regulation challenge in California

2023Moreover, it is well-established that procedures governing one specific company’s activity are not rules of general application. ( Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4lh at p. 571 [to be a regulation, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case]; Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal. 2d 317 , 323- 324 [resolution regarding construction of one particular bridge not a regulation because not rule of general application]; Roth v. Department of Veteran Affairs (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 622, 630 [although rule of general application need not pertain uni

2023Moreover, it is well-established that procedures governing one specific company’s activity are not rules of general application. ( Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4lh at p. 571 [to be a regulation, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case]; Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal. 2d 317 , 323- 324 [resolution regarding construction of one particular bridge not a regulation because not rule of general application]; Roth v. Department of Veteran Affairs (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 622, 630 [although rule of general application need not pertain uni

2022(Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 556 ; see Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 571 [“interpretations that arise in the course of case-specific adjudication are not regulations”]; Bendix Forest Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [agency’s order directing an employer to both provide and pay for safety devices for its employees, based on a statute requiring an employer to “provide” safety devices, was “a specific application of laws and existing regulations” and “not a quasi-legi

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2022(Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 556 ; see Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 571 [“interpretations that arise in the course of case-specific adjudication are not regulations”]; Bendix Forest Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [agency’s order directing an employer to both provide and pay for safety devices for its employees, based on a statute requiring an employer to “provide” safety devices, was “a specific application of laws and existing regulations” and “not a quasi-legi

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2023Moreover, it is well-established that procedures governing one specific company’s activity are not rules of general application. ( Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4lh at p. 571 [to be a regulation, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case]; Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal. 2d 317 , 323- 324 [resolution regarding construction of one particular bridge not a regulation because not rule of general application]; Roth v. Department of Veteran Affairs (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 622, 630 [although rule of general application need not pertain uni

2023Moreover, it is well-established that procedures governing one specific company’s activity are not rules of general application. ( Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4lh at p. 571 [to be a regulation, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case]; Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal. 2d 317 , 323- 324 [resolution regarding construction of one particular bridge not a regulation because not rule of general application]; Roth v. Department of Veteran Affairs (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 622, 630 [although rule of general application need not pertain uni

2004Co. v. Commercial Metals Co. (1982) 456 U.S. 336, 344-345 , 102 S.Ct. 1815 , 72 L.Ed.2d 114 [whether a regulation provides a defense in a civil action is determined by an examination of legislative intent and other factors].) No intent to permit private enforcement by affirmative claim or defense (here, a "defense" to a motion) appears in the language or history of the Act, or LSC regulations.

2004Co. v. Commercial Metals Co. (1982) 456 U.S. 336, 344-345 , 102 S.Ct. 1815 , 72 L.Ed.2d 114 [whether a regulation provides a defense in a civil action is determined by an examination of legislative intent and other factors].) No intent to permit private enforcement by affirmative claim or defense (here, a "defense" to a motion) appears in the language or history of the Act, or LSC regulations.

2022(Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 556 ; see Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 571 [“interpretations that arise in the course of case-specific adjudication are not regulations”]; Bendix Forest Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [agency’s order directing an employer to both provide and pay for safety devices for its employees, based on a statute requiring an employer to “provide” safety devices, was “a specific application of laws and existing regulations” and “not a quasi-legi

2015Often in rules and regulations." (OED Online (2015) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/168717> [as of Oct. 19, 2015], at def. 5.) Webster's defines "policy" as "a definite course or method of action selected (as by a government, institution, group, or individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usu[ally] determine present and future decisions." (Webster's, supra, at p. 1754; see also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 485-486 [utilizing dictionary definition of "policy" to interpret section 1101].) OED Online defines a "policy"

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2007(Bendix Forest *59 Products Corp. v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1979) 25 Cal.3d 465, 471 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 882 , 600 P.2d 1339 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment promulgating a new regulation or standard but rather a specific application of laws and existing regulations]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 309-310 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 530 P.2d 161 ] [agency decision was not a quasi-legislative judgment declining to promulgate a new regulation, but rather involved the interpretation and application of an existing regulation]; Taye v.

2004(See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane (2000) 89 Ohio St.3d 62 , 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 [holding that under the Ohio Constitution, "the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest" and finding the regulation at bar not the least restrictive]; State v. Hershberger (Minn.1990) 462 N.W.2d 393 [under the Minnesota Constitution, neutral motor vehicle statute, which burdened Amish re

2004(See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane (2000) 89 Ohio St.3d 62 , 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 [holding that under the Ohio Constitution, "the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest" and finding the regulation at bar not the least restrictive]; State v. Hershberger (Minn.1990) 462 N.W.2d 393 [under the Minnesota Constitution, neutral motor vehicle statute, which burdened Amish re

2004(See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane (2000) 89 Ohio St.3d 62 , 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 [holding that under the Ohio Constitution, "the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest" and finding the regulation at bar not the least restrictive]; State v. Hershberger (Minn.1990) 462 N.W.2d 393 [under the Minnesota Constitution, neutral motor vehicle statute, which burdened Amish re

2004(See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane (2000) 89 Ohio St.3d 62 , 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 [holding that under the Ohio Constitution, "the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest" and finding the regulation at bar not the least restrictive]; State v. Hershberger (Minn.1990) 462 N.W.2d 393 [under the Minnesota Constitution, neutral motor vehicle statute, which burdened Amish re

1996(Id. at pp. 504, 515-516.) The court emphasized that “in a case in which such information is the sole basis for imposing disciplinary sanctions, the regulation requires the hearing officer personally to make a reliability and truthfulness finding, and therefore—as almost every other court recently addressing the issue has held—the disciplinary record must contain information (confidential or otherwise) from which a reviewing court can conclude the hearing officer actually made a reliability and truthfulness determination, and that the determination is supported by evidence. [Citations.]” (Id.

1987(See Kyle, supra, 677 F.2d 1386, 1390-1391 ; see also Nelson v. Commission, supra, 456 N.E.2d 1000 , 1009-1010; Shumway v. Oregon, supra, 657 P.2d 686, 687-688 ; Niday v. State, supra, 252 N.W.2d 92 , 93-94; Homer v. Morris, supra, 684 P.2d 64, 68 ; Dawson v. Smith, supra, 719 F.2d 896, 899 ; Finney v. Mabry, supra, 455 F.Supp. 756, 769 ; cf. Ponte v. Real, supra, 471 U.S. 491, 504-516 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 553, 564-571 , 105 S.Ct. 2192, 2200-2205 ] (Marshall, J., dis.).) The judgment of the superior court is reversed.

1987(See Kyle, supra, 677 F.2d 1386, 1390-1391 ; see also Nelson v. Commission, supra, 456 N.E.2d 1000 , 1009-1010; Shumway v. Oregon, supra, 657 P.2d 686, 687-688 ; Niday v. State, supra, 252 N.W.2d 92 , 93-94; Homer v. Morris, supra, 684 P.2d 64, 68 ; Dawson v. Smith, supra, 719 F.2d 896, 899 ; Finney v. Mabry, supra, 455 F.Supp. 756, 769 ; cf. Ponte v. Real, supra, 471 U.S. 491, 504-516 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 553, 564-571 , 105 S.Ct. 2192, 2200-2205 ] (Marshall, J., dis.).) The judgment of the superior court is reversed.