was no longer a requirement. 1987And finally, in City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 530 S.W.2d 806 (Tax. 1975). the court expanded the doctrine of purely public charicy to reach a situation in which "purely" was no longer a requirement. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Wadewitz v. Montgomery
green
1 sentence2022Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 , 466–67 (Tex. 1997). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence2016Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-29 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re ALE
green
1 sentence2016See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424 , 428–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding parent’s drug and alcohol abuse constituted material change supporting custody change); Duggan v. Duggan, 446 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (noting mother was “running 3 In her appellate brief, Mother asserts “the trial court further abused its discretion when [Mother] was denied an expanded standard possession order and burdened with an injunction prohibiting her to drive without a driver’s license.” Other than this sentence, Mother d | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2016The Court later expanded the exception-to. encompass war-rantless- searches- based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on (1) a statute that was later held unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 343 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), or (2) binding appellate precedent that was later overturned. 2016The Court later expanded the exception-to. encompass war-rantless- searches- based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on (1) a statute that was later held unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 343 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), or (2) binding appellate precedent that was later overturned. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ex Parte Cervantes
green
1 sentence1995Ex parte Cervantes, 762 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.