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8 North Carolina opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Trexlergreen2 sentences2012“The expanded rule enunciated in Parker applies in cases in which such independent proof is lacking but where there is substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong corroboration of essential facts contained in defend ant’s confession so as to establish trustworthiness of the confession.” Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532 , 342 S.E.2d at 881 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Parker, 315 N.C. at 237 , 337 S.E.2d at 495-96 (finding substantial corroborating evidence of the defendant’s extrajudicial confession to two murders when the victims’ bodies were found in the same condition described by 2012“The expanded rule enunciated in Parker applies in cases in which such independent proof is lacking but where there is substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong corroboration of essential facts contained in defend ant’s confession so as to establish trustworthiness of the confession.” Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532 , 342 S.E.2d at 881 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Parker, 315 N.C. at 237 , 337 S.E.2d at 495-96 (finding substantial corroborating evidence of the defendant’s extrajudicial confession to two murders when the victims’ bodies were found in the same condition described by | 3 | 3 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences2012“The expanded rule enunciated in Parker applies in cases in which such independent proof is lacking but where there is substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong corroboration of essential facts contained in defend ant’s confession so as to establish trustworthiness of the confession.” Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532 , 342 S.E.2d at 881 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Parker, 315 N.C. at 237 , 337 S.E.2d at 495-96 (finding substantial corroborating evidence of the defendant’s extrajudicial confession to two murders when the victims’ bodies were found in the same condition described by 2012“The expanded rule enunciated in Parker applies in cases in which such independent proof is lacking but where there is substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong corroboration of essential facts contained in defend ant’s confession so as to establish trustworthiness of the confession.” Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532 , 342 S.E.2d at 881 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Parker, 315 N.C. at 237 , 337 S.E.2d at 495-96 (finding substantial corroborating evidence of the defendant’s extrajudicial confession to two murders when the victims’ bodies were found in the same condition described by | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. Norman
neutral
2 sentences1983The policies behind collateral estoppel are: "(1) that each person have his day in court to completely adjudicate the merits of his claim for relief, and (2) that the courts must demand an end to litigation when a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits of his right." 37 N.C.App. at 624 , 247 S.E.2d at 261 . 1983The policies behind collateral estoppel are: "(1) that each person have his day in court to completely adjudicate the merits of his claim for relief, and (2) that the courts must demand an end to litigation when a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits of his right." 37 N.C.App. at 624 , 247 S.E.2d at 261 . | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence2026The majority’s opinions create an expanded exception, subsumes the Constitutional warrant requirement, and allows “the ‘good faith’ exception” to “swallow the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 258, 180 L.Ed.2d at 308 . “[O]ur constitution demands the exclusion of illegally seized evidence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Borders
green
1 sentence2026The courts cannot condone or participate in the protection of those who violate the constitutional rights of others.” State v. Borders, 236 N.C. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004In HAJMM, the Court expanded this exception to cover “the trade, issuance and redemption of corporate securities or similar financial instruments[.]” HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594 , 403 S.E.2d at 493 . 2004In HAJMM, the Court expanded this exception to cover “the trade, issuance and redemption of corporate securities or similar financial instruments[.]” HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594 , 403 S.E.2d at 493 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin
green
1 sentence2004The Court explained-that Chapter 75 applies to “the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs,” while “[t]he issuance of securities is an extraordinary event done for the purpose of raising capital . . . .” Id. 3 This *304 Court has since applied HAJMM to exclude a loan agreement from Chapter 75 coverage: “Because the loan agreement at issue here, which also granted [plaintiff] the right to purchase stock [in a company] in the future, was primarily a capital-raising device, it was not ‘in or affecting commerce’ for purposes of Chapter 75.” Oberlin Capi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
TAR LANDING VILLAS OWNERS'ASS'N v. Atl. Beach
green
1 sentence1997Writing for the Court, Judge Wells stated: While we recognize these exceptions [regarding mutuality and offensive application] and approve of the expanded doctrine as a way to end vexatious litigation, we, nevertheless, find that it would be inequitable to allow petitioners, even those with privity, to assert the doctrine in this case.” Id. at 243, 307 S.E.2d at 185 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.