expanded test in California

2026Clark was convicted of first degree felony murder, and true findings were made on the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance allegations based on his aiding and abetting liability in the shooting. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 608–610.) To decide whether Clark was a major participant in the robbery, the court reviewed the factors discussed in Banks, but did not decide whether Clark was a major participant because it held the evidence was insufficient to show reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at p. 614 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded on

2026Clark was convicted of first degree felony murder, and true findings were made on the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance allegations based on his aiding and abetting liability in the shooting. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 608–610.) To decide whether Clark was a major participant in the robbery, the court reviewed the factors discussed in Banks, but did not decide whether Clark was a major participant because it held the evidence was insufficient to show reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at p. 614 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded on

2025(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1296.) In a case like the present one, however, in which the amendment to the statute is made to clarify existing law, then it is not retrospective because the true meaning of the statute has not changed.3 (Ibid.) 3 In view of the clarification of the inquiry provision in former section 224.2, subdivision (b), we see no need to address the Department's argument that the expanded inquiry provision does not apply in this case because the child was removed from home pursuant to a section 340 warrant. 7 2.

2023A. Legal Background Congress enacted ICWA “‘to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of 9 minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7-8 ; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902 .) Both ICWA and state law define an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an India

2021(Italics added.) Under this approach, “[t]he evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing must be considered in applying the accusatory pleading test when the specific conduct supporting a holding order establishes that the charged offense necessarily encompasses a lesser offense.” (Ibid., italics added.) Applying this expanded test, Cantor contends unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor qualifies as a lesser included offense of the charged aggravated rape offenses because the preliminary hearing transcript “put the parties on notice that [Cantor] was born on October 28, 1984” and thus was at

2021What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 .) In Clark, the court expanded on the factors relevant to establishing reckless indifference.

2015The Court of Appeal’s approach is both impractical and unnecessary. “[W]hen an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we simply consider whether, objectively, “ ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 255 , quoting Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554 and Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 436 .) *978 The People take a different approach to justifying Deputy Geasla

2015The Court of Appeal’s approach is both impractical and unnecessary. “[W]hen an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we simply consider whether, objectively, “ ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 255 , quoting Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554 and Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 436 .) *978 The People take a different approach to justifying Deputy Geasla

2015As we will reverse on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel " 'only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission' " (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 980 ), and defense counsel may have made a reasonable tactical decision to omit CALCRIM No. 522, we conclude that Garcia has failed to establish a ground for reversal.14 14 Because we have rejected each of Garcia's claims of error, we also reject Garcia's argument that any errors were cumulatively prejudicial. 18 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2015The Court of Appeal’s approach is both impractical and unnecessary. “[W]hen an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we simply consider whether, objectively, “ ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 255 , quoting Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554 and Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 436 .) *978 The People take a different approach to justifying Deputy Geasla

2011(See Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 407, 410-411 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 369 P.2d 708 ] (Woolen); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 255 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ] (Van Arsdale).) In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , we changed course and overruled Woolen, supra, 57 Cal.2d 407 , and its progeny.

2011(See Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 407, 410-411 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 369 P.2d 708 ] ( Woolen ); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 255 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 ] ( Van Arsdale ).) In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , we changed course and overruled Woolen, supra, 57 Cal.2d 407 , and its progeny. ( Privette, supra, at p. 702, fn. 4 .) We noted that work-related injuries are compensable under our state's Workers' Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.). ( Privette, supra, at pp. 696-698 .) Moreover, that act affords "`the exclusive remedy . . . for injury or death

2006(See Puerto Rico Telephone v. U.S. Phone Mfg. (1st Cir.2005) 427 F.3d 21, 31 ; Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser (3d Cir.2001) 257 F.3d 287, 293 ; Syncor Intern.

2006Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 ( Volt ), as authority for the proposition that "the `primary purpose' of the FAA is to `ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms' in order to `give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.'" However, numerous federal circuit courts have considered the precise issue whether private parties may contract for an expanded standard of judicial review of arbitral decisions under the FAA.

2006Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 , 103 L.Ed.2d 488 ( Volt ), as authority for the proposition that "the `primary purpose' of the FAA is to `ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms' in order to `give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.'" However, numerous federal circuit courts have considered the precise issue whether private parties may contract for an expanded standard of judicial review of arbitral decisions under the FAA.

2006(See Puerto Rico Telephone v. U.S. Phone Mfg. (1st Cir.2005) 427 F.3d 21, 31 ; Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser (3d Cir.2001) 257 F.3d 287, 293 ; Syncor Intern.

2001(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) The parties in Knight were engaged in a recreational game of football, clearly a physical activity and “sport” within any common understanding of the word. *797 In a companion case to Knight, Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 834 P.2d 724 , 34 A.L.R.5th 769 ] (Ford), the court expanded the rule slightly and applied it to the noncompetitive, nonteam, sporting activity of waterskiing.

2001(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) The parties in Knight were engaged in a recreational game of football, clearly a physical activity and “sport” within any common understanding of the word. *797 In a companion case to Knight, Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 834 P.2d 724 , 34 A.L.R.5th 769 ] (Ford), the court expanded the rule slightly and applied it to the noncompetitive, nonteam, sporting activity of waterskiing.

2001(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) The parties in Knight were engaged in a recreational game of football, clearly a physical activity and “sport” within any common understanding of the word. *797 In a companion case to Knight, Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 834 P.2d 724 , 34 A.L.R.5th 769 ] (Ford), the court expanded the rule slightly and applied it to the noncompetitive, nonteam, sporting activity of waterskiing.

1998(See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.1988) Torts, § 610 et seq., p. 707 et seq.; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed.1997) Pleading, § 660, p. 116.) D In discussing cases from other jurisdictions, the majority allude to "the need to contain burgeoning liability theories in this arena." (Maj.opn., ante, p. 15, fn. 5.) The majority also refer to unspecified "deleterious effects on business if disciplined employees may avoid Foley 's [ Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ] bar by simply alleging malice and suing coemployees for damages on alt

1998(See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.1988) Torts, § 610 et seq., p. 707 et seq.; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed.1997) Pleading, § 660, p. 116.) D In discussing cases from other jurisdictions, the majority allude to "the need to contain burgeoning liability theories in this arena." (Maj.opn., ante, p. 15, fn. 5.) The majority also refer to unspecified "deleterious effects on business if disciplined employees may avoid Foley 's [ Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 ] bar by simply alleging malice and suing coemployees for damages on alt

1998Code, § 3529.) More fundamentally, plaintiffs ignore the purpose of immunity statutes. “[T]he purpose of Vehicle Code section 17004.7 is to provide an avenue for conferring an expanded immunity on the governmental entity employing police officers who are likely to engage in high-speed pursuits and thus free the officers from the fear of exposing the entity to liability when making the determination of whether to engage in such a pursuit or to terminate it once it has begun.” (Kishida v. State of California, *965 supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 329, 338 .) This purpose is in keeping with the general purp

1993It strains credulity to suggest that the Legislature intended that immunity be granted for the act of reporting but not for the rendering of professional services resulting in the identification of a suspected case of child abuse.” (Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1223 .) Expanded immunity was likewise applied to the activities of an independent professional corporation and officer hired by the authorities to investigate whether children had been victims of abuse and to advise the district attorney.