regulation rule in New York

2022If a regulation or rule applied to the facts of the case, the regulation or rule could be presented to the jury as some evidence of negligence to be taken “into consideration with all the other evidence bearing on that subject” (Conte, 10 NY2d at 29 ).

2011This conclusion is consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of North v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y. ( 8 NY3d 745 [2007]), which held that “SORA is not a penal statute and the regulation requirement is not a criminal sentence” (id. at 752).

2011Defendant raises several constitutional challenges to Correction Law § 168-a (2) (d) (ii), which subjects a sex offender to registration requirements if he or she was convicted of “a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred.” To the extent defendant is claiming it is unconstitutional to require him to register in New York at all, his arguments in that regard are not properly before this Court, because “a person seeking review of the Board’s determination that he or she is obligated to

2006Consequently, FRA believes that the placing of a running board on each side of the roof for the entire length of the roof meets as nearly as possible the requirement of Section 231.1(c)(3) based on the design of the car involved.” Although letter rulings such as the one at bar are not entitled to deference as defined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ( 467 US 837 [1984]) and are not conclusive as to an interpretation of a regulation or standard which binds a court’s process, they are persuasive (see Christensen v Harris County, 529 US 576, 587 [2000]; Skidmore v

2000There is a question of fact as to whether the defendants violated this regulation and whether the violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see, Lisi v MRP Holdings, 238 AD2d 316, 317 ; Silva v Micelli, 178 AD2d 521 ; Stoop v Kurtz, 121 AD2d 529 ).

2000There is a question of fact as to whether the defendants violated this regulation and whether the violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see, Lisi v MRP Holdings, 238 AD2d 316, 317 ; Silva v Micelli, 178 AD2d 521 ; Stoop v Kurtz, 121 AD2d 529 ).

2000There is a question of fact as to whether the defendants violated this regulation and whether the violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see, Lisi v MRP Holdings, 238 AD2d 316, 317 ; Silva v Micelli, 178 AD2d 521 ; Stoop v Kurtz, 121 AD2d 529 ).

1991What is meant by the regulatory prescription that a landlord establish "that he requires the entire structure * * * for his own immediate use in connection with a business” (emphasis added) is sufficiently vague to allow administrative interpretation and, as Supreme Court appropriately observed: "The interpretation and construction placed upon a statute and implementing regulations by the agency responsible for administering them is entitled to great weight ([Matter of] Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 ).” Respondent has not argued, as it might have, that residen tial use of business premises

1991It is abundantly clear that the language employed in this regulation is subject to more than one interpretation and that the meaning ascribed to it by respondent does not involve "engrafting to the regulation a requirement of 'business necessity’ ”, to use Supreme Court’s words (see, in this regard, Thorgeirsdottir v New York City Loft Bd., 161 AD2d 337 , affd 77 NY2d 951 ).

1991It is abundantly clear that the language employed in this regulation is subject to more than one interpretation and that the meaning ascribed to it by respondent does not involve "engrafting to the regulation a requirement of 'business necessity’ ”, to use Supreme Court’s words (see, in this regard, Thorgeirsdottir v New York City Loft Bd., 161 AD2d 337 , affd 77 NY2d 951 ).

1985The regulation under challenge (9 NYCRR 415.2) provides as follows: "No person shall, except under or by virtue of a special permit or license issued by the commissioner, bring into any park or have in his possession in any park any beer or other alcoholic beverage, other than those purchased at a controlled sale at a park refreshment stand, except that beer, wine, and other alcoholic beverages for temperate and personal use of patrons 19 years of age or older shall be permitted in camping areas of Wildwood State Park, Hither Hills State Park and Heckscher State Park.” The defendant contends t

1981Initially, the Appellate Division has recently held that the Commissioner of Education may not adopt an across-the-board directive applicable in all instances to all applicants without formally adopting a regulation or rule to that effect (Matter of Organization to Assure Servs. for Exceptional Students v Ambach, 82 AD2d 993 ).

1980Thus, an interpretation of a regulation or standard by an administrative body charged with its application is not reviewable unless "so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary” (Matter of Marburg v Cole, 286 NY 202, 212 ; see Matter of Pollak v Conway, 276 App Div 435 , 437; People ex rel.

1980New York & Queens Gas Co. v McCall, 219 NY 84, 89 , supra), or if it lacks any rational basis whatsoever (see Liebman v New York City Housing Auth., 91 Misc 2d 854, 855 ).

1980New York & Queens Gas Co. v McCall, 219 NY 84, 89 , supra), or if it lacks any rational basis whatsoever (see Liebman v New York City Housing Auth., 91 Misc 2d 854, 855 ).

1978"While as a general proposition legislative actions are not reviewable by article 78 proceedings * * * there still remains a residuum of judicial right to determine if there has been action in excess of delegated authority or in disregard of standards prescribed by the Legislature.” Matter of Town of Arietta v State Bd. of Equalization ( 37 AD2d 431 , revd for other reasons 30 NY2d 771 .) "Similarly, the power to disqualify an owner who can’t prove to the satisfaction of the stewards that neither he nor his horse is 'disqualified’ from racing is void as an unconstitutional delegation of the li

1978"While as a general proposition legislative actions are not reviewable by article 78 proceedings * * * there still remains a residuum of judicial right to determine if there has been action in excess of delegated authority or in disregard of standards prescribed by the Legislature.” Matter of Town of Arietta v State Bd. of Equalization ( 37 AD2d 431 , revd for other reasons 30 NY2d 771 .) "Similarly, the power to disqualify an owner who can’t prove to the satisfaction of the stewards that neither he nor his horse is 'disqualified’ from racing is void as an unconstitutional delegation of the li

1978"While as a general proposition legislative actions are not reviewable by article 78 proceedings * * * there still remains a residuum of judicial right to determine if there has been action in excess of delegated authority or in disregard of standards prescribed by the Legislature.” Matter of Town of Arietta v State Bd. of Equalization ( 37 AD2d 431 , revd for other reasons 30 NY2d 771 .) "Similarly, the power to disqualify an owner who can’t prove to the satisfaction of the stewards that neither he nor his horse is 'disqualified’ from racing is void as an unconstitutional delegation of the li

1977On appeal by respondents (the State and local commissioners of social services) from an order of the Appellate Division affirming the denial of their motion to dismiss the petition we assume, as we must, the truth of the factual allegations set forth in petitioners’ pleading (cf. Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 ).

1959Conditions of like character were sustained as a proper regulation under rule 17 (Matter of Brenner v. O’Connell, 308 N. Y. 636 ).

1941(Matter of Lyons v. Prince, 281 N. Y. 557 ; Matter of Small v. Moss, 279 id. 288.) This it would have been attempting to exercise had it endeavored through a regulation or rule to gain the power to compel the making of a lease on grounds other than those specified.

1930The principle of Weld v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. ( 199 N. Y. 88, 98 ) seems to support the proposition that the regulation at bar in so far as it does not seek immunity from gross negligence or willful misconduct, is reasonable.