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21 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Espinosa v. Floridagreen2 sentences2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). 2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). | 1 | 5 |
James v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). | 1 | 1 |
Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Ziebarthgreen1 sentence2001Paul v. Ziebarth, 485 N.W.2d 788, 791 (N.D.1992), to permit state court action where the second petition is "insufficient on its face to raise even a colorable claim of diversity jurisdiction." Thus, even in states propounding the rule of voidness, exceptions have been carved out. *6 In Weatherly v. North American Van Lines, 440 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), we cited with approval to 76 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Hand v. Hustadgreen1 sentence2001Paul v. Ziebarth, 485 N.W.2d 788, 791 (N.D.1992), to permit state court action where the second petition is "insufficient on its face to raise even a colorable claim of diversity jurisdiction." Thus, even in states propounding the rule of voidness, exceptions have been carved out. *6 In Weatherly v. North American Van Lines, 440 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), we cited with approval to 76 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Kearse v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Because the instruction as given was virtually identical to the instruction we upheld in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473, 478 (Fla.1993), we find no error on this point. | 1 | 1 |
Larzelere v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See Larzelere v. State, 676 So.2d 394, 408 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 615 , 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Louisianagreen1 sentence1997See Larzelere v. State, 676 So.2d 394, 408 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 615 , 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th 1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th | 1 | 1 |
Krause v. Whitleygreen1 sentence1995See Jones v. State, 612 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1992) (no requirement that the jury be given instructions on each nonstatutory mitigator that may be considered), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 112 , 126 L.Ed.2d 78 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence1995In Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 88 (Fla. 1994), this Court declared unconstitutionally vague a standard instruction on the cold, calculated, and premeditated factor that told the jury it could consider, if established by the evidence, that "the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without a[ny] pretense of moral or legal justification." In this case, the trial judge gave the following expanded instruction on cold, calculated, and premeditated: The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Jones v. State, 612 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1992) (no requirement that the jury be given instructions on each nonstatutory mitigator that may be considered), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 112 , 126 L.Ed.2d 78 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Statered1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1 |
Klokoc v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kirk
neutral
2 sentences1982No Florida case has ever accepted this expanded exception, although the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Kirk, 362 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), adverted to it without expressing [sic] adopting same. 1979No Florida case has ever accepted this expanded exception, although the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Kirk, 362 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), adverted to it without expressing adopting same. | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Henry v. State
green
1 sentence2014Henry, 613 So.2d at 434 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gore v. State
green
1 sentence2012For example, with regard to the calling of witness Stone, we noted in Gore VI that the decision to do so was “made solely by Nickerson,” and this Court held that Nick-erson had a strategic reason for his actions, despite Udell’s testimony to the contrary that “we all kn[e]w that Mr. Stone was not going to be friendly to David Alan Gore in his testimony.” 964 So.2d at 1269 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Boyd v. State
green
1 sentence1999In regard to his convictions, Appellant argues most strongly the failure of the trial judge to give an expanded instruction based on Boyd v. State, 578 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), of the definition of an "enterprise." The trial judge, failing to find it insufficient, gave the Standard Jury Instruction on racketeering enterprise. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Stringer v. Black
green
2 sentences1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th 1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sochor v. Florida
green
2 sentences1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th 1996As the Supreme Court explained in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 , [538], 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122 , 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), while a jury is likely to disregard an aggravating factor upon which it has been properly instructed but which is unsupported by the evidence, the jury is "unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law." See also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 466, 474 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ("When jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and experience will save them from th | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Henderson v. Singletary
green
1 sentence1994Cf. Henderson v. Singletary, 617 So.2d 313 (Fla.) (claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on appeal even though the defendant had preserved the issue at trial by both objecting to the instruction and requesting an expanded instruction), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1891 , 123 L.Ed.2d 507 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. DiGuilio
green
1 sentence1994State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Fotopoulos v. State
green
1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Nuclear Management & Resources Council, Inc. v. Public Citizen
green
1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates
green
1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hodges v. Florida
green
1 sentence1994However, we believe that in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Espinosa v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), and Hodges v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992), the issue must be considered anew. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moss v. Collins
green
1 sentence1994Cf. Henderson v. Singletary, 617 So.2d 313 (Fla.) (claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on appeal even though the defendant had preserved the issue at trial by both objecting to the instruction and requesting an expanded instruction), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1891 , 123 L.Ed.2d 507 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Henderson v. Singletary
green
1 sentence1994Cf. Henderson v. Singletary, 617 So.2d 313 (Fla.) (claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on appeal even though the defendant had preserved the issue at trial by both objecting to the instruction and requesting an expanded instruction), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1891 , 123 L.Ed.2d 507 (1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Williams v. Collins
green
1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Banks v. Ryan
green
1 sentence1994Although we reject the challenge to the aggravating factor itself, see Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2377 , 124 L.Ed.2d 282 (1993); Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991), we find merit to Jackson's claim that the instruction given in this case on the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) is unconstitutionally vague. *88 The trial court in this case denied defense counsel's request for an expanded instruction on the CCP aggravator, instead instructing Jackson's jury that it could consider, if established | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Calloway v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Fundora green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. City of Winter Park green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Bell v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.