regulation standard in Illinois

2020“More specifically, ‘[w]here a tort claim would interfere with “rail transportation” or “operation” of railroad tracks or facilities, the regulation or claim is expressly preempted.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, ‘where a tort claim is premised upon a railroad’s activities on its property that have only a remote or - 13 - 1-19-0836 incidental connection to “rail transportation” or “operation” of railroad tracks or facilities, but rather are “tortious acts committed by a landowner who happens to be a railroad company,” the claim is not expressly preempted by the [Termination Act.]’ [Citations.

2016Patrick Engineering, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31 .

1975In City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 482 , we recognized that a complaint under section 9(a) could be based either on a violation of an express statutory provision or on a violation of a regulation or standard adopted by the Board. ( 57 Ill.2d 482, 486 .) We further held that there were sufficient standards to describe a violation of the statutory provision by reading section 9(a) in conjunction with sections 3(b), 3(d) and 33(c). 57 Ill.2d 482, 487 .

1975In City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 482 , we recognized that a complaint under section 9(a) could be based either on a violation of an express statutory provision or on a violation of a regulation or standard adopted by the Board. ( 57 Ill.2d 482, 486 .) We further held that there were sufficient standards to describe a violation of the statutory provision by reading section 9(a) in conjunction with sections 3(b), 3(d) and 33(c). 57 Ill.2d 482, 487 .

1975In Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 59 Ill.2d 290 , we expanded upon Monmouth by stating that it is essential to a finding of the second category of air pollution — that is, the unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of life or property — that the Board consider, at least, those four factors set forth in section 33(c). 59 Ill.2d 290, 296 .

1975In Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 59 Ill.2d 290 , we expanded upon Monmouth by stating that it is essential to a finding of the second category of air pollution — that is, the unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of life or property — that the Board consider, at least, those four factors set forth in section 33(c). 59 Ill.2d 290, 296 .

1975It bars one from discharging any contaminant into the environment so as to cause qr tend to cause air pollution # * or so as to violate regulations or standards adopted by the Board # # section clearly contemplates that one may be in violation of the Act either if he causes air pollution or if he violates a regulation or standard. * * *” 60 Ill.2d 330, 335 .

1945Also Armstrong v. City of Chicago, . 328 Ill. 147 .

1945This was followed in People ex rel Leland v. Board of Education, 325 Ill. 320 , and applied to a 'case where the validity of a regulation or rule of the board of education of the city of Chicago was in question.