investigation claim in Texas

1988Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged.” In Stringer, supra, the per curiam opinion referred to Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1986), reaffirming that the Court had held the investigation privilege embodied in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d) was still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977).

1988Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged." In Stringer, supra, the per curiam opinion referred to Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1986), reaffirming that the Court had held the investigation privilege embodied in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d) was still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977).

1970Courts should encourage and not discourage the prompt payment of compensation when an injury is sustained by an employee, and a holding that payments made pending the final investigation of the claim would be binding upon *564 the insurer both as to liability and rate of compensation regardless of what that investigation should disclose would manifestly discourage prompt payments following injuries.” 158 S.W.2d at 995 .

1959We think Judge Hickman has held contrary to appellee's contention in Southern Underwriters v. Schoolcraft, Tex.Com.App., 138 Tex. 323 , 158 S.W.2d 991, 995 , when he said: "Courts should encourage and not discourage the prompt payment of compensation when an injury is sustained by an employee, and a holding that payments made pending the final investigation of the claim would be binding upon the insurer both as to liability and rate of compensation regardless of what that investigation should disclose would manifestly discourage prompt payments following injuries." Appellee's motion for rehear

1988Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged.” In Stringer, supra, the per curiam opinion referred to Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1986), reaffirming that the Court had held the investigation privilege embodied in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d) was still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977).

1988Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged." In Stringer, supra, the per curiam opinion referred to Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1986), reaffirming that the Court had held the investigation privilege embodied in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d) was still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977).

1988We quote from Stringer : "In Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 ([Tex.] 1986), we held the investigation privilege embodied in TEX.

1988Only information obtained by a party after there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit is privileged." In Stringer, supra, the per curiam opinion referred to Robinson v. Harkins & Company, 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1986), reaffirming that the Court had held the investigation privilege embodied in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(d) was still governed by the rule established in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977).

2014Therefore, in light of McGinty v. Hennen, 372 S.W.3d 625 (Tex.2012) (per curiam), I would hold Boutin’s testimony is no evidence of the additional damages AMJ sought.

2014Therefore, in light of McGinty v. Hennen, 372 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam), I would hold Boutin’s testimony is no evidence of the additional damages AMJ sought.

2007Co. , 32 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000), aff'd , 81 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. 2002) (determining that Legislature "sought to encourage a carrier uncertain of the compensability of an injury to pay the benefits pending a full investigation of the claim").

2007Co., 32 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000), affd, 81 S.W.3d 803 (Tex.2002) (determining that Legislature “sought to encourage a carrier uncertain of the compensability of an injury to pay the benefits pending a full investigation of the claim”).

2022While the Family Members attempted to rebut these affidavits and raise a fact issue on each of the three actual-notice elements, they failed to provide any evidence of element two: the Governmental Entities’ notice of their alleged fault.16 See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28.

2019Id. at 481 .

2018Randall’s Food Mkts., 891 S.W.2d at 646 .

2017Co. v. Martinez, 216 S.W.3d 799 , 803-804 & nn.14- 20 (Tex.2007); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas.

2015The charge instructed the jury that actual cash value was “[t]he difference, if any, between the value at the time of the loss for damage and the $3,700.00 deductible and applicable depreciation under the policy.” See State Farm Fire & Cas, Co. v. Griffin, 888 S.W.2d 150 , 157 n. 9 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (construing contract provision stating that ‘“Actual Cash Value’ means the replacement cost of an insured item of property at the time of loss, less the value of physical depreciation as to the item damaged”).

2015Thus, the jury reasonably could have inferred that West Point’s policy was not a “proven, effective mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment.” See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 .

2015Thus, the jury reasonably could have inferred that West Point’s policy was not a “proven, effective mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment.” See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 , 118 S.Ct. 2275 .

2013Id.

2013In Abbott v. Texas State Board of Pharmacy , No. 03-11 00481-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2012 WL 5974080 (Tex. App.--Austin Nov. 21, 2012, no pet.), we held that occupations code sections 159.004 and 159.005 do not provide a patient a "special right of access" to his medical records that trumps the Board's right to withhold the contents of its investigation file.

2010Id. (citing C.M., 884 S.W.2d at 563 ). -6- 04-09-00360-CR A juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer a child to a criminal court if: (1) the child is alleged to have committed a felony; (2) the child was fifteen years of age or older at the time the offense occurred, and the offense allegedly committed is a second or third degree felony, or a state jail felony;2 (3) no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning the alleged offense; and (4) after a full investigation and a hearing the juvenile court determines there is probable cause to believe the child committe

2010Id. (citing C.M., 884 S.W.2d at 563 ). -6- 04-09-00360-CR A juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer a child to a criminal court if: (1) the child is alleged to have committed a felony; (2) the child was fifteen years of age or older at the time the offense occurred, and the offense allegedly committed is a second or third degree felony, or a state jail felony;2 (3) no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning the alleged offense; and (4) after a full investigation and a hearing the juvenile court determines there is probable cause to believe the child committe